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Abstract 
Who gets what, when and how? Each of the three papers in this thesis 
makes a distinct contribution to answering this question in the context of 
the political economy of South Africa. The first paper examines how 
South Africa’s public financial management system distributes central 
government funds to its provinces. Using a unique panel dataset 
comprising all provinces and three elections over the period 1995-2010, I 
demonstrate that provinces where the national ruling party has higher 
vote margins receive higher per capita equitable shares in pre-election 
years. This result suggests that even in a dominant party framework, 
electoral competition can function as an incentive to implement political 
budget cycles. The second paper evaluates how the extension of the 
franchise affected the delivery of electricity to South African households. 
The dataset combines nightlight satellite imagery, census data and 
municipal election results, making it possible to exploit the heterogeneity 
in the share of newly enfranchised voters across nearly 800 municipalities 
with a difference-in-differences approach. The analysis demonstrates that 
enfranchisement has a significant positive effect on household 
electrification. Moreover, the findings show that political parties have a 
potential mediating role in accounting for service delivery patterns in 
new democracies. The third paper addresses the problem of 
measurement in studying public service delivery by examining a novel 
methodology for combining census-based data with satellite imagery of 
the world at night. Using cross-national data and South African census 
data, the paper provides a roadmap for how to navigate limitations and 
thus make the most of this technological advance in quantitative social 
science research. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction  
 
Who gets what, when and how? This is one of the most basic questions in 
political economy. It also sets the scene for this thesis, which focuses on 
how government affects the distribution of financial resources and 
services. I build on the proposition that different types of government 
generate different policy outcomes by empirically examining the 
distribution of public goods and services as a country transitions to 
democracy. It is the fuzzy path along the spectrum from autocracy to 
democracy that lies at the heart of my thesis. When it comes to the 
distribution of public goods, the poles of the spectrum seem more clear-
cut: there is a strong consensus that democracy is the type of government 
that is best at satisfying the needs of the people. In Sen’s (1999: 16) words, 
“no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a 
functioning democracy.” Indeed, there is a large literature that suggests 
democratic governments are better at providing public goods and 
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services than autocratic regimes (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2000a, 
Lake and Baum 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Stasavage 2005, 
Blaydes and Kayser 2011, Kudamatsu 2012).  
 
However, this literature raises important questions that are fundamental 
to my thesis: what exactly is it about democratization that leads to 
redistribution? Is the implementation of universal suffrage the key 
mechanism driving the change? What roles do political competition and 
the institutional environment play in determining the redistribution of 
public resources? With the following three chapters, I aim to make a 
small contribution to answering specific aspects of these big questions. 
Each chapter presents separate tests of related propositions about 
elections, public finance and service delivery and was authored as 
independent, self-sufficient pieces of research with separate conclusions 
and implications. To offer a preview, this introduction presents a brief 
discussion of the core themes that unite the three chapters.  
 
1.1 Investigating the role of political competition as 
an incentive to redistribute public resources 
The aforementioned political economy literature posits that governments 
subject to electoral competition have an incentive to redistribute public 
goods and services in order to satisfy their electorate. The underlying 
assumption is that politicians in democracies are motivated by the desire 
to retain public office (Golden and Min 2013: 77). Empirically, this idea 
should be particularly noticeable when regimes transition from autocracy 
to democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b: 684) argue that the 
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process of democratization changes the identity of the median voter, 
thereby making a credible commitment to future redistribution. There is 
an extensive literature that supports this observation, suggesting shifts in 
the median voter due to the extension of the franchise improve 
redistribution towards the poor (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981, Husted 
and Kenny 1997, Boix 2003) and benefit the newly enfranchised (Miller 
2008, Fujiwara 2013, Vernby 2013).  
 
My thesis builds on this literature by examining the effect of 
democratization on the provision of basic public services. In line with the 
recent political economy literature, I emphasize the incentives of political 
parties “who may be opportunistic and implement policies so as to 
maximise their chances of re-election, or be partisan and so want to 
further the interests of their own support groups” (Arulampalam et al. 
2009: 103). Indeed, when it comes to the provision of public goods and 
services, central governments cannot be expected “to behave as a 
benevolent social planner would do” (Brollo and Nannicini 2012: 742). 
The role of political competition and particularly political alignment of 
lower tiers of government therefore lie at the heart of my investigation.  
 
In this context, I focus on the strategic role of political competition with 
respect to redistribution, as “an election that is expected to be ‘closer’ 
increases the value and thus the desirability of any action that increases 
the incumbent’s re-election prospects” (Alt and Rose 2007: 12). Such 
actions may include periodic fluctuations in fiscal policy variables in the 
vicinity of elections, which the literature refers to as political budget 
cycles (PBCs). There are two main theories that explain why political 
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budget cycles arise: partisan and opportunistic theories. Partisan theory, 
starting with Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987), states that PBCs are 
predetermined by the ideology of the incumbent government. However, 
this explanation is unlikely to be useful for studying PBCs in developing 
countries, where political parties generally do not exhibit the typical 
Western left-right pattern (Block 2002b: 209, Shi and Svensson 2003: 68). 
Since South Africa provides the testing ground for my investigation, I 
focus on the opportunistic theory pioneered by Nordhaus (1975)1 and 
later developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990). The main 
proposition that I test is that incumbents signal their competence to the 
electorate and maximise their chance for re-election through the 
manipulation of fiscal variables. Political competition functions as the key 
incentive for such manipulations and it is in this context that I carry out 
empirical tests to determine how electoral competition affects the 
distribution of public resources.  
 
1.2 Emphasizing the institutional environment as a 
determinant of available policy options 
Drawing on Tufte’s (1978) motive, opportunity and weapon analogy Alt 
and Rose (2005) argue that incumbents must not only have an incentive to 
manipulate policy, but also the ability to do so. While political 
competition may function as an incentive to redistribute public resources, 
the institutional environment determines the policy options available to 
                                                 
1  The subject of Nordhaus’ theory is the political business cycles, which refers to 
electorally timed distortions in macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and 
unemployment. This is different from PBCs, which refer to periodic fluctuations in fiscal 
policy variables (i.e. variables affecting the budget).  
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the incumbent. That explains why Alt and Rose’s (2007) theory of context-
conditional budget cycles is based on two conditions: incentive and ability. 
The first condition relates to the incentivising role of political competition 
as discussed above. The second condition relates to the institutional 
environment. If the institutional environment makes it difficult to 
manipulate policy instruments, politicians are less able to resort to 
electioneering. In many countries, independent central banks have almost 
entirely eliminated the possibility for politicians to influence monetary 
policy for electoral purposes. Alt and Rose (2007: 6) cite this as one of the 
reasons why the literature has shifted its focus from outcomes, such as 
unemployment and inflation, to policy instruments, such as spending. 
While incumbent politicians tend to have more control over fiscal policy 
than over monetary policy, the institutional environment often limits 
political discretion over spending, for example through fiscal rules or 
budget transparency initiatives. However, it is difficult to fully shelter the 
distribution of public resources from political distortions, as “incumbent 
politicians have a lot of discretion in using them to tease swing voters, 
reward core supporters, or build alliances with other politicians” (Brollo 
and Nannicini 2012: 742). 
 
Given the importance of the institutional environment in curtailing 
political discretion, it is not surprising that the magnitude of political 
budget cycles has been found to be far greater in developing countries 
(Shi and Svensson 2002) and new democracies (Brender and Drazen 2005). 
Striking examples include the 400 per cent increase in money supply by 
Zambian President Kaunda prior to the 1991 election, or the confiscation 
and redistribution of foreign currency bank accounts of Zimbabwean 
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President Mugabe prior to the 2008 election (Chauvet and Collier 2009: 
514). These albeit extreme examples emphasize the importance of a 
country’s institutional environment: it is easier to implement political 
budget cycles undetected in countries where institutions are fragile and 
impose few checks and balances on executive authority, and most media 
outlets are state-owned. While South Africa’s constitutional oversight is 
stronger and the media landscape more vibrant than in most other Sub-
Saharan African countries, such factors are a main motivation for why 
my thesis examines political budget cycles in the South African context.   
 
1.3 Explaining distributive patterns of public 
service delivery 
The distributive politics literature offers useful insights into the spatial 
distribution of public resources. This literature explains how policies that 
involve taxes and transfers, and in particular the decision about 
allocations of government goods and services are distributed to 
identifiable localities or groups (Golden and Min 2013: 74). There are two 
dominant models, which make predictions regarding the incentives for 
resource allocation across different regions based on their level of 
competitiveness. On the one hand, Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) core 
supporter model predicts that incumbent governments allocate more 
resources to their political support groups in order to maximize the 
return of votes. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa one may view this as a 
form of patronage i.e., when an incumbent selectively distributes 
“favours and material benefits to loyal followers” (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997: 62). The basic idea is thus to reward loyalty and punish 
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disloyalty, an incentive that is independent of electoral competition. This 
model provides a possible explanation for why incumbents may choose 
to manipulate the distribution of resources even if they do not face 
electoral competition.  
 
Empirical evidence is mixed. Some endorse the core supporter model, 
e.g., Larcinese, Snyder and Testa (2013) use exit polls to measure voter 
preferences in the United States (US) over the period 1978-2002 and find 
that politicians favour areas that contain a large percentage of their core 
supporters. They find no association between the amount of federal 
funds and the degree of partisan balance in a state. Miguel and Zaidi 
(2003) use a regression discontinuity design to show that in Ghana, 
education expenditure per student was 27 per cent higher in districts in 
which the ruling party had an overwhelming majority of votes when 
compared to other districts in 1989. Similarly, Case (2001) finds that the 
size of the block grants in Albanian districts depends on the district's 
political leanings and increases with the president’s vote share in the 
previous election. 
 
On the other hand, Lindbeck and Weibull (1993), and Dixit and 
Londregan (1996, 1998), argue that rational incumbents target swing 
regions in which they have a higher chance of impacting vote choices. 
Empirical evidence in support of this model includes Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2002) who find that a Swedish municipal grant programme 
has been used to distribute transfers to regions where there are many 
swing voters. Moreover, Kwon (2005: 324) finds that national subsidies in 
South Korea were allocated to swing provinces in which electoral 
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contests were competitive, while no such allocations were made to non-
competitive provinces. In an investigation of intergovernmental transfers 
in Ghana, Banful (2010) shows that certain grants were higher in districts 
where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower, also 
suggesting that swing districts were targeted.  
 
It is in this context that my thesis differentiates between core and swing 
provinces to investigate the theory of context-conditional political budget 
cycles. My thesis also highlights the essential complementarity of 
distributive politics and median voter accounts in order to interpret 
spatial patterns of service delivery following a democratic transition.  
 
1.4 Using South Africa as a testing ground for the 
politics of service delivery 
My thesis focuses on the politics of service delivery following the historic 
1994 South African election. Under apartheid, black South Africans were 
not represented in Parliament, but through separate Black Local 
Authorities. Indian and coloured population groups had limited 
representation in the Tricameral Parliament, but the system lacked 
legitimacy. Effectively, the election in 1994 thus increased the electorate 
by over 500 per cent, enabling all South Africans aged 18 or above to 
participate in a credible, democratic election for the first time. South 
Africa thus represents a case of contemporary democratization on a 
unique scale. This is a key advantage over comparable studies, such as 
Larcinese (2014) who analyses the effect of Italy’s franchise extension in 
1912 to 5 million voters or Berlinski and Dewan (2011) who examine the 
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effect of 1 million newly registered voters following the United 
Kingdom’s Second Reform Act in 1867. The modern-day South African 
setting with 19 million enfranchised voters makes for an ideal testing 
ground. 
 
At the same time, South Africa is a country that is highly heterogeneous 
on the subnational level, which lends itself well for empirical analyses: 
while South Africa has a dominant party system, subnational units vary 
greatly in terms of electoral competition faced by the ruling party, the 
number of newly enfranchised voters, as well as the extent of backlog in 
the provision of basic public services. In the following chapters, I exploit 
the observed spatial and temporal heterogeneity of different outcomes in 
South Africa’s subnational units.  
 
Another advantage of the South African setting is that the three-tiered 
system with national, provincial and local levels of government offers the 
possibility to compare across subnational units. The availability of high 
quality data reduces the risk of measurement error, particularly compared 
to other developing countries: with a high level of fiscal transparency, 
even in comparison to most developed countries, South Africa’s Treasury 
makes extensive subnational budget information publicly available on an 
annual basis. 2  In addition to this, South Africa has carried out three 
censuses in the past two decades, in 1996, 2001, and 2011. Since even most 
industrialised countries only carry out one census per decade, the 
frequency of the data, coupled with its high quality, present a strong 
                                                 
2 South Africa ranks second out of 100 countries in the Open Budget Index 2012, which 
measures budget transparency and accountability (Open Budget Index 2012). 
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comparative advantage for studying elections, public finance, and service 
delivery in South Africa. 
 
While the South African context offers many advantages, it also poses 
particular challenges to disentangling the effect of democratization on 
public service delivery. Indeed, South Africa’s “negotiated revolution” 
went far beyond the implementation of universal suffrage (Sparks 1995), 
which increases the risk of compound treatment effects. Indeed, the 
release of political prisoners and liberalization of previously banned 
political organizations in 1990 paved the way for major transformations, 
including the implementation of two democratic constitutions, the 
creation of new national, provincial and local spheres of government, the 
complete overhaul of fiscal structures and new assignment of functions 
and resources to the different spheres (Wehner 2000: 47-48). Disentangling 
the effect of franchise extension from the other transformations that took 
place at the same time is therefore a major challenge in the South African 
setting. A cleaner identification of the effect of enfranchisement is possible 
in the cases of the United Kingdom in 1867 (Berlinski and Dewan 2011) or 
Italy in 1912 (Larcinese 2014) where the extension of voting rights to 
unskilled population groups was the only major change during the 
periods under review. In order to take a step towards addressing this 
compound treatment problem, chapter 3 disentangles the effect of 
franchise extension from political representation. However, this does not 
fully eliminate the possibility of a compounding effect of the other 
transformations associated with the date of South Africa’s first democratic 
election, as further discussed in chapter 3.   
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1.5 Highlighting the importance of measurement 
and good data 
In order to empirically determine the effect of democracy on 
redistribution, the quantification of both measures is an important pre-
condition, which I argue should not be underestimated. Most existing 
papers use standard indices of democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). 
The use of such indices in particular, and generally the reliance on data 
based on multiple national sources with different data collection 
methodologies, gives rise to concerns about measurement error. Put 
simply, bad data produce bad results. Good quantitative research 
requires good data. Subnational level analyses reduce concerns of 
comparability across units, but that in itself does not guarantee data 
quality, particularly in Africa (Jerven 2013). That is why technological 
advances in the areas of geographic information systems and remote 
sensing are powerful tools for quantitative social science research. 
Nighttime light satellite imagery has the potential to address the growing 
need for high-resolution data. However, there are important risks 
associated with any application of these data to a given context. The 
objective of the third paper in this thesis is to enhance the usefulness of 
nighttime light satellite imagery to measure socioeconomic outcomes for 
social science research.  
 
Nonetheless, studying outcomes that are related to government decision-
making is a challenging endeavour, particularly cross-nationally (Golden 
and Min 2013: 84). Since subnational units tend to be uniform in terms of 
electoral rules and scope for distributive policy making, this level of 
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analysis naturally offers a higher degree of comparability than cross-
national studies. Cross-national studies face the difficulty of having to 
control for different institutional regimes, however, any such attempt is 
necessarily imperfect (Kneebone and McKenzie 2006: 755). This greatly 
increases the risk of omitted variable bias, reverse causality, and sample 
selection bias, making it very difficult to convincingly establish causality 
in such studies. My thesis contributes to the still limited inventory of sub-
national analyses of distributive outcomes: the next chapter uses South 
African provinces as the unit of analysis, the third chapter analyses 
municipalities, and the fourth demonstrates how to examine local 
socioeconomic outcomes at a resolution as fine grained as one square 
kilometre. My thesis makes a methodological contribution to the growing 
body of literature using nighttime lights, by highlighting potential Type I 
and Type II errors and thus showing how to enhance the social science 
toolkit with this new data source.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: each of the three 
following chapters includes one paper, authored as a self-contained piece 
of research. Each addresses one aspect of the political economy in South 
Africa as introduced above. In the final chapter, I discuss the substantive 
and methodological contributions of the three papers, address their 
external validity, and highlight future areas of research. 
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Chapter II 
 
Political budget cycles and  
intergovernmental transfers in a dominant 
party framework: empirical evidence from 
South Africa 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter tests the theory of context-conditional political budget cycles 
in South Africa’s dominant party framework, and demonstrates that the 
central government distributes intergovernmental transfers according to 
electoral motivation. Using a unique panel dataset comprising South 
Africa’s nine provinces over the period 1995-2010, I find that provinces 
where the national ruling party faces less electoral competition receive a 
higher per capita equitable share in pre-election years. Political influence 
on the intergovernmental transfer system is possible despite the fact that 
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the equitable share is based on a formula. However, the impact of vote 
margin on the equitable share in pre-election years decreases over time in 
line with existing accounts of political budget cycles in new democracies. 
Overall, the results suggest that even in a dominant party framework, 
electoral competition can trigger the political targeting of 
intergovernmental transfers in the vicinity of elections. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The popular perception that incumbent politicians manipulate fiscal 
policies to increase their chances of re-election is given formal expression 
through political budget cycle theory. Building on the pioneering work of 
Nordhaus (1975), the literature explains the phenomenon in terms of a 
moral hazard model and asymmetric information. Incumbent politicians 
are predicted to take advantage of informational asymmetries to signal 
their competence towards the electorate, for example, by demonstrating 
their ability to produce public goods without raising taxes (Shi and 
Svensson 2002: 70). The result of this behaviour is a “periodic fluctuation 
in a government’s fiscal policies induced by the cycle of elections” (Alt 
and Rose 2007: 1), which is the generally accepted definition of PBCs.  
 
In the past, most empirical studies have tested PBC theory in the context 
of developed countries and have provided evidence on how the 
magnitude and composition of cycles varies with respect to different fiscal 
variables.3 More recent work has started to analyse PBCs in developing 
countries and generally finds that cycles there are more pronounced than 
                                                 
3 See Drazen (2000) or Franzese (2002) for a comprehensive review of the empirical 
literature.  
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in developed countries (Brender and Drazen 2005, Block et al. 2003, Shi 
and Svensson 2002, Schuknecht 2000). However, most of these studies use 
country-level panels, which means that they cannot provide insight into 
the mechanisms through which PBCs are implemented at the subnational 
level. While some papers have carried out subnational analyses, they have 
generally focused on traditional PBC variables, such as revenue and tax, 
but not intergovernmental transfers.4 These are likely to be important 
channels for PBCs in countries where the subnational level of government 
has limited revenue-generating power. Moreover, while an emphasis has 
been placed on studying PBCs in new democracies, the literature has not 
explicitly applied PBC theory to the context of a dominant party 
framework. Hence there is little understanding about a dominant 
incumbent’s motivation to use fiscal policy to win votes in such a context.  
 
Motivated by this gap in the literature, this chapter examines the presence 
of opportunistic PBCs in South Africa’s intergovernmental transfer system. 
South Africa is an ideal case to consider as the federal structure offers the 
possibility to compare across provinces. Moreover, even though South 
Africa has a dominant party system, the provinces vary greatly in terms of 
electoral success. In other words, the main party, the African National 
Congress (ANC), does not win everywhere all the time, although it 
controls the national level. This variation in subnational electoral 
competition can be exploited to identify its effect on intergovernmental 
                                                 
4 Among others, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) carry out a subnational analysis on 
Russian regions. Moreover, Cerda and Vergara (2007) analyse Chilean municipalities, 
Gonzales (2002) focuses on Mexican regions, and Khemani (2004) on Indian Provinces. 
To date, no subnational PBC studies have been carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
which lack of quality data seems to be an obvious explanation. 
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transfers. While provinces are responsible for independently 
implementing their own budgets, they are almost entirely financed by the 
central government. Indeed, the provinces’ own receipts are typically less 
than 5 per cent. It is thus intuitive to analyse whether the dominant party 
can use the centralized intergovernmental transfer system to distribute 
funds according to political motivations.  
 
This chapter finds that provinces where the ANC has a higher vote 
margin receive a higher equitable share through the provincial 
intergovernmental transfer system. This increase is possible despite the 
presence of a formula-based mechanism, as the ANC controls two 
important levers: formula revisions and data updates. Overall, the 
findings suggest that electoral competition on the subnational level is a 
salient feature when it comes to distributing national funds through South 
Africa’s intergovernmental transfer system.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
provides a distributive politics perspective on political budget cycle 
theory and its empirical predictions. Section 2.3 assesses the role of 
incentive and ability to manipulate fiscal variables in the South African 
context. This is followed by a description of the empirical strategy and 
presentation of the estimation results in sections 2.4. and 2.5 respectively. 
In section 2.6 I further discuss the results, particularly regarding the 
evolution of the vote margin effect over time. Finally, the conclusion 
summarises the results and discusses policy implications.   
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2.2 A distributive politics perspective on political 
budget cycles 
 Originally, most empirical studies on PBCs focused on developed 
countries, which is the context in which PBC theory was conceived (Block 
2002a: 2). An increasing number of empirical studies now concentrates on 
developing countries. Empirical evidence often confirms the presence of 
opportunistic PBCs, although a publication bias against null results may 
distort the real picture. Schuknecht (2000) conducts a study of 24 
developing countries for the 1973-1992 period and finds evidence for 
PBCs, particularly in the form of public investment. In a study of sub-
Saharan Africa, Block et al. (2003) discover significant election-year 
increases in public expenditure and net claims on the government. Shi 
and Svensson (2002) find that in a panel of selected developing countries, 
government spending increases and revenues fall before elections, leading 
to larger deficits in election years. Crucially, the latter study also finds that 
the magnitude of PBCs is far greater in developing countries than it is in 
developed ones. Other scholars have extended this finding to argue that 
in comparison to developed countries, PBCs are not only more 
pronounced in developing countries, but also in new democracies (see 
Brender and Drazen 2005, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004). 
 
Evidently, opportunistic PBC theory does not apply equally under all 
circumstances. If the extent of informational asymmetry is a function of 
political institutions and voter characteristics, then the possibility to 
implement PBCs is also a function of these factors. Alt and Rose (2007) 
use this logic to argue that PBCs are context-conditional. In particular, 
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they employ Tufte’s (1978) motive, opportunity and weapon analogy to 
argue that two conditions must hold: incumbents must have both an 
incentive and the ability to manipulate policy.   
 
The first condition relates to the question of why an incumbent would 
choose to manipulate public finances. In the political budget cycle 
literature, the competitiveness of an election has often been used as an 
explanation. Indeed, Alt and Rose (2007: 12) trace the idea back to Wright 
(1974) and Tufte (1978) and explain how competitiveness functions as a 
strategic variable, as “an election that is expected to be ‘closer’ increases 
the value and thus the desirability of any action that increases the 
incumbent’s re-election prospects”. But exactly what type of action 
maximises the incumbent’s re-election prospects? The distributive 
politics literature provides two models that make predictions regarding 
the incentives for resource allocation across different regions based on 
their level of competitiveness. Neither one focuses on the timing of fiscal 
distortions in the way that PBC theory does, but both add a perspective 
on distribution.  
 
Lindbeck and Weilbull’s (1993) and Dixit and Londregan’s (1996, 1998) 
swing voter model predicts that parties strategically allocate public 
resources to swing voters to maximise their chances for re-election. This 
makes sense as “voters who are predisposed in favour of [a party] on 
partisan or programmatic grounds cannot credibly threaten to punish 
their favoured party if it withholds rewards” (Stokes 2005: 317). On the 
other hand, Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) core supporter model suggests 
that incumbent governments allocate more resources to political support 
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groups in order to maximize the return of votes and reward loyalty. 
Stokes (2005) and Golden and Min (2013) provide insightful reviews of 
the core versus swing voter debate, which I omit here to focus on their 
empirical implications.  
 
As indicated in the introduction, empirical evidence on distributive 
politics has been mixed.5 If there is one theme, then it is that patterns of 
distribution and favouritism vary across countries and outcomes 
(Kramon and Posner 2013: 467). Nonetheless, the empirical predictions of 
the two distributive politics models add an interesting nuance to political 
budget cycle theory: periodic fluctuations in fiscal policy variables in the 
vicinity of elections may be conditional on the level of electoral 
competition in a given region. This paper builds on the existing literature 
by empirically examining this question in the context of South Africa’s 
intergovernmental transfer system.  
 
Alt and Rose’s second condition, the ability to manipulate policy, relates 
to the institutional environment. If the institutional environment makes it 
difficult to manipulate policy instruments, politicians are less able to 
resort to electioneering. While politicians tend to have more control over 
fiscal policy than over monetary policy, the institutional environment 
often limits political discretion over spending, for example through fiscal 
rules or budget transparency initiatives.  
 
                                                 
5 See Golden and Min (2013) and Kramon and Posner (2013) for a review of the existing 
empirical literature on distributive politics.  
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Such factors may constrain an incumbent’s ability to implement electoral 
fiscal effects. In a sample of 19 OECD countries in the 1990s, Alt and 
Lassen (2005) find that higher transparency countries have lower deficits 
and debt accumulation, while lower transparency countries display a 
persistent pattern of electoral cycles. In this vein, Rose (2006) shows that 
fiscal rules can mitigate PBCs by limiting the incumbent’s ability to 
increase spending in the vicinity of an election. Benito et al. (2013) show 
how the balanced budget rule has succeeded in limiting the budget 
deficit in a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities in 1994-2009. 
Khemani (2007) analyses fiscal transfers to Indian states in 1972-1995 and 
finds electoral fiscal effects only in states where transfers are determined 
by the central political executive rather than by an independent agency.  
 
To constrain political manipulations of fiscal policy, many countries (e.g., 
Austria, Brazil, Japan, Ghana and South Africa) have implemented 
intergovernmental transfer formulae based on objective and quantifiable 
criteria. While such attempts are not likely to be equally effective, 
empirical evaluations are scarce. Banful (2011) is an exception and in her 
study on Ghana’s intergovernmental transfer system she finds that the 
formula-based mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated 
targeting of groups. Instead, Banful (2011: 289) finds that districts with 
more swing voters have systematically benefitted from changes to the 
formula. Her finding that the mere presence of a formula-based 
mechanism cannot be assumed to fully remove political influence over 
the distribution of funds, motivates this paper.   
 
 30 
Regardless of the policy instrument, we may expect political budget 
cycles to weaken over time as young democracies gain experience with 
the electoral cycle and develop their institutions and checks and balances. 
Indeed, Brender and Drazen (2005: 10) demonstrate that cycles become 
less strong in new democracies as voters grow suspect of fiscal 
manipulations in the vicinity of elections and punish rather than reward 
such activities at the polls. Their point is not that the voting population in 
new democracies is naïve, but rather that in “countries with less of an 
electoral history, and hence less exposure to pre-electoral fiscal 
manipulations, a political cycle is more likely to occur” (Brender and 
Drazen 2005: 18).  
 
The empirical analysis in this paper builds on the existing literature, by 
determining whether South Africa’s intergovernmental transfer system, 
which has both a formula-based and non-formula-based component, is 
subject to fiscal manipulations and if so, whether such manipulations 
display distributive patterns and whether this effect changes over time. 
 
2.3 Incentive and ability in the South African 
context  
There are four main reasons why South Africa is a useful case to consider 
for this analysis. First, its federal structure offers the possibility to make 
comparisons across provinces. A main problem with country level panels 
is the inherent difficulty to control for cross-country differences, such as 
the rule of law or certain institutions that could be endogenous to fiscal 
policy. An examination of fiscal variables in the South African provinces 
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avoids many of these problems, as the provinces are characterized by high 
uniformity in electoral rules, institutional framework, and governance 
structures in general. Second, although South Africa’s political landscape 
is dominated by one party on the national level, the subnational level 
displays high variation in the level of electoral competition, whereby at 
least two of nine provinces may be considered swing provinces. This 
variation makes it possible to identify the effect of electoral competition 
on the political budget cycle. Third, provincial revenues derive almost 
entirely from central government transfers, which implies that 
investigating intergovernmental transfers to the provinces means 
investigating the only possible source of PBCs on the subnational level. 
This circumstance renders the South African setting particularly relevant 
for the study of PBCs and intergovernmental grants. Finally, South Africa 
has the highest level of fiscal transparency among Sub-Saharan African 
countries. This is a significant advantage because extensive subnational 
budget information is publicly available, which renders this chapter’s 
methodology feasible. Based on the discussion on PBC theory and 
distributive politics, two questions arise with respect to the South African 
context: does the South African government have an incentive to instigate 
political budget cycles? And if so, does it have the ability to implement 
them?  
 
Incentives.   With respect to the first question it seems unlikely that the 
ANC would have an incentive to implement PBCs on the national level, 
where it hardly faces any electoral competition. Winning 63, 66, and 70 
per cent in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 elections respectively, the ANC has 
held a large and increasing majority (Independent Electoral Commission 
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2012). On the subnational level, South Africa’s electoral system, which is 
based on proportional representation with minimum thresholds, has 
given parties other than the ANC chances of controlling provincial 
governments, such as the National Party (NP), the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP), and more recently the Democratic Alliance (DA). Table 1 illustrates 
the variation of provincial electoral outcomes, by presenting the share of 
votes achieved by the first and second party in each province in the 1994, 
1999, 2004, and 2009 elections. While the ANC won Limpopo province 
with as much as 92.7 per cent of votes in the 1994 election, it came second 
in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and the Western Cape with merely 31.6 and 
33.6 per cent respectively.  
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Table 1: Electoral outcomes in South African provinces, 1994, 1999, 2004 
and 2009 
Province 
 
1994 1999 2004 2009 
 
 
 
Party Vote 
share* 
Party Vote 
share* 
Party Vote 
share* 
Party Vote 
share* 
Eastern Cape ANC 
NP 
84.4 
10.6 
ANC 
NNP 
73.9 
12.9 
ANC 
UDM 
79.3 
8.9 
ANC 
COPE 
68.8 
13.7 
Free State ANC 
NP 
77.7 
14.5 
ANC 
DP 
81.0 
5.9 
ANC 
DA 
82.1 
8.9 
ANC 
COPE 
71.1 
11.6 
Gauteng ANC 
NP 
59.1 
27.6 
ANC 
DP 
68.2 
17.7 
ANC 
DA 
68.7 
20.3 
ANC 
DA 
64.0 
21.9 
KwaZulu-Natal IFP 
ANC 
48.6 
31.6 
IFP 
ANC 
40.5 
39.8 
ANC 
IFP 
47.5 
34.9 
ANC 
IFP 
63.0 
22.4 
Limpopo ANC 
NP 
92.7 
3.6 
ANC 
UDM 
89.3 
2.6 
ANC 
DA 
89.7 
3.8 
ANC 
COPE 
84.9 
7.5 
Mpumalanga ANC 
NP 
81.9 
10.3 
ANC 
DA 
85.3 
5.0 
ANC 
DA 
86.3 
7.2 
ANC 
DA 
85.6 
7.5 
Northern Cape ANC 
NP 
49.8 
41.9 
ANC 
NNP 
64.4 
22.5 
ANC 
DA 
68.8 
11.6 
ANC 
COPE 
60.8 
16.7 
North West ANC 
NP 
83.5 
10.1 
ANC 
UCDP 
80.5 
7.5 
ANC 
UCDP 
81.8 
6.5 
ANC 
COPE 
72.9 
8.3 
Western Cape NP 
ANC 
56.2 
33.6 
ANC 
NNP 
42.6 
34.4 
ANC 
DA 
46.3 
26.9 
DA 
ANC 
51.5 
31.6 
Note: ANC = African National Congress; COPE = Congress of the People; DA = 
Democratic Alliance; DP = Democratic Party; IFP = Inkatha Freedom Party; NP = 
National Party; UDM = United Democratic Movement; UNCDP = United Christian 
Democratic Party. Source: Independent Electoral Commission 2012; * denotes per cent as 
unit of measurement.  
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The closeness of the political race on the provincial level may serve as an 
incentive to implement PBCs.6 From the point of view of the ANC, the 
main strategic question is whether to target provinces where it has a high 
vote margin or where it faces strong political opposition, or both. On the 
one hand, it would make sense to spend more money where it could 
potentially make a difference in the year before an election, for example 
in KZN or the Western Cape, but not in a province like Limpopo where 
the ANC can expect a vote share in excess of 90 per cent. On the other 
hand, this rationale is contingent on the assumption that voters attribute 
increases in spending to the ANC, rather than the provincial government. 
If the two are not the same, as has been the case in swing provinces such 
as the Western Cape or KwaZulu-Natal, this assumption seems 
unrealistic. Voters may attribute an increase in spending or the provision 
of certain public goods to the competence or bargaining success of the 
provincial government, which is de facto responsible for service provision.  
 
Similarly to Brollo and Nannicini’s (2012: 746) model of the politics of 
federal transfers in Brazil, shared responsibilities between central and 
provincial governments in South Africa mean that there are “political 
credit spillovers”. I only expect the ANC to implement PBCs where it can 
claim political credit. This argument strengthens the core supporter 
prediction, as claiming credit is straightforward in the ANC’s core 
provinces, where revenue and spending powers are aligned within the 
                                                 
6 The ethnic census argument, which suggests that the variation in political competition 
mirrors ethnic patterns, could be interpreted as a disincentive. However, while ethnic 
voting patterns can explain some of the variation in South African political competition, 
Mattes (1995) shows that the nature of elections and political preferences are much more 
than a racial census. Therefore there is scope for vote-purchasing behaviour. 
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same party. In this context, Stokes (2005: 316) emphasizes that the crucial 
feature of the core supporter model is that the party is more certain about 
how core groups will respond to rewards than it is about other groups, 
making the targeting of swing voters less likely. Given the South African 
context, the empirical analysis in this chapter is guided by the core 
support model’s prediction about the distribution effect of the political 
budget cycle: in the year before an election, I expect higher vote margins 
in a province to be associated with higher intergovernmental transfers. 
The model also evaluates the alternative outcomes, i.e. whether the 
opposite relationship can be observed or whether vote margins do not 
have a conditioning effect on intergovernmental transfers. These 
expectations are fully aligned with the theoretical models developed in 
Brollo and Nannicini’s (2012) assessment of centre-municipality transfers 
in Brazil and Arulampalam et al.’s (2009) analysis of centre-state transfers 
in India. 
 
Ability.   Even if we assume the ANC has an incentive to implement PBCs 
through the intergovernmental transfer system, would the party be able 
to do so given the policy instruments available? In order to answer this 
question, it is important to understand South Africa’s budgeting system, 
which changed substantially during the overhaul of government 
structures after the end of apartheid. Constitutional arrangements made 
the nine newly created provinces responsible for independently drafting 
and implementing their own budgets (SA Treasury 2000: 21). However, 
Wehner (2000: 71) shows that despite these decentralization efforts the 
system has operated in a highly centralised manner in practice. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the provinces’ own revenues have constituted less 
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than 5 per cent of total provincial revenues between 1995 and 2010, which 
means that provinces rely almost entirely on transfers from the national 
government to fund their activities.  
 
The ability to implement political budget cycles on the provincial level is 
thus contingent on the ability to manipulate the transfer from the 
national government, which is made up of two components: an equitable 
share and conditional grants. With a range of between 80 per cent and 90 
per cent of the total transfer between 1995 and 2010, the equitable share is 
the largest component of the total transfer. The main idea behind it is that 
“each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable 
share of revenue collected nationally so as to ensure that provinces and 
local governments are able to provide basic services and execute the 
functions allocated to them” (SA Treasury 1999: 22). Unlike the equitable 
share, the second component of the total transfer to provinces, the 
conditional grant, is not determined by a formula. By definition, it 
provides for national priorities in provincial budgets (SA Treasury 1999: 
15) and “is voted in the budget of a national department and reflected as 
a revenue item in provincial accounts” (SA Treasury 1999: 38). Wehner 
(2000) provides a detailed account of how the two components are 
integrated into South Africa’s budget cycle.  
 
The decision making process around the conditional grant has often been 
criticized for lack of transparency and the former Head of 
Intergovernmental Relations in the National Treasury has argued that 
many conditional grants “lack a clear purpose and measurable objective, 
and are poorly designed” (Momoniat 1999: 12). While these features may 
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make it easier to manipulate conditional grants, the small share of the 
total transfer render it an unlikely target for the implementation of 
electorally motivated fiscal distortions. In 1995, 1 per cent of the equitable 
share was equivalent to 17 per cent of the conditional grant. Hence, a 
small distortion of the equitable share offers a larger effect in monetary 
terms compared to a similar distortion of the conditional grant in 
percentage terms. In this sense, politically motivated distortions of the 
equitable share generate higher impact at a lower risk of getting caught. 
But how would the ANC be able to get its hands on the lever of the 
equitable share? The equitable share is not only determined by a formula, 
but the division of national revenues is also overseen by an independent 
body, the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC).7 I argue that neither is 
sufficient in safeguarding the equitable share from political influence.  
 
Since its implementation in 1997, the formula has had a number of 
components: an education share, a health share, a basic share, a backlog 
component, an economic output share and an institutional component.8 
Definitions of the individual components are provided in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Prior to the formula, the allocations to provinces have been 
described as a system where “all arrangements were subject to arbitrary 
political intervention” (Simkins in van Zyl 2003: 9). The formula was 
intended to curtail such interventions by largely deriving the distribution                     
                                                 
7
 The FFC was established with section 220 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa as an independent, impartial body subject only to the Constitution and the law 
(SA Constitution 1996).  
8
 Two main components have historically been (and continue to be) education and 
health, having made up over half of the total annual transfer since 1995. Between 1997 
and 2005 the formula also had a social welfare component, but this was removed in 2006 
when responsibility for social security grants shifted from the provincial to the national 
sphere of government (SA Treasury, 2006: 49). 
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Figure 1: Breakdown of total provincial revenues into own receipts, 
conditional grants and equitable share, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from SA Treasury 1999-2011. 
 
Figure 2: South African provinces and their average share of the total 
population, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with population data and shape file from Statistics South 
Africa 2011 Community Profiles and GIS database.  
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across provinces based on the provincial share of the total population. To 
illustrate, Figure 2 maps each of the nine South African provinces, such 
that darker shades indicate higher shares of total population and thus 
higher shares of total intergovernmental transfers. 
 
Under the formula, there are two main discretionary elements available 
for manipulation: data revisions and formula revisions. Regarding the 
data, the equitable share formula is subject to change every year as 
information is reviewed or improved, which is particularly challenging 
given the “number of informal settlements and high levels of illiteracy 
and poverty” (Momoniat 1999: 7). One possibility for political 
intervention would be to strategically delay information updates to the 
formula. For the 1998 budget, for example, the figures used to determine 
the equitable share were based on the ‘October Household Survey 1995’, 
rather than on the preliminary results from the 1996 census. In retrospect, 
this decision had important consequences: provinces such as Gauteng 
and the Western Cape were two main destinations of migratory 
movements, which meant that their true population counts were greatly 
underestimated and budget allocations based on the 1995 figures put 
them at a distinct disadvantage (van Zyl 2003: 11).  
 
Regarding revisions to the formula, one main problem is that the FFC 
lacks teeth and the Department of Finance has often ignored its 
recommendations (Wehner 2000: 69). The decision not to follow or delay 
the FFC’s recommendations is another lever for political control over the 
equitable share. For the budget year prior to the 1999 election, the FFC’s 
recommendations for the horizontal division of revenue between 
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provinces were set aside and replaced by the national Department of 
Finance’s formula (Folscher et al. 1999: 31). Instead of implementing the 
FFC’s formula in the pre-election year 1998, the Department of Finance 
promised that the issues raised by the FFC “will be addresses in the 
budget process for 1999/2000” (SA Treasury 1998: E10). The decision not 
to follow the FFC’s recommendation to increase the subnational 
percentage of shared revenues reinforced the government’s bias towards 
the centralized control of provincial revenue streams. 
 
That revisions to an intergovernmental formula can be used to achieve 
political targeting of certain regions is not an anomaly: Banful (2011) 
finds empirical evidence of politically motivated revisions in Ghana’s 
District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) formula. The empirical 
strategy tests whether such manipulations occur in the South African 
case.  
 
2.4 Empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis is based on a unique panel data set, consisting of 
annual observations of South Africa’s nine provinces for the period 1995 - 
2010.9 The data on the fiscal variables to be tested for PBCs has been 
provided by the South African Treasury and are based on the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Reviews (1999 – 2011). The fiscal variables 
include all provincial revenue variables, in terms of the actual allocations 
of total transfers, equitable shares, and conditional grants. The dataset 
therefore captures all of the provinces’ annual receipts from national 
                                                 
9 The time period has been determined by the availability of data; 1995 being the earliest 
and 2010 being the most recent year for which data were available at the time of writing. 
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government. This is a considerable advantage over other empirical studies 
(e.g., Banful 2011), which are selectively based on one type of transfer to 
subnational governments.    
 
The time span of the data set includes three elections in 1999, 2004 and 
2009. As is the case in most empirical studies of PBCs, the timing of these 
elections is taken to be exogenous to fiscal policies.10 In the case of South 
Africa, this is an appropriate assumption as the timing of these elections 
was fixed by constitutionally predetermined five-year intervals. The 
elections were not strategically delayed or advanced, and it would have 
been extremely difficult to do so. The national and provincial government 
fiscal year starts on 1 April and ends on 31 March the following year.11 
The elections took place during the first quarters of the fiscal year, on 2 
June 1999, 14 April 2004 and 22 April 2009. This means that the fiscal year 
before the election is most relevant when it comes to the implementation 
of PBCs. In order to estimate the effect of these elections on the fiscal 
variables, the dummy pre-election takes the value one in the year before an 
election (i.e. in 1998, 2003 and 2008) and zero otherwise. While this 
variable changes over time, it is constant across provinces as elections are 
held at the same time in all provinces.  
                                                 
10 Shi and Svensson (2002), among others, relax this assumption with respect to countries 
in which the timing of elections is set strategically, for example at the time of an 
economic boom. However, they do not find a significant effect on their results when 
they exclude the countries in which they classify elections to have been endogenous (Shi 
and Svensson, 2002: 10). Khemani (2004) applies an instrumental variable to distinguish 
early and scheduled elections.  
11 The first quarter starts on 01 April and ends 30 June; the second quarter starts 01 July 
and ends 30 September; the third quarter starts on 01 October and ends on 31 December; 
the fourth quarter starts on 01 January and ends on 31 March. 
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Most empirical applications use voting data in order to measure regional 
electoral competition. Schultz (1995) uses opinion polls and Alt and Rose 
(2007) use governors’ job approval ratings. The most common measure in 
subnational analyses is the vote margin of the incumbent government in 
the previous election (see Cingermayer and Wood 1995, Case 2001, 
Dahlberg and Johansson 2002, and Banful 2011). In line with this 
literature, I define the variable vote margin (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009) as the 
difference between the share of votes won by the first party and the 
second party in the previous provincial election. This quantitative 
measure of electoral competition changes over time and across provinces: 
Based on the election outcomes reported in Table 1, the vote margin 
between the ANC and the NP in the 1994 election is 63.2 per cent in the 
Free State, while it is 31.5 per cent in Gauteng. This indicates that the Free 
State is less competitive than Gauteng. Anecdotal evidence regarding the 
competitiveness of the provinces is in line with the ranking of provinces 
by this measure. In terms of interpretation, a higher vote margin 
percentage indicates less political competition and vice versa. 
 
However, the main criticism of using this measure is that voting 
behaviour is endogenous to the policy variables of interest. Larcinese et al. 
(2006) address this issue by using exit polls to measure voter preferences 
and partisanship. While this may be a more appropriate measure, such 
data are not available for South African provinces. I therefore define an 
alternative measure of electoral competition in order to maximise the 
plausibility of exogeneity: vote margin (1994) captures electoral 
competition based on 1994 election results, rather than the results of 
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elections during the sample period. While it changes across provinces, it 
remains constant over time as I use 1994 vote margins for all time periods. 
The 1994 election represented the transition from apartheid to democracy 
and extended the franchise to approximately 20 million South Africans 
who had never voted before. It is highly unlikely that vote margins in this 
first democratic election were endogenous to provincial spending after 
the end of apartheid. Fixing the competition variable to vote margins 
from the 1994 election therefore greatly helps to reduce the risk of 
endogeneity. However, the downside of this measure is that it gets less 
precise over time. Indeed, the ANC results in 2009 do not bear a close 
resemblance to those in 1994 in all provinces. For this reason, I use both 
vote margin measures in the empirical analysis.  
 
To provide an overview of key variables, Table 2 presents definitions and 
descriptive statistics. Table A2 in the Appendix provides further 
information on the characteristics, construction and sources of these 
variables.  
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Table 2: Definition and descriptive statistics for key variables 
Variables Definition N Mean 
Stand. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Total 
transfer 
Total transfer from 
national government to 
provinces per capita, 
1995-2010. 
144 2,084.97 425.84 1,296.10 3,515.43 
Equitable 
share 
Equitable share per 
capita, 1995-2010.  
144 1,823.78 346.97 1,066.37 2,699.46 
Conditional 
grant 
Conditional grants per 
capita, 1995-2010.  
144 263.08 149.14 66.14 815.97 
Vote margin 
(1994, 1999, 
2004, 2009) 
Vote margin is the 
absolute difference 
between the share of 
votes of the 1st and 2nd 
party in the previous 
provincial election. 
144 53.89 26.72 0.70 89.10 
Vote margin 
(1994) 
Vote margin is the 
absolute difference 
between the share of 
votes of the 1st and 2nd 
party in the 1994 
provincial elections. 
144 50.01 28.46 7.90 89.10 
Pre-election 
Election dummy equal 
to 1 one year before an 
election and 0 
otherwise. 
144 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Provincial 
GDP  
Provincial GDP per 
capita, 1995-2010. 
144 2.62E+04 1.27E+04 1.91E+03 5.86E+04 
Population < 
14 
Number of people aged 
under 14 years by 
province, 1995-2010. 
144 1.44E+06 9.16E+05 1.68E+05 3.70E+06 
Population > 
60 
Number of people aged 
above 60 years by 
province, 1995-2010. 
144 3.56E+05 1.94E+05 6.09E+04 8.22E+05 
Note: All fiscal variables are measured in inflation adjusted ZAR per capita.  
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The aim of the identification strategy is to test the validity of the empirical 
predictions formulated above, i.e. whether the ANC implements PBCs 
conditional on vote margin, using the equitable share. For a given fiscal 
variable per capita12 (fiscal) the baseline specification takes the following 
form:  
 
log(fiscalit)  = α+ β1  vote marginit + β2 (vote marginit × pre-electiont ) + γZit         
+ σi +τt + uit                    (1) 
 
In this specification, fiscal is the dependent variable, which corresponds to 
each of the three fiscal variables to be tested for evidence of PBCs. 
Subscript i indexes the nine provinces (i = 1,2,3…9) and t indexes the 
years (1995, 1996…2010). The variable vote margini measures electoral 
competition as discussed in the previous section. The variable pre-election 
is a dummy equal to one in the year before an election and zero otherwise. 
Zit is a vector of control variables, GDP per capita and demographic 
variables, σi represents province fixed effects and τt represents year fixed 
effects. Finally, uit is the error term, which is estimated using 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.13 
 
                                                 
12 Since provinces differ largely in terms of population, and since spending and revenue 
are highly correlated with population, per capita measures are used to make 
comparisons across provinces. 
13 As fiscal variables for each province are likely correlated over time, it is generally 
advisable to use clustered standard errors. However, with only nine possible clusters, 
robust standard errors are used instead, following Nichols and Schaffer (2007: 7) who 
argue that with a number of clusters less than 50, it is generally argued that “the cure 
would be worse than the disease”. 
 46 
The rationale behind equation (1) is that the dependent variable in each 
specification can be tested for evidence of fiscal manipulations in pre-
election years, following the standard specifications in the PBC literature 
(see for example Faal 2007).14 The coefficient on vote margini, β1, shows 
the direct effect of vote margin on the dependent variable. The coefficient 
on the interaction term between pre-electiont and vote margini, β2, is used 
to test whether the electoral cycle depends on electoral competition; it is 
thus the key coefficient of interest. As per the empirical predictions 
formulated above, β2 is expected to be positive and significant with 
respect to the equitable share.  
 
Province fixed effects, σi, control for time-invariant omitted variables and 
absorb much of the effect of any slowly changing variables such as the 
level of development or the ratio of the economically active population in 
a province. These variables are important determinants of how much 
funding a province receives, while at the same time also determining 
electoral competition. For example, low levels of education in a province 
require higher educational spending, while also being associated with a 
higher share of votes for the ANC in the 1994 election (Johnson, 1996: 126). 
Year fixed effects, τt, control for aggregate shocks and the national 
business cycle effect, which have been found to exacerbate the electoral 
cycle in a given year, thus leading to an overestimation of PBCs (Kwon, 
2005: 331). Since pre-electiont only varies across time but not across 
provinces, it is absorbed by the year fixed effects estimator, τt. 
                                                 
14 In the literature, lagged dependent variables are often used to control for fiscal inertia. 
However, as the lagged dependent variable in combination with fixed effects introduces 
a bias of magnitude 1/t (where t is only 16), I will not use this method in this context.  
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2.5 Estimation results  
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the three main fiscal variables, 
the total transfer, the equitable share and conditional grants, based on 
equation (1). The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction term between vote margin and pre-election in column (2) 
shows that as predicted provinces with higher vote margins received a 
higher per capita equitable share in pre-election years. This finding 
suggests that the ANC strategically channels a higher share of the main 
component of the total intergovernmental transfer to its core provinces.  
 
For each percentage point vote margin, the equitable share is 0.053 per 
cent higher in pre-election years. This seems small, but given that the 
average vote margin over the time period under review is 50 per cent (see 
Table 2) the average effect is multiplied: in a province with a political 
competition profile like Mpumalanga, the equitable share is 2.65 per cent 
higher than in a province where the ANC only achieved 50 per cent of the 
vote in 1994. In terms of the mechanism, the ANC appears to successfully 
control the discretionary levers of the equitable share formula to channel 
additional funds to core support provinces in pre-election years. 
 
Interestingly, this effect is not detected in the total per capita transfer to 
the provinces. The coefficient of the interaction term in column (1) of 
Table 3 is positive and thus points in the same direction as with respect to 
the equitable share, but it is statistically insignificant. If fiscal 
manipulation of the equitable share is implemented in pre-election years, 
why is this not detected in the total transfer to provinces? Although the 
equitable share is the main component, the total transfer also consists of 
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conditional grants. The latter is a very noisy measure, with a coefficient of 
variation, i.e. ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, in excess of 50 
per cent. This helps explain the large standard error in column (1) relative 
to column (2). By the same token, the size of the coefficient in column (1) 
is smaller as it absorbs the opposing force from the conditional grant: 
vote margin has a strong negative, but far from statistically significant 
effect on the conditional grant in the year before an election (see column 
(3)). Despite the aforementioned lack of transparency in this component 
of the intergovernmental transfer, the conditional grant does not appear 
to be used systematically as an instrument for politically motivated fiscal 
distortions in the vicinity of elections. Given the evidence, we cannot 
accept the hypothesis that per capita total transfers or conditional grants 
increase with the vote margin in pre-election years.  
 
In the first three columns of Table 3, vote margin is defined in terms of 
previous election results, analogous to Banful’s (2011) analysis of a 
formula-based component of Ghana’s intergovernmental transfer system. 
In comparison, the magnitude of the coefficient (.05 per cent) is slightly 
less than half compared to what Banful finds regarding the DACF in 
Ghana, which is also based on a formula. However, in monetary terms, 
the impact on South Africa’s equitable share is far greater since the DACF 
only corresponds to approximately 5 per cent of national revenue in 
Ghana, whereas the equitable share consumes over 40 per cent of annual 
national revenue in South Africa. 
 
However, a serious concern about the coefficients reported in columns (1) 
– (3) of Table 3 is that voting behaviour and thus vote margin is 
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endogenous to the fiscal variables under review if it varies over time. A 
useful exercise is thus to re-run the regressions with a measure of 
electoral competition that is fixed over time: columns (4) to (6) report 
regression results with vote margin (1994) (see Table 2 for a definition 
and descriptive statistics). Compared to column (1), the coefficient of the 
interaction term in column (4) is slightly smaller, but still far from 
statistically significant. Regarding the impact on the equitable share, the 
coefficient of the interaction term is significantly weaker, with a decrease 
of over 40 per cent, but still statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Since vote margin only varies across provinces but not over time, its 
direct effect on fiscal variables in columns (4) – (6) is absorbed by the 
province fixed effects estimator and therefore does not enter separately in 
the equation. Since fixing the alternative vote margins to the 1994 election 
results greatly helps to reduce the risk of endogeneity, I consider the 
results reported using vote margin (1994) the most demanding and 
parsimonious. 
 
In order to get a better sense of the effect of vote margin on the equitable 
share, it is useful to consider a counterfactual scenario in which the swing 
province KwaZulu-Natal were a core support province of the ANC, such 
as Limpopo province. Based on the measure vote margin, Limpopo 
province scores 89 per cent compared to 17 per cent in KZN. According 
to my results, KZN would receive an additional 2.7 per cent of equitable 
share payments per capita from the national government in pre-election 
years, if KZN had the same vote margin Limpopo in 1994. In monetary 
terms this would have amounted to an additional ZAR 1.18 billion 
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(approximately USD 115 million) in the year 2008. Figure 3 illustrates this 
example systematically for all provinces relative to Limpopo.  
 
The idea for providing this counterfactual scenario is inspired by Kwon 
(2005: 338). In his example, the hypothetical additional allocation of 
national subsidies to South Cholla province if it were as contested as 
Seoul, is estimated at approximately USD 490,000. The distortion Kwon 
detects in South Korea is thus only a small fraction of the result presented 
here, even though the examples are based on roughly similar vote 
margins in the respective provinces. This benchmarking exercise suggests 
that the extent to which core provinces in South Africa have benefitted 
from the equitable share is relatively large. 
 
This is particularly worrying given that the coefficient in column (5) is a 
conservative estimate: in the main regression, vote margin is defined in 
terms of 1994 election results because one might argue that subsequent 
voting behaviour is endogenous to the fiscal variables under review. 
While fixing the competition variable to vote margins from 1994 helps to 
reduce the risk of endogeneity, the quality of the indicator is likely to 
decrease over time as it becomes more removed from the true level of 
electoral competition. Indeed, the ANC results in 2009 do not bear a close 
resemblance to those in 1994. This is particularly noticeable with respect 
to KZN where the ANC won just over 30 per cent of votes in the 1994 
election and then more than doubled its share to over 60 per cent in the 
2009 election (see Table 1).  
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Table 3: The impact of vote margin on intergovernmental transfers in pre-election years 
Dependent variable 
Log of real 
per capita 
total transfer 
Log of real 
per capita 
equitable 
share 
Log of real 
per 
conditional 
grant 
Log of real per 
capita total 
transfer 
Log of real per 
capita equitable 
share 
Log of real 
per 
conditional 
grant 
 
Vote margin (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009):  
changes over time, previous election results time 
Vote margin (1994):  
constant over time, 1994 election results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vote margin  
.00070 
(.00109) 
.00010 
(.00140) 
.00056 
(.00214) 
   
Pre-election ×  
vote margin 
0.00018 
(0.00031) 
0.00053** 
(0.00024) 
-0.00139 
(0.00108) 
0.00012 
(0.00030) 
0.00037** 
(0.00017) 
-0.00145 
(0.00140) 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.87 0.79 0.84 0.87 0.79 0.84 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls are provincial GDP per capita, provincial population aged 
less than 14 years and provincial population aged 60 years or above. In columns (4) – (6) the variable vote margin varies across provinces, but not 
over time and is therefore absorbed by the province fixed effects and does not enter the regression separately. All regressions include a constant.  
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Figure 3: Counterfactual effect of vote margin on equitable shares to provinces relative to Limpopo 
 
Note: this Figure is based on a counterfactual scenario in which the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), Gauteng (GT), Western Cape (WC), Eastern 
Cape (EC), Northern Cape (NC), Free State (FS), Mpumalanga (MP) and North West (NW) are assumed to have the same vote margin as Limpopo 
province. The difference between each province’s vote margin and Limpopo’s vote margin is calculated and then multiplied with the vote margin 
effect in pre-election years (i.e. the coefficient in Table 3, column (2)). This percentage determines the counterfactual monetary effect on each 
province, in this case derived from each province’s total equitable share in the year 2008. 
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2.6 Evaluation and further discussion 
Based on this discussion, two factors are particularly worrying: first, the 
impact of the pre-electoral distortion of the main source of provincial 
revenues is large and significant. Second, the distortion is possible despite 
the implementation of a formula, which has been designed to ensure the 
fair distribution of funds, and despite the creation of the FFC. Other 
countries such as India have had positive experiences with the creation of 
an independent body to oversee their intergovernmental transfer system. 
Khemani (2007: 465) shows that, while the transfers that are determined 
by the central political executive are distributed to favour those Indian 
states that are politically important for the central ruling party, the 
transfers that are delegated to an independent agency serve to constrain 
such partisan impact. However, in South Africa the FFC lacks the teeth to 
curtail politically motivated targeting: “whereas the Constitution 
envisaged a key role for the Finance and Fiscal Commission in ensuring 
agreement on the assignment of revenue, it never gained enough influence 
to fulfil its function as an independent advising body” (Folscher et al. 
1999: 31).   
 
From a distributive politics point of view, the results presented above 
point in the opposite direction of what Banful (2011) finds in Ghana, 
where additional DACF funds are channelled to swing voter districts. In 
South Africa, a different strategy seems to be at play as provinces where 
the ANC has higher vote margins receive preferential treatment through 
the equitable share in pre-election years. Since the swing voter model 
hinges on attribution, it is unlikely to be an effective strategy in the context 
of South Africa’s political economy. Anecdotal evidence corroborates this 
 54 
view: in an interview with van Zyl (2003: 10) Hennie Bester, the former 
leader of the Democratic Party in the Western Cape, suggests that “the 
budget of the province is reduced without any input from its side … the 
province is nevertheless perceived as responsible for the decline in 
services that follows the reduction of its allocation. This would be a very 
effective strategy by the ANC to control the Western Cape, being a 
province that escapes from its direct political control”.  
 
Brender and Drazen (2005) offer some insight into what we might expect 
from the evolution of politically motivated fiscal distortions in pre-election 
years over time. Their paper distinguishes between new and established 
democracies and suggests that electoral fiscal effects fade out over time as 
new democracies gain experience with elections (Brender and Drazen 
2005: 10). In their sample, the pre-election effect on national fiscal balances 
loses statistical significance after the fourth election in new democracies 
and is generally insignificant for elections in established democracies. 
While South Africa has yet to hold its fifth election as it celebrates the 20th 
anniversary of the first democratic elections this year, the temporal 
analysis in Table 4 can still provide useful insights.  
 
Columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 4 report the coefficients on the interaction 
term between pre-election and vote margin (1994) for the period 1995 to 
2007, covering only the first three elections. Again, the direct effect of vote 
margin on fiscal variables is absorbed by the province fixed effects 
estimator and therefore does not enter separately in the equation. The 
impact on both the total transfer and the equitable share is larger than in 
the full sample, suggesting that the effect is decreasing over time. In this 
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sense, the results confirm Brender and Drazen’s (2005) finding on a 
subnational level, at least as far as intergovernmental transfers to South 
African provinces are concerned. Whether this is because of institutional 
improvements that constrain the ability to control the levers on the 
equitable share or because voters have become more experienced, 
reducing the incentive to do so is an interesting question for future 
research, particularly once election results on the fifth democratic election 
become available. Reassuringly, the results are robust to both vote margin 
measures; whether they are fixed to 1994 electoral outcomes or vary over 
time. 
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Table 4: The evolution of the pre-election vote margin effect over time 
Dependent variable 
Log of real per capita total 
transfer 
Log of real per capita equitable 
share 
Log of real per conditional 
grant 
  
1995-2007 
 
1995-2010 
 
1995-2007 
 
1995-2010 
 
1995-2007 
 
1995-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-election ×  
vote margin (1994) 
0.00050 
(0.00047) 
0.00012 
(0.00030) 
0.00074** 
(0.00031) 
0.00037** 
(0.00017) 
-0.00127 
(0.00228) 
-0.00145 
(0.00140) 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.72 0.87 0.67 0.79 0.74 0.84 
Observations 117 144 117 144 117 144 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls are provincial GDP per capita, provincial population aged 
less than 14 years and provincial population aged 60 years or above. All regressions include a constant. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter builds on the context-conditional political budget cycle 
literature to present a first analysis of subnational PBCs in South Africa. It 
demonstrates that the national government has both an incentive and the 
ability to implement political budget cycles in provincial revenues. In line 
with PBC theory and the core supporter model from the distributive 
politics literature, the empirical analysis suggests that less politically 
competitive provinces receive higher transfers from the central 
government. This increase is driven by the equitable share, which is the 
main component of total intergovernmental transfers. While the equitable 
share is determined by a formula, the government has discretion over 
two important levers: data revisions and formula revisions, the timing of 
which can be strategically manipulated to favour core support provinces 
in pre-election years. No presence of electorally motivated spending is 
found in the conditional grant. Overall, the results indicate that even in a 
dominant party system, electoral competition can trigger the 
implementation of PBCs. 
 
With respect to South Africa’s intergovernmental transfer system, these 
findings have important implications. The equitable share has been 
shown to be vulnerable to electorally motivated manipulations, in 
particular the targeting of less competitive provinces in pre-election years. 
This is possible despite the fact that the equitable share is determined by 
a formula and part of a comprehensive budget process. This substantiates 
existing qualitative evidence of the FFC’s inability to ensure the equal 
division of revenues. In line with Brender and Drazen (2005), the findings 
do suggest that the impact of vote margin on the equitable share has 
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decreased over time, but the magnitude of the effect in the full sample is 
nonetheless disconcerting. 
 
However, it is also clear that the South African budget system faces a 
number of other forms of misallocations, in the form of unauthorized 
payments, contracts without competitive bidding, and manipulation of 
tenders. While these issues are beyond the scope of this chapter, it should 
be noted that compared to the overall level of corruption in South 
Africa’s financial management system, the distortion of the equitable 
share is admittedly small.15 From this perspective, reforms addressing the 
public procurement system require more immediate attention than the 
manipulation of the equitable share uncovered here. Nonetheless, it is 
important to point out that in addition to off-the-book malpractices, 
official channels may be subject to manipulation, too.  
 
With respect to the existing political budget cycle literature, the results 
suggest that intergovernmental grant systems can function as potential 
channels through which the central government can distribute electorally 
motivated funds across regions. Empirical predictions from the 
distributive politics literature offer useful insights into the incentives that 
may govern the political decision to target specific groups of voters or 
regions. In this context, the empirical findings build on Miguel and Zaidi 
(2003) and Case (2001), who also find evidence of the core supporter 
model. By analysing the relationship between intergovernmental 
transfers and electoral competition in other settings, future studies can 
                                                 
15
 The South African government is estimated to lose approximately USD 2.7 billion to 
procurement corruption each year (Corruption Watch 2013). 
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contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics between central and 
subnational governments and the role of strategic distributions of central 
government funds. The results presented here suggest that PBCs may be 
found in an environment with little or no electoral competition on the 
national level. The analysis of political budget cycles in countries that 
have previously been excluded from cross-country panels due to little or 
no electoral competition on the national level is thus encouraged. Indeed, 
more research should focus on the subnational level and disaggregated 
fiscal instruments, to identify fiscal manipulations that would otherwise 
remain undiscovered.  
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Chapter III 
 
A better life for all? Democratization and 
electrification in post-apartheid South 
Africa 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Does democracy affect basic service delivery? If yes, which elements of 
democracy matter – enfranchisement, the liberalization of political 
organization, or both? In 1994, 19 million South Africans gained the right 
to vote. The previously banned African National Congress won the 
elections promising “a better life for all”. Using a difference-in-
differences approach, we exploit heterogeneity in the share of newly 
enfranchised voters across municipalities to evaluate how franchise 
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extension affected household electrification. Our dataset combines geo-
referenced nightlight satellite imagery, census data, and municipal 
election results. We control for a range of covariates and perform 
multiple robustness checks, including placebo regressions and an 
examination of contiguous census tracts from different municipalities. 
We find that enfranchisement has a significant positive effect on 
electrification, and that the national electricity company prioritized core 
constituencies of the ANC. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Does democracy affect the delivery of essential basic services? And if yes, 
which elements of democracy trigger changes in implemented policies – 
enfranchisement, the liberalization of political organization, or both? It is 
crucial to assess the socio-economic consequences of democracy, not only 
because it is today’s main form of government, but also because countries 
across the globe continue to transition towards democracy. A number of 
studies in the political economy literature find that democracies are better 
at providing public services than autocratic regimes (e.g., Lake and Baum 
2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2013). A related 
literature suggests that the extension of the franchise can shift the median 
voter in a way that affects redistribution towards the poor (e.g., Meltzer 
and Richard 1981, Husted and Kenny 1997, Boix 2003) and the provision 
of services benefiting the newly enfranchised (Miller 2008, Vernby 2013). 
 
However, several challenges make it difficult to quantitatively assess the 
direct effect of democratization on the lives of the poor. Many empirical 
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studies are based on cross-country comparisons from which it is hard to 
convincingly establish causality due to the possibilities of omitted 
variable bias, reverse causality, and sample selection bias (Ross 2006, 
Hollyer et al. 2011). Reliance on data collated by international 
organizations from diverse sources of uneven quality, and sometimes 
based on inconsistent definitions, also gives rise to concerns about 
measurement error. Other studies examine the impact of democracy on 
resource allocation rather than services delivered (Stasavage 2005). Yet, 
especially in poor countries, funds are often not spent as intended, which 
undermines service provision (Stasavage and Moyo 2000, Reinikka and 
Svensson 2004). These are some of the reasons why our knowledge about 
the effect of democratization on public service delivery is still limited. 
 
An additional challenge is that the process of democratization typically 
entails a bundle of different changes, including franchise extension as 
well as the lifting of barriers to political activity and organization. Yet, 
existing empirical work, especially when based on standard indices of 
democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), often leaves unresolved what 
precisely it is about democracy that accounts for the effect of interest. We 
argue that tackling such “compound treatment” problems requires a joint 
consideration of the effect of franchise extension via its effect on the 
median voter as well as an analysis of the mediating role of political 
parties in service provisions. The most common conjecture in the 
distributive politics literature, the “swing voter” hypothesis, posits that 
rational incumbents target swing regions in which they have a higher 
chance of affecting vote choice.  In other words, “parties woo the groups 
that are politically central, and most willing to switch their votes in 
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response to economic favors” (Dixit and Londregan 1996: 1132).  On the 
other hand, Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) core supporter model predicts 
that incumbent governments allocate more resources to core support 
groups to maximize votes. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this has been linked to 
the notion of patronage, where an incumbent selectively distributes 
“favors and material benefits to loyal followers” (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997: 62). This reward of loyalty and punishment of disloyalty is 
independent of political competition. Our approach highlights the 
essential complementarity of median voters and partisan accounts in 
order to interpret spatial patterns of service delivery following a 
democratic transition. 
 
This chapter examines the effect of democratization on the provision of 
basic public services in post-apartheid South Africa. We estimate the 
effect of extending voting rights to the non-white population on 
electrification during the first period of their democratic local 
government. Our subnational approach helps to mitigate several of the 
concerns raised above. In particular, municipalities within South Africa 
are more comparable units than countries with different historical, 
cultural, and institutional circumstances, which should help to mitigate 
omitted variable bias.  We use perhaps the most reliable data on service 
delivery, collected without involvement by the units we examine. 
Moreover, we directly measure actual service delivery outcomes, not 
resource allocation. Finally, by differentiating franchise extension and 
political representation, we take a step towards addressing “compound 
treatment” problems that afflict cross-national studies. 
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There are few prior studies of the political determinants of electricity 
provision. Brown and Mobarak (2009) document a positive effect of 
democratization on the relative share of electricity going to residential 
consumers in poorer countries. This cross-national study is vulnerable to 
the various threats to valid inference noted above, and it suffers from the 
“compound treatment” problem. Moreover, we are interested in whether 
democracy improves absolute levels of electricity access amongst 
disadvantaged groups. Most closely related to our work is the study by 
Min (2010), who traces partisan effects on electricity use with subnational 
data from India. However, unlike Min, we examine electrification in the 
context of democratization, involving franchise extension and the 
liberalization of political organizations. At the same time, we draw on 
Min’s pioneering work with satellite nighttime light imagery in our 
robustness checks, thus expanding our understanding of the use of these 
images in conjunction with other data. 
 
South Africa’s post-apartheid experience in the 1990s provides a 
particularly good opportunity to evaluate the effect of democracy on 
service delivery. With two decades since South Africa’s first democratic 
election, we are examining a case of contemporary democratization on a 
unique scale: in 1994 suffrage was extended to about 19 million 
previously disenfranchised South Africans, representing 84 per cent of 
the estimated 22.7 million citizens and permanent residents aged 18 or 
above who had the right to vote (Southall 1994: 639). At the same time, 
the backlog in the provision of basic public services reflected the 
apartheid era’s political inequality. Two-thirds of households were 
estimated to lack access to electricity (African National Congress 1994: 
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para. 2.7.1). These conditions make for an ideal setting to investigate the 
effect of democratization on electrification. Our identification strategy 
exploits the heterogeneity in the share of the newly enfranchised 
population across South African municipalities following the unbanning 
of the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela and the first 
fully democratic local government elections. Our quantitative estimates 
show that municipalities with larger shares of newly enfranchised voters, 
and thus a clear change in the identity of the median voter, experienced 
larger improvements in household access to electricity in the period 1996-
2001.  
 
We also show that the ANC’s representation plays an important 
mediating role. In municipalities directly responsible for electricity 
distribution to households, our results are compatible with standard 
theories of electoral competition that predict policy convergence on the 
median voter (Downs 1957): in this case the effect of enfranchisement 
does not appear to be conditioned by the party political composition of 
the local council. In other parts of the country, the state-owned electricity 
company Eskom carried out electrification. Here, we find evidence that 
newly enfranchised voters in the ANC’s core constituencies were 
prioritized. This suggests that the dominant party at the national level 
might have exerted pressure on the company to prioritize its base 
support, in line with theories of distributive politics that policy-makers 
reward their core constituents. Hence, a combination of median-voter 
and core-constituency accounts is reflected in the spatial patterns of 
service delivery that we observe. This finding makes a contribution 
towards clarifying the mechanism by which democratization affects the 
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provision of essential basic services: the effect of franchise extension is 
mediated by political parties, which control the levers available to deliver 
essential services. Our findings highlight the importance of pinpointing 
the actors who control service provisions, which is crucial for the 
interpretation of the results. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 
provides the relevant background for our case and develops our 
expectations. Section 3.3 discusses the main variables, data sources, and 
related methodological issues. This is followed by a discussion of our 
empirical approach in section 3.4, and our analysis of the effect of 
franchise extension on household electrification in section 3.5. Section 3.6 
investigates the conditioning role of political parties. The conclusion 
discusses the wider relevance of our results, and highlights several 
implications for further theoretical and empirical work on the 
relationship between democratization and public service delivery.  
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3.2 Enfranchisement, political parties, and 
electrification 
South Africa’s “negotiated revolution” (Sparks 1995) culminated in 
democratic elections in April 1994, where for the first time all adult South 
Africans had the right to vote (Mattes 1995). 16  The country’s mass 
electrification campaign was inherently linked to the transition to 
democracy, which had fundamental implications for the composition of 
the electorate, as well as South Africa’s party political landscape. In this 
section, we develop our expectations as to how these developments 
affected electrification patterns. 
 
Enfranchisement.  Under apartheid, formal political representation was 
mainly reserved for the white population. The Independent Electoral 
Commission estimated a total of 22.7 million eligible voters in 1994, 
consisting of South African citizens and permanent residents who were 
18 years or older and who possessed at least one of five documents 
demonstrating their eligibility. Of these, 72 per cent were estimated to be 
“black African,” 9 per cent “coloured,”17 and 3 per cent “Indian or Asian.” 
The “white” population previously enfranchised in the territory of the 
                                                 
16 Black people were stripped of their South African citizenship in 1970. In 1982, the 
apartheid government established Black Local Authorities in South Africa, but they 
lacked resources and legitimacy. From 1984 to 1994, the Indian and coloured population 
groups had limited representation in separate chambers of the Tricameral Parliament, 
but this system lacked legitimacy and elections were widely boycotted. None of these 
pre-democracy forms of representation enabled credible participation and influence. 
17  Under apartheid, people regarded to be of mixed descent were classified as 
“coloured” and distinguished from the other groups listed here, often with arbitrary 
rules such as the notorious “pencil test.” The continued use of the classification is 
widespread but not uncontroversial. 
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Republic of South Africa constituted a mere 16 per cent of the estimated 
electorate (Southall 1994: 637). This population classification remains in 
use to this day for census purposes and in public policy debates, and 
forms the basis for our analysis of franchise extension. 
 
Results from the 1996 census indicate a striking correlation between these 
population groups and access to basic services, reflecting their unequal 
treatment by the apartheid regime. Merely 44 per cent of black and 84 per 
cent of coloured households used electricity for lighting (Statistics South 
Africa 2005: 145). As a result, the extension of the franchise to these 
historically disadvantaged groups also implied a substantial shift in the 
identity of the median voter, increasing demand for basic services such as 
electricity. Hence, we expect a positive effect of enfranchisement on 
electrification, particularly for black but also coloured households. In 
order to establish causality and not mere correlation, we need to 
overcome some important empirical concerns that will be addressed in 
the chapter.  
 
Political parties.  The transition to democracy also brought fundamental 
shifts in political party control. In 1994, the ANC won 62.6 per cent of the 
national vote in the first national elections after its unbanning, giving the 
party 252 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly. The party also won a 
majority of seats in six out of nine newly constituted provincial 
legislatures (Southall 1994). In the Western Cape, the previously ruling 
National Party (NP) won 53.2 per cent of the vote, while in the Northern 
Cape the ANC was the largest party but fell short of a majority with 49.7 
per cent of the vote, and in KwaZulu-Natal the Zulu-nationalist Inkatha 
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Freedom Party (IFP) narrowly achieved victory with 50.3 per cent of the 
vote. 
 
Following a transition period and the redemarcation of municipal 
boundaries, the first democratic elections of local councils took place in 
1995 and 1996. For the first time in its history, South Africa had municipal 
councils elected under universal suffrage which were responsible for 
delivering essential services to all residents (Cameron 1996). According to 
the Elections Task Group (1996: 230-232), the ANC won 6,032 out of 
11,368 seats on municipal councils, or about 53 per cent. While the party 
attracted the majority of black voters, these elections were not purely 
determined along racial lines (Mattes 1995). In several provinces, 
dominant population groups were divided across parties, notably 
coloured voters in the Western Cape and the Northern Cape, as well as 
the Zulu-speaking population in KwaZulu-Natal. Moreover, local 
elections combined proportional representation with wards in a way that 
biased representation in favour of local minorities and reduced 
proportionality (Cameron 1996: 30-31). 
 
Shortly after its unbanning in 1990, the ANC adopted mass electrification 
as a central political goal. The National Electrification Conference in 1992 
started a process that led to an agreement between Eskom, the country’s 
state-owned electricity company, and the ANC over a set of electrification 
targets (Bekker et al. 2008: 3128). 18  These became part of a National 
                                                 
18 Eskom had initiated a more limited “Electrification for All” program in the late 1980s 
(Conradie and Messerschmidt 2000: 265-309). Previously, Eskom had not been 
permitted to supply black communities with electricity. In the empirical section, we use 
placebo regressions to investigate electrification trends prior to democratization. 
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Electrification Program (NEP) and the ANC’s manifesto for the 1994 
liberation elections, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). 
The ANC promised “electricity for all” and pledged: “An accelerated and 
sustainable electrification programme must provide access to electricity 
for an additional 2.5 million households by the year 2000, thereby 
increasing the level of access to electricity to about 72 per cent of all 
households (double the present number)” (ANC 1994: para. 2.7.7). This 
high-level commitment meant that the ANC’s performance would be 
measured in no small part by whether it would be able to achieve these 
ambitious targets. 
 
At the local government level, the RDP remained a focal point of the 
ANC’s political agenda. The party’s manifesto for the municipal elections 
(“A Better Life: Let’s Make It Happen Where We Live”) highlighted that 
democratic local councils make crucial decisions on delivering basic 
services, including “where new electricity supplies…will be put in” 
(ANC 1995). In contrast, the Democratic Party (DP) and NP campaigns 
emphasized crime, which was perceived as “principally a ‘white’ 
preoccupation” (Lodge 1999: 44). The IFP had other priorities still, in 
particular the future role of traditional authorities, which provided an 
important power base in its rural strongholds in KwaZulu-Natal (Beall et 
al. 2005). Given the ANC’s high-level policy commitment to 
electrification, we expect the party to have strong incentives to influence 
the connection of households to the grid. We explore different 
mechanisms further below. 
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Electrification.  While the ANC adopted an overall electrification target, 
the 1996 constitution left responsibility for electricity reticulation with 
local authorities, which had provided electricity to households prior to 
democracy. It is important to note that electricity generation did not 
impose a constraint during this period. Eskom had a 55 per cent reserve 
margin in 1990 (Bekker et al. 2008: 3126). Yet, not all municipalities had 
the capacity to connect households to the grid. Hence, the NEP split 
responsibility between established municipal distributors, which were 
responsible for one-third of the new connections, while Eskom took on 
the task of electrification and direct distribution to households elsewhere, 
especially in rural areas (Gaunt 2005: 1310). In assessing the determinants 
of electrification during this period, it is essential to understand the 
motivations of the different actors. 
 
In the mid-1990s, the regulatory authorities issued all 362 existing 
municipal distributors with temporary licenses (National Electricity 
Regulator 2000: 93). These municipal distributors were under the direct 
control of local governments and subject to their political direction. 
Councils played an important role in identifying priorities and needs 
(Qase et al. 2001). Municipal electricity departments had to seek funding 
from the council, clarify technical requirements, and plan implementation 
(Gaunt et al. 2012: 9-11). This ensured direct local accountability for 
electrification, since “communities can use their vote to choose their 
representatives and influence policies”, as highlighted in an official 
evaluation of the NEP (Department of Minerals and Energy 2001: 15). 
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For Eskom, strategic considerations were important. The company 
initially had to rely on internal financing for electrification, including 
cross-subsidies as well as debt (Bekker et al. 2008: 3131). It also faced 
pressure to meet the demanding electrification targets. Hence, the 
company had incentives to prioritize areas that could be electrified easily 
and at the lowest possible cost per household, which depends on factors 
such as an area’s distance from the grid, settlement density, as well as 
topographical conditions such as land gradients (Dinkelman 2011: 3084). 
Many new household connections were not financially viable (Davis 
1997). Without direct government subsidies during the initial 
electrification period, Eskom could contain operating losses by focusing 
on areas where potential consumption was comparatively high. 
 
Gaunt (2003: 196) argues that “it would be contradictory to expect no 
political interference in essentially social programmes.” The politicization 
of electrification by Eskom dates back to the apartheid period. According 
to Davis and Steyn (1998: 68), “Eskom has always been used to serve the 
interests of key constituencies behind the political party in power.” In the 
1970s and 1980s, the company (then known as Escom) connected white-
owned commercial farms to the electricity grid, even though many of the 
connections were not financially viable. Under the ANC-led government, 
pressures to deliver to the party’s “key constituencies” were also likely. 
In addition, Eskom managers had incentives to please the ruling party in 
order to delay a restructuring of the electricity industry (Dinkelman 2011: 
3083). While the process by which Eskom internally prioritized areas for 
electrification is not formally documented, we can examine its outcomes. 
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This discussion leads us to anticipate different effects on electrification 
depending on whether distribution was in the hands of Eskom or local 
authorities. In the latter case, the link to the political composition of the 
local council and its administration is through representation. If parties at 
the local level converge on the median voter in a Downsian fashion, then 
service delivery to the newly enfranchised should not be affected by the 
partisan composition of a council. On the other hand, if the ANC was 
more committed to electrification than other parties, then it may matter 
whether the party gained control of a council. Hence, we examine such 
representation effects in the municipal distribution subsample. However, 
partisan effects in Eskom distribution areas could be rather different. 
Since Eskom was at least indirectly subject to pressure from the dominant 
party at the central government level, its selection of electrification 
projects would always be political and could potentially be used to target 
specific voters. Our empirical analysis investigates such party political 
influences. 
 
3.3 Variables and data 
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of 799 municipalities in South 
Africa. As shown in Figure 4, these municipalities are located within nine 
provinces. All variables are structured in a municipality-province-year 
format. The census data are from Statistics South Africa’s 1996 and 2001 
Community Profiles and GIS databases. Shortly before the 2001 census, a 
new local government structure with 262 municipalities replaced the one 
that existed at the time of the 1996 census. This process involved the 
redrawing of boundaries as well as the renaming of areas, which helps to 
explain why past analyses of service delivery over this period have been 
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limited to comparisons at the provincial level, the lowest geographical 
hierarchy that has stayed constant over time (Statistics South Africa 2005). 
In order to make 1996 and 2001 local government data comparable, we 
took advantage of their spatial attributes and aggregated information on 
21,243 so-called ‘subplaces’ from the 2001 census up to the level of 1996 
municipal boundaries. This generated a unique dataset with 1996 and 
2001 level data using the municipal boundaries that existed in 1996.19 
One contribution of this chapter is precisely to offer to the research 
community a new longitudinal dataset of South African electoral and 
socio-demographic variables at the municipal level. Studies of service 
delivery in South Africa often resort to coarse data on just nine provinces 
(Statistics South Africa 2005). Our dataset provides a much finer 
representation of South African society at the time of transition to 
democracy and we hope other researchers will use it to explore questions 
beyond the central theme of this chapter. Appendix B provides detailed 
information about the process of generating this new dataset and 
definitions of all variables. 
 
                                                 
19  Although our 2001 municipal boundaries are “virtual boundaries” this is not a 
problem for our empirical analysis because we use them only in order to measure the 
outcome of interest (electrification) in 2001. Political decisions taken by councils elected 
in 1995/6 directly affected areas belonging to a municipality defined according to 1996 
boundaries. Hence, reporting 2001 outcomes at 1996 boundaries is the correct procedure 
if we want to evaluate the impact of the 1995/6 elections on outcomes during the first 
period of South Africa’s democratic local government. 
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Figure 4: Overview of South Africa’s census geography in 1996 
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Figure 5: Geographic distribution of key variables 
Map 1: Change in household access to electricity (1996-2001) 
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Dependent variables.  Our main dependent variable is Electricityit measured 
as the percentage share of households with access to electricity, where i 
indexes a given municipality and t corresponds to time. This variable is 
based on the answer “electricity” to the census question: “What type of 
energy/fuel does this household MAINLY use for lighting?”20 As non-
technical losses such as theft or illegal connections are widespread, it is 
important to note that our dependent variable captures actual electricity 
use, not just connections and official users (Statistics South Africa 2005: 
144). Map 1 in Figure 5 offers a visual impression of the change in 
Electricity between 1996 and 2001. 21  Former “homeland” areas 
experienced some of the greatest changes in electrification. These areas, 
reserved for the black population under the previous regime’s policy of 
racial segregation, were synonymous with poverty and 
underdevelopment (Christopher 1994). At the same time, however, it is 
important to note that almost all municipalities across the country had 
                                                 
20 We also have data on the type of energy used for cooking and heating. Both are highly 
correlated with lighting, but the latter is the most relevant indicator of whether or not a 
household has access to electricity (Statistics South Africa 2005: 144): “It should be noted 
that the census captures use of electricity, not access. In the case of heating and cooking, 
use may be limited for reasons of expense, both of the electricity itself and of appliances, 
so no conclusions can be drawn about access to electricity. The use of electricity for 
lighting, however, can be taken as a proxy for access to at least some level of electricity.” 
21  Illegal connections might make it difficult to attribute electrification to Eskom or 
municipalities. Only the 1996 census distinguishes between municipal and Eskom 
connections from other connections. However, less than 2 percent of households 
indicated they get electricity from another source, which is likely to be the reason why 
this category was dropped from the 2001 census. Due to the presence of illegal 
connections we cannot assume that there were no connections other than those 
provided by a municipality or Eskom, but the findings in the 1996 census suggest that 
the electricity variables in both censuses reflect whether or not the main source of 
electricity is provided by a municipality or Eskom and thus whether or not households 
are connected to the grid. We can therefore reasonably assume that changes in electricity 
between 1996 and 2001 are due to Eskom and municipalities, either through new 
connections or newly used old connections. 
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electrification backlogs, and most of them had substantial numbers of 
households that were not connected to the grid. According to our 
calculations with the 1996 census data, merely seven municipalities had 
universal household access to electricity. The average (median) share of 
municipal households with access to electricity was 63 (70) per cent. In 
1996, half of the municipalities had household electrification rates of 70 
per cent or lower, and merely 132 (17 per cent of the total) had rates of 90 
per cent or above. Hence, sizable improvements in household 
electrification were possible in the vast majority of South Africa’s 
municipalities. Nonetheless, our analysis needs to account for possible 
ceiling effects. As we do not expect large changes in municipalities that 
already have high rates of household electrification, one of our 
robustness checks entails dropping those municipalities from our 
analysis. We try different thresholds to demonstrate that our findings are 
robust. 
 
As an alternative dependent variable, we use Nightlightit, which is 
calculated using a set of satellite images of the earth at night. The images 
were collected with the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s 
Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) and released by the National 
Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) for the years 1992-2012. We use the 
annual composites of cloud-free, visible, and stable lights that are cleaned 
to filter out fires and background noise to calculate Nightlight for the 
years 1992, 1996, and 2001.22 Figure 6 visualizes how we transform this 
                                                 
22 Gas flares are visible in nighttime light images, which could be a concern. However, 
no gas flares have been identified on land in South Africa (email correspondence with 
Chris Elvidge, June 29, 2012). 
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data: we first use the raw nighttime lights images (Map 1) to classify each 
of the over one million pixels as either “lit” or “unlit” (Map 2), and then 
calculate the percentage share of lit pixels at the municipal level within 
the 1996 boundaries to yield information on local electrification levels 
(Map 3) as well as changes between 1996 and 2001 (Map 4). The data 
appendix contains full details. 
 
An alternative method is to combine nighttime lights with population 
rasters to calculate the share of population in lit pixels (see Elvidge et al. 
2010). While this variable is conceptually closer to our census-based 
measure, it relies heavily on the accuracy of population rasters.23  In our 
case, daytime population counts at the local level differ substantially 
from census data due the legacy of the Group Areas Act, which under 
apartheid forced non-whites to live in designated areas often requiring 
long commutes to work (Christopher 1994). Moreover, these data are not 
available for the time period examined here. We prefer a methodology 
that only uses the nighttime images. 
 
What is the relationship between the two dependent variables? Only the 
census measure directly captures our outcome of interest, household 
access to electricity, while the satellite images provide an aerial view of 
pixels that appear lit at night. On the municipal level the average 
                                                 
23 Main sources for population rasters are the US Department of Energy’s Landscan data 
and gridded population datasets from the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network (CIESIN). The former are based on daytime population counts 
using daily averages that capture populations on roads and other public areas. They are 
available to us only from 2002 onwards. The latter has a resolution of 2.5’ and is thus 
less fine-grained than the nighttime lights data. 
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correlation between Nightlight and Electricity (in levels) for the years 
1996 and 2001 is 0.47.24 This is broadly consistent with other comparisons 
of nighttime lights to national electricity data (e.g., Elvidge et al. 2001, 
Min et al. 2013).25 In the absence of stable outdoor lighting, pixels appear 
unlit even where households have access to electricity. This matters in 
our context, since street lighting was “often not provided” when 
households were connected to the grid (Department of Minerals and 
Energy 2001: viii). Even where outdoor lighting is present, it may be too 
weak to be detected. 26  Moreover, Nightlight captures light from 
uninhabited industrial sites and highways. South Africa’s mines and 
main highways are clearly visible from outer space. In areas around 
Johannesburg and Cape Town we also observe the overglow effect, due 
to the tendency of light “to travel to pixels outside of those in which it 
originates, and light tends to be magnified over certain terrain types such 
as water and snow cover” (Pinkovskiy 2011: 9). The satellite data might 
still be preferable were the census of poor quality. However, the quality 
of South Africa’s official statistics is recognized as uniquely high on the 
continent (Jerven 2013: 101). For our purposes the census is the ideal data 
source, but we exploit the satellite data to assess the robustness of our 
results and to analyze years for which census data are not available. 
                                                 
24 This correlation increases for smaller subnational units, suggesting that the nighttime 
lights measure is more precise in smaller geographic areas.  
25 Recent contributions in the economics literature include the use of nighttime lights as 
a proxy for economic activity (Henderson et al. 2011, 2012; Storeygard 2012; Pinkovskiy 
2011), regional development (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2012), and spatial 
inequality (Alesina et al. 2012). 
26 In his analysis of nighttime lights in India, Min (2014) points out the lowest population 
density at which lights are observed are 60 people per square kilometer.  
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Independent variable.  The main independent variable is the percentage 
share of enfranchised citizens in the municipal electorate. The variable 
Enfranchisedi refers to all non-white citizens of voting age in municipality 
i at the time of the first democratic local government elections. It is 
derived from a cross-tabulation of population group and age from the 
1996 census. The census also allows us to break down this variable 
further into separate groups of newly enfranchised voters that are 
categorized as black, coloured, and Indian (or Asian). Maps 2 and 3 in 
Figure 6 show, respectively, the distribution of all newly enfranchised 
and black voters across municipalities. 
 
Control variables.  In order to address concerns that Enfranchised is 
correlated with other variables that are in turn correlated with trends in 
Electricity, we include a number of control variables. We control for 
geographic covariates that were important in determining the supply of 
electricity: the distance to the main power grid in 1996, the distance to the 
closest main road, gradient/slope, and elevation. We control for the 
demand for electricity by including a number of socioeconomic variables, 
such as employment and education, as well as demographic variables, 
such as population density and the municipal share of the national 
population.27 Finally, our regressions also include province fixed effects. 
Given that the dependent variable is expressed in differences, they 
capture province-specific shocks and absorb fixed spatial autocorrelation.  
                                                 
27 In order to avoid “post-treatment bias” (King 2010), we prefer specifications without 
“bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 64), that is, control variables that are 
themselves potential outcomes affected by Enfranchised, such as changes in other public 
services that occurred after democratization.  
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Appendix Table B1 reports summary statistics. As shown in panel (a), the 
average change in the share of electrified households is approximately 9 
percentage points according to the census, whereas our data based on 
nighttime lights show an average change of only 2 percentage points in 
the share of lit pixels. Comparing these means in panels (b) and (c), which 
show summary statistics for our variables in municipalities with 
enfranchisement below and above the median respectively, suggests that 
there is a systematic discrepancy between the two measures, which is 
greater in high enfranchisement areas. At the same time, it is clear that 
high and low enfranchisement municipalities differ according to most 
other indicators. Our empirical strategy removes fixed municipal 
characteristics but we still need to worry about possible differential 
trends. 
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Figure 6: Nighttime lights as a proxy for municipal household electrification rates 
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3.4 Empirical strategy 
In an ideal setting, we would like to compare our data with a 
counterfactual scenario in which democratization did not occur. This 
comparison would allow us to determine precisely what difference 
democracy made in terms of delivering electricity to households. Since 
we cannot observe this counterfactual scenario we exploit the 
heterogeneity in enfranchisement in the first democratic elections across 
South African municipalities. Under apartheid, non-white citizens had no 
meaningful right to vote and the first fully democratic local elections took 
place in 1995/6. Municipalities with a high share of newly enfranchised 
voters can therefore be viewed as being part of the treatment group. 
Conversely we can think of municipalities with low levels of 
enfranchisement as being part of the control group. While this 
categorization helps to conceptualize the empirical strategy, Enfranchised 
is a continuous rather than binary treatment. This allows us to determine 
the effect of enfranchisement on electrification by using a difference-in-
differences specification. The model can be expressed as follows, with i 
indexing a given municipality: 
 
ΔElectricityi1996-2001 = α + βEnfranchisedi1996 + γControlsi1996 + Δεi1996-2001         (2) 
 
Electricity corresponds to the proportion of households with access to 
electricity, Enfranchised corresponds to the share of non-white citizens of 
voting age in the first democratic local government elections and ε is the 
error term. There are a number of potential confounders that affect both 
the level of enfranchisement and electrification. We control for a wide 
range of such variables that we discussed above. 
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By using a specification in changes rather than levels, we purge our 
regressions of omitted unobservables that are fixed over time. However, 
we still remain concerned about changing characteristics of the 
municipalities that could be correlated with changes in electrification via 
Enfranchised. Our main identifying assumption is that, conditional on 
the observables we control for in our regressions, Enfranchised is 
uncorrelated with the error term. We run placebo regressions to rule out 
as far as possible that our results are driven by a violation of the parallel 
trends assumption. A paramount concern is that electrification in areas 
with high enfranchisement could simply constitute a catching-up effect, 
due to the fact that municipalities with high electrification rates in 1996 
have little margins for further electrification. These municipalities are 
also those with higher white populations and therefore lower 
enfranchisement rates. Placebo regressions should help to rule out this 
possibility, since it is not obvious that a catching-up effect, if not due to 
democratization, should only occur after the first democratic elections. 
We document several additional robustness checks below. 
 
3.5 Main results 
Baseline estimates.   Table 5 reports our baseline estimates, using census-
based measure as the dependent variable and enfranchisement rates as 
the main explanatory variable. We report the results from several 
specifications, starting with a simple regression (column 1) and 
progressively including province-specific shocks (column 2), geographic 
controls (column 3), population and socioeconomic controls at their 1996 
levels (column 4), and non-electrified households in 1996 (column 5). We 
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then include 1996-2001 differences in population and socioeconomic 
controls (column 6). This introduces the possibility of post-treatment bias 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009: 64, King 2010), but failing to control for these 
differences may also result in bias. The coefficient of interest is positive 
and statistically significant throughout. We can safely conclude that the 
share of newly enfranchised non-white voters has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on household electrification rates. The 
magnitude of the coefficients ranges from 0.19 to 0.34. The lower bound 
suggests that one standard deviation in enfranchisement led to an 
increase in electrification of at least 3.5 percentage points, more than one 
third of the sample mean: a substantively large effect. 
 
In column 7 we distinguish between newly enfranchised black, coloured 
and Indian voters. The results show that the effect is particularly strong 
for black voters, positive but less strong for coloured voters, and 
statistically insignificant for newly enfranchised Indian voters. The 
coefficients indicate that an increase of one standard deviation in the 
share of black voters led to an increase of 12 percentage points in the 
household electrification rate, and about half that size for coloured voters. 
We address several empirical concerns in the remainder of this section. 
 
Placebo regressions.   The most important identification concern is that our 
estimates could be capturing changes that would have happened anyway 
in the absence of democratization. Our identification strategy relies on 
the “parallel trends” assumption (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 230-233): the 
idea that, once other covariates are taken into account, the various 
municipalities had similar pre-existing electrification trends, 
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irrespectively of their level of enfranchisement. Hence, we would like to 
rule out that our results could be driven by pre-existing trends associated 
with Enfranchised. To address this concern we follow the standard 
procedure to run placebo regressions that check whether 
enfranchisement rates can explain electrification before democratization 
(when they should not). 
 
Comparable information for the period prior to 1996 does not exist, as 
apartheid-era census data from the early 1990s are unreliable and 
incomplete.  For this reason we use Nightlight as an alternative 
dependent variable. This has two important advantages: first, it is based 
on an entirely independent data source with complete records of the 
distribution of electricity across South Africa. As such, the images 
function as an additional source of data that we use to corroborate our 
findings. Second, the satellite images are publicly available as annual 
composites from 1992, which means that they can provide information 
about electrification in the years prior to democratization.  
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Table 5: The impact of enfranchisement on electrification (census data) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Enfranchised 0.343*** 0.280*** 0.293*** 0.232*** 0.191*** 0.277*** 
 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
 
Enfranchised black 
      
0.327*** 
       
(0.041) 
Enfranchised coloured 
      
0.204*** 
       
(0.047) 
Enfranchised Indian 
      
-0.022 
       
(0.059) 
Constant -19.058*** -11.056*** -6.992* -5.269 -2.204 -12.815*** -13.817*** 
 
(2.534) (3.001) (3.619) (4.399) (4.328) (4.757) (4.565) 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Households without electricity (1996) No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996-2001 
diff.) 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.111 0.161 0.173 0.192 0.245 0.307 0.325 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity for lighting (difference 1996-2001) calculated from census data. 
Geographic controls are: (1) Distance from electricity grid; (2) Distance from main road; (3) Elevation; (4) Slope. Population controls are: (1) 
Population density; (2) Number of households. Socioeconomic controls are: (1) Share of population with no schooling; (2) Median income; (3) Share 
of labor force with low income (due to differences in the underlying variables in the 2001 census, this variable is only included as a 1996 level control 
and not as a 1996-2001 difference). Refer to the data appendix for full details. N = 799. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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We begin by replicating the models reported in Table 6, this time using 
the change in the share of lit pixels over the 1996-2001 period as our 
dependent variable. The results appear in Table 6, panel (a). The 
coefficients of interest are statistically significant and very stable across 
the different specifications, but magnitudes are smaller than in our 
regressions with census data: a one standard deviation in the share of 
non-white new voters leads to a maximum 1.6 percentage point increase 
in the share of lit pixels. It is reassuring that the estimated effects of 
enfranchisement relative to mean changes in electrification are similar 
across models using census and satellite data. 
 
In panel (b) of Table 6 we report the results of our placebo regressions. 
Here, we replace the dependent variable with changes in the share of lit 
pixels during 1992-1996. In this earlier period, Enfranchised should not 
matter if the “parallel trends” assumption holds. Reassuringly, all 
coefficients on Enfranchised are far from any acceptable significance level. 
We also experimented with a range of alternative nightlight-based 
variables used in the literature, notably the population-adjusted 
measures discussed earlier. The overall pattern is highly robust with 
significant enfranchisement effects for the period 1996-2001 and 
insignificant enfranchisement effects in the placebo regressions for the 
period 1992-1996. Despite the limitations of the Nightlight-based measure, 
these results strongly suggest that what we capture with our estimates is 
unlikely to be due to pre-existing trends in electrification. 
 
Examining contiguous census tracts.   The main identification concern is 
that the need for electrification at the municipal level is highly correlated 
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with enfranchisement (both being correlated with the share of non-white 
population at the time of democratization). It is therefore difficult to 
disentangle the effect of empowering the non-white population from a 
“catching up” effect. Placebo regressions help to rule out this second 
possibility. In this section we further corroborate our results by using an 
alternative empirical strategy based on spatial discontinuity. We use 
more fine-grained data at the census tract (henceforth CT) level and 
match adjacent CT pairs that lie on different sides of a municipal 
boundary, thus restricting the sample to CTs that lie on municipality 
borders only.28  By including a fixed effect for each pair of neighbouring 
CTs, identification is obtained by matching CTs that belong to different 
municipalities (hence treated with differential levels of enfranchisement) 
but that are adjacent (hence generally similar in other respects).29  By 
using this strategy we should be able to take into account several 
confounding factors. First, it is unlikely that economic and social 
conditions vary discontinuously along municipality borders, which 
makes comparisons more reliable. Second, electricity needs and 
socioeconomic conditions may be specific to a CT while the relevant 
decision-making unit is the municipality: municipal-level 
enfranchisement should now better capture the effect of democratization 
rather than a “catching up” effect. We estimate the following equation 
(omitting years from subscripts): 
 
                                                 
28
 This empirical strategy is described in detail in Holmes (1998), and has been used and 
extended by Dube et al. (2010) and Duranton et al. (2011). 
29
 A CT bordering more than one CT of a bordering municipality enters multiple times 
into the sample, each time with a separate pair fixed effect. To correct for the resulting 
correlations across pairs on the same municipality boundary, we use two-way clustering 
(Cameron at al 2008), by municipality and by each border between municipalities. 
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ΔElectricitycpi = αp + βEnfranchisedi + γControlsc + εcpi           (3) 
As before, i indicates a municipality, c indicates a CT and p indicates a 
pair of adjacent CTs that lie across a municipality boundary. Note that 
the controls are now at CT level but Enfranchised remains at the 
municipal level. Results are reported in Table 6 and are similar to those 
obtained with our difference-in-differences specification. The coefficient 
of Enfranchised is always statistically significant at 1% level and ranges 
from 0.17 to 0.28, slightly lower than what we obtained previously.  
When we distinguish between ethnic groups, the coefficient of black 
enfranchised remains positive, statistically significant and with a 
magnitude almost identical to that of Table 5. The coefficient of 
enfranchised coloured becomes instead statistically insignificant while 
that of enfranchised Indians becomes significant: these are the only 
relevant differences compared to our main specification. Overall, our 
results are robust to this quite demanding specification, both in terms of 
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients of interest. 
 
Other robustness checks.   As discussed in section 3.3, another concern is 
that our dependent variable has an upper bound of 100. Highly 
electrified areas in the pre-treatment period have lower margins to 
improve, and since pre-treatment electrification levels are certainly not 
orthogonal to enfranchisement, this may bias the coefficients of interest. 
Therefore we repeated our exercise with restricted samples, excluding 
municipalities where more than 90 per cent of the population had access 
to electricity in 1996, and progressively bringing this threshold down to 
40 per cent (in 10-point intervals). Using the same specification as in 
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column 5 of Table 6, the coefficient on Enfranchised is about twice as 
large as in the full sample. While electrification gains were lower in areas 
with very high levels of household access to electricity in 1996, the basic 
pattern is very robust. These results appear in Appendix Table B2, panel 
(a). 
 
Further robustness checks reported in Appendix Table B3, panel (a), 
show that the pattern of results does not change if we exclude, in turn, 
the municipalities that fall into any one of the nine provinces: the 
relationship we document is not limited to any particular region of the 
country. 
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Table 6: The impact of enfranchisement on electrification (satellite data, with placebo regressions) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
a. Dependent variable: ΔNightlight 1996-2001 
       
Enfranchised 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.092*** 0.088** 0.080** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) 
 
Enfranchised black 
      
0.109*** 
       
(0.038) 
Enfranchised coloured 
      
0.041 
       
(0.044) 
Enfranchised Indian 
      
0.015 
       
(0.049) 
b. Dependent variable: ΔNightlight 1992-1996 
       
Enfranchised 0.068 0.029 0.037 0.047 0.059 -0.006 
 
 
(0.052) (0.059) (0.056) (0.063) (0.064) (0.070) 
 
Enfranchised black 
      
0.007 
       
(0.072) 
Enfranchised coloured 
      
-0.026 
       
(0.078) 
Enfranchised Indian 
      
-0.078 
       
(0.082) 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pop. and socioeconomic controls (1996) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Households without electricity (1996) No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Pop. and socioeconomic controls (1996-2001 diff.) No No No No No Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of lit pixels (difference 1996-2001 and 1992-1996, respectively) calculated from satellite data. 
All regressions also include a constant. Refer to Table 5 for a description of control variables, and the data appendix for full details. N = 799. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: The impact of enfranchisement on electrification (contiguous census tract pairs) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Enfranchised 0.276*** 0.261*** 0.257*** 0.188*** 0.169*** 0.192*** 
 
 
(0.052) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) 
 
Enfranchised black 
 
    
 
       
 
0.260*** 
       
(0.063) 
Enfranchised coloured 
      
-0.020 
       
(0.081) 
Enfranchised Indian 
      
0.188*** 
       
(0.074) 
Contiguous CTs Pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Households without electricity (1996) No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Population and socioeconomic controls (1996-2001 
diff.) 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared (overall) 0.084 0.062 0.038 0.074 0.083 0.089 0.103 
R-squared (within) 0.017 0.019 0.027 0.069 0.082 0.088 0.095 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity for lighting (difference 1996-2001) calculated from census data. 
Refer to Table 5 for a description of control variables, and the data appendix for full details. All variables are calculated at the CT level, except 
Enfranchised and Enfranchised black/coloured/Indian, which are calculated at the municipality level. N = 7528. Standard errors are double clustered 
(see Cameron et al. 2011) at the municipality and the border level. There are 687 clusters for municipalities and 1172 clusters for borders. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.6 The mediating role of political parties 
This section focuses on how party politics affected electrification during 
this period. As noted earlier, partisan effects could differ depending on 
whether Eskom or a local distributor was in charge of electrification. In 
municipalities served by Eskom, electricity distribution could be part of a 
national strategy of rewarding core supporters or swing voters. On the 
other hand, local distributors could be more responsive to changes in the 
median voter (irrespective of party representation at the local level). We 
use 1996 membership data from the Association of Municipal Electricity 
Undertakings (AMEU) to distinguish the two groups. Appendix B 
contains a detailed description. 
 
Our statistical analysis draws on the variable ANC seat sharei, which is the 
share of total seats on local council i won by the ANC in the 1995/6 
elections (Elections Task Group 1996). This was the first time following 
its unbanning that the ANC was able to fully contest municipal elections. 
Hence, the share of seats obtained in those elections at the same time 
represents the change in the share of ANC seats from zero prior to 
democracy. The variable is highly heterogeneous and ranges from zero to 
100 per cent with a mean of 55 and a standard deviation of 31. Map 4 in 
Figure 5 shows the geographic distribution, with spatial clusters of ANC 
seats between 76 and 100 per cent in the Eastern Cape, North West, and 
Limpopo (the latter was initially called Northern Transvaal and then 
Northern Province). These provinces contain the ANC’s core 
constituencies and coincide with the areas that experienced the greatest 
changes in electrification as depicted in Map 1. 
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We first test whether enfranchisement is merely a proxy for the changed 
landscape in municipal representation, or put differently, if the impact of 
democratization on electrification is channelled via municipal 
representation of the ANC. Hence, we start by augmenting our model 
with the seat share variable. Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the ANC’s 
seat share had no direct effect on electrification outcomes and that 
enfranchisement, which remains positive and statically significant, is 
therefore not merely a proxy for ANC representation. Only when we 
exclude enfranchisement, the effect of ANC representation on 
electrification is not statistically distinguishable from zero (column 2). We 
also find no evidence of a direct effect of ANC seat share when we 
distinguish Eskom (column 3) and municipal distribution (column 4) 
areas. Moreover, the coefficient on Enfranchised is the same in both 
subsamples. 
 
If not via municipal representation, another possibility is that the impact 
of enfranchisement itself differed as a function of ANC strength. To test 
this, we augment our model with an interaction between Enfranchised 
and ANC seat share. We report results for the full sample (column 5) and 
separately for Eskom (column 6) and municipal distributors (column 7).30 
The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant only in 
the full sample and the Eskom subsample. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is larger in the latter case. To probe the precise nature of the 
partisan effect, we construct separate dummies for quartiles of ANC seat 
                                                 
30 When we replaced the ANC’s seat share with NP or IFP seat shares, the results convey 
a similar story in different ways: the effect of enfranchisement is statistically significant 
only when these parties had low levels of representation on local councils, and it is 
decreasing in their representation. See Appendix Figure B3. 
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share. We then use these dummies and their interactions with 
enfranchisement in our regressions (the first quartile is the reference 
category), replacing the continuous seat share measure and its interaction. 
The results in columns (8) to (10) and in Figure 7 reveal important 
nuances. First, the 50 percent threshold does not matter; the conditional 
coefficients for the second and third quartiles are not statistically 
distinguishable. Second, F-tests indicate that in Eskom-served 
municipalities the marginal effect of franchise extension when the party 
controls 75 percent of seats or more is statistically different from the other 
conditional coefficients. If it simply were the case that the coordination 
between a non-ANC council and Eskom was more difficult, then it 
should matter whether the ANC had a majority or not, irrespective of its 
size, but this is not the pattern we detect. For councils with municipal 
distributors, the effect of enfranchisement is still larger in the three 
highest quartiles of ANC representation, compared to the baseline 
category, but the differences are smaller and statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 7: Enfranchisement conditional on ANC seat share quartile 
 
Note: Graphs (a), (b), and (c) are based on the results in columns (8), (9), and (10) of Table 8, respectively. 
 
 
  
 99 
We also conduct a formal test of whether the corresponding coefficients 
depicted in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 7 are statistically different. Using 
the full sample, we estimate a model with a three-way interaction of 
enfranchisement, the seat share quartile dummies, and an indicator of 
whether a municipality is supplied directly by Eskom.31 The coefficient 
on the interaction between Enfranchised, ANC seat share Q4, and the 
Eskom indicator is .655 (the difference between .953 and .297 in columns 
9 and 10 of Table 8), with a standard error of .258 (p = .011). For all other 
seat share quartiles, the corresponding differences between the two 
subsamples are not statistically distinguishable. In other words, Eskom 
delivered a significant top-up to core constituencies of the ANC, in both a 
substantive as well as a statistical sense. 
 
These patterns are robust to different combinations of controls included 
in Tables 2 and 3; we do not report these results. Supplementary results 
in appendix Table B2, panel (b) show that pattern is also evident in the 
restricted samples introduced earlier to account for a possible ceiling 
effect. Table B3, panel (b), further shows that the interactive pattern is 
robust to excluding municipalities in any one of the nine provinces. 
 
In sum, we detect two distinct patterns of service delivery, depending on 
the assignment of institutional responsibility for electrification. In 
municipal distribution areas, the partisan composition of local councils 
                                                 
31 To recover the precise coefficients reported in columns 9 and 10 of Table 8, we also 
allowed the coefficients on all controls to vary across the two subsamples. The results 
reported here are substantively the same whether we do this or not. 
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does not condition the effect of enfranchisement. This implies that, when 
decision-making happened at the local level, party convergence was 
more likely in line with standard models of electoral competition (Downs 
1957). The results for Eskom distribution areas, on the other hand, point 
to a strong role for the partisan composition of municipal assemblies and 
appear compatible with core-voter models in the distributive politics 
literature (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986). Here, the pattern of results 
suggests that the dominant party in the national government, via Eskom, 
rewarded its “key constituencies”, as predicted by Davis and Steyn (1998: 
68). Since Eskom was responsible for two-thirds of the electrification 
target under the NEP, this effect dominates in the full sample.32 
                                                 
32  Without the subsample analysis, the average pattern of results could have been 
interpreted as evidence against convergence on the median voter while our results are 
compatible with this hypothesis. This highlights the central importance of 
understanding the precise delivery mechanisms for the proper interpretation of the 
spatial patterns we document. 
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Table 8: The role of the ANC’s seat share on local councils 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Enfranchised 0.194*** 
 
0.216*** 0.115 0.053 0.065 -0.005 0.080* 0.082* -0.082 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.050) (0.086) (0.044) (0.048) (0.143) (0.044) (0.047) (0.168) 
ANC seat share -0.005 0.050** -0.011 -0.005 -0.370*** -0.491*** -0.187 
   
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.032) (0.051) (0.086) (0.114) (0.153) 
   
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 
    
0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002 
   
     
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
   
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 
Q2        
0.125 0.174 0.224 
        
(0.083) (0.107) (0.187) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 
Q3        
0.165* 0.211** 0.167 
        
(0.087) (0.103) (0.199) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 
Q4        
0.511*** 0.953*** 0.297 
        
(0.159) (0.173) (0.194) 
ANC seat share Q2 
       
-12.401** -17.632** -15.247 
        
(6.211) (8.236) (13.649) 
ANC seat share Q3 
       
-12.898* -16.789** -9.201 
        
(6.836) (8.373) (14.527) 
ANC seat share Q4 
       
-44.830*** -86.916*** -20.830 
        
(14.614) (15.934) (14.458) 
Observations 799 799 551 248 799 551 248 799 551 248 
Distributors in the sample All All Eskom Municipal All Eskom Municipal All Eskom Municipal 
R-squared 0.245 0.227 0.240 0.311 0.262 0.264 0.314 0.266 0.277 0.318 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity for lighting (difference 1996-2001) calculated from census data. All regressions include a 
constant, province fixed effects, geographic controls, population and socioeconomic controls (1996), and households without electricity (1996). Refer to Table 5 for a description 
of control variables, and the data appendix for full details. The pattern of results is not affected when we vary the combination of controls. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
We find that enfranchisement increased household electrification rates 
during the first period of the democratic local government in South 
Africa. For the period 1996-2001, we estimate an average increase in the 
share of households with electricity access across municipalities of 
between 3 and 6 percentage points per standard deviation of 
enfranchisement. When distinguishing different groups of newly 
enfranchised voters, we find that the effect of enfranchisement on 
electrification is largest in municipalities with higher shares of black 
voters. Our placebo regressions, in which we proxy for electrification by 
using nighttime lights satellite imagery, provide evidence that this 
finding is unlikely to be due to pre-existing trends. We conduct further 
robustness checks that return the same pattern of results. With regard to 
the question we raised at the outset of this chapter, our evidence suggests 
that in the case of South Africa, democracy did indeed affect the delivery 
of electricity, as enfranchisement shifted the median voter.  
 
Our analysis also shows that the liberalization of political organization 
mediated the effect of enfranchisement. While enfranchisement had a 
positive effect on electrification across municipalities, ANC core 
constituencies supplied by Eskom saw even larger gains in this initial 
period of the post-apartheid electrification campaign. In other words, 
Eskom delivered an ANC top-up in areas where it distributed electricity. 
Conversely, the partisan composition of the local council made no 
difference in areas with municipal distributors controlled by local 
councils, suggesting convergence on the median voter. Hence, it appears 
that all political parties tried to deliver electrification when in power at 
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the local level, but the ANC had its hands on one crucial additional lever: 
Eskom. These findings highlight the importance of pinpointing how 
political parties can affect service provision in order to understand 
observed spatial patterns of service delivery.  
 
Our results contribute to the literature on democracy and public services 
in several ways. Much of the literature is cross-national and uses 
comparative indices of democracy that make it difficult to pin down what 
precisely affects public service provision. Our analysis is sub-national 
and establishes an analytically separate contribution of franchise 
extension and changes in partisan representation; not only does it matter 
that more people receive the right to vote, but under certain conditions it 
also matters which party they vote for. This is a valuable first step in 
addressing the “compound treatment” problem in cross-national work 
on this topic. 
 
Moreover, by directly measuring service delivery outcomes our analysis 
focuses on the ultimate outcome of interest: whether people’s lives were 
actually affected. This is essential for assessing the implications of 
democracy on the poor when resource allocation is a limited indicator for 
actual service delivery, as is the case in many developing countries. Our 
empirical analysis uses two independent data sources to assess 
electrification outcomes. This is an advance over studies based on data 
collected with involvement by the very governmental units that are 
under examination. By using both census data and satellite images, our 
work is also among the first in documenting their relationship. We 
demonstrate potential for cross-validation but also limitations. More 
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research is needed to analyse how precisely these alternative measures 
relate to one another in different contexts. 
 
With respect to the South African context of this chapter, we recognize 
that our scope is narrowly defined: we focus on the initial period of 
electrification after the demise of apartheid. Various institutional 
adjustments, including the redrawing of municipal boundaries, and 
changes to the electricity sector, make it difficult to trace effects for a 
more extended period. While, on balance, electricity access continued to 
improve, disconnections due to non-payment became a widespread 
phenomenon that undermined access (Fjeldstad 2004). More recently, 
electricity blackouts occurred as a sustained lack of investment in 
generation capacity became evident. It is important to point out that these 
problems were not an inevitable consequence of the initial electrification 
campaign that we examine, but rather the result of inadequate planning 
(Johnson 2009: 473-481). 
 
How generalizable are our results? On the one hand, the South African 
context was unusual in that the conditions for a rapid rollout of electricity 
existed at the time of the transition to democracy. Due to a massive 
reserve margin, electricity generation was not an obstacle to expansion. 
Post-democratization electrification gains might be less impressive in 
countries with lower reserve margins. Related work on how democracy 
affects health outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that the basic 
pattern that we document for electricity applies more widely to other 
services (Kudamatsu 2012). We plan detailed follow-up work on access to 
drinking water and housing, which have their own complexities. 
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Nonetheless, we have reasons to believe that the patterns we document 
apply not only to other services, but also widely across countries. Recent 
work on enfranchisement in very different geographic and historical 
contexts (e.g., Miller 2008, Vernby 2013) gives external validation to our 
finding that enfranchisement matters for service delivery. We contribute 
to this literature by drawing attention to the potentially crucial mediating 
role of political parties and how they affect spatial patterns of service 
delivery in response to franchise extension. 
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Chapter IV 
 
How can we study socioeconomic 
outcomes from outer space? Opportunities 
and pitfalls of using nighttime lights data 
in quantitative social science research 
 
 
Abstract  
How can we study socioeconomic outcomes from outer space? This 
chapter makes a methodological contribution to answering this question 
by providing the first review of nighttime lights applications from a 
social science perspective. It highlights the possibilities for using these 
data to proxy for a range of socioeconomic outcomes, from electrification, 
to economic activity, and educational attainment. More importantly, I 
demonstrate that there are significant limitations using the data and that 
 107 
a strong positive correlation between nighttime lights and a given 
socioeconomic outcome on the national level does not warrant their 
application on the subnational level. Both Type I and Type II errors are 
likely to arise. The chapter also draws attention to important differences 
between the ways in which we can turn the information stored in the 
satellite images into proxies for socioeconomic outcomes. Crucially, the 
results we get can differ greatly, depending on which method is chosen.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In 1960, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) of 
the United States launched its first experimental weather satellite. 
Initially, the aim was to obtain global meteorological data, but it soon 
became clear that the images obtained by the satellite provided a unique 
perspective of human activity from outer space. Today, the images 
present an opportunity to obtain independent, globally consistent and 
complete proxies for a range of socioeconomic outcomes such as 
electricity provision, economic growth, greenhouse gas emissions, or 
urbanisation. This value proposition is appealing to social scientists 
engaging in quantitative research as they depend on consistent, high-
quality data, which are often difficult to obtain. While data collection 
efforts by governments and other organizations have increased, 
availability remains a problem, particularly for those hoping to study 
socioeconomic outcomes in developing countries. But even in the 
developed world, high local precision is difficult to achieve in studies 
that transcend national borders. For example, with access limited to 
traditional data sources, it would hardly be possible to compare 
socioeconomic outcomes in an area of precisely 20 square kilometres on 
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either side of a national border. Similarly, we would not be able to 
answer questions that require the measurement of rural electrification 
rates across countries in sub-Saharan Africa, energy consumption levels 
in China, or urbanisation trends in Indian villages.  
 
It is thus not surprising that the use of the satellite images is starting to 
spill over from weather forecasting to the social sciences. Taking 
advantage of the revolution in remote sensing technology and advances 
in geospatial analysis, a few social scientists with an empirical research 
agenda have started using the images to proxy for a range of 
socioeconomic outcomes in various country contexts, such as measuring 
electrification in India (Min 2010), economic development in Africa 
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013), or human well-being across the 
globe (Ghosh et al. 2013). The global breadth and at the same time local 
accuracy of these data opens up avenues for exploring new research 
questions. The investigation of contemporary differences in well-being 
across ethnic groups within 17 Sub-Saharan countries in Alesina et al. 
(2012) is another fitting example. While social science applications of the 
images are still in their infancy, the remote sensing literature is well 
established and offers a wealth of insights into the many possible 
applications of the data. This chapter provides the first review of the 
existing literature from a social science perspective, thereby highlighting 
the potential of this technological advance to study human development.  
 
More importantly, however, the aim of this chapter is to draw attention 
to three main risks associated with any application of the images in 
quantitative social science research: first, even though several scholars 
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have shown high correlations between satellite-based and census-based 
measures of socioeconomic outcomes on the global level, there are large 
outliers in each of these studies. We cannot therefore assume that the 
images work equally well in all countries of the world. Second, even if 
the correlation coefficient between satellite-based and census-based 
measures is high at the national level, this does not mean that the 
correlation is equally high on the subnational level. Third, there are 
important differences between the ways in which we can turn the 
information stored in the satellite images into proxies for socioeconomic 
outcomes. The results we get can differ greatly, depending on which 
method is chosen. This risk is amplified when researchers refer to the 
variables with vague concepts such ‘luminosity’ or ‘light density,’ even 
though this can easily lead to interpretations that are removed from what 
the variable captures in reality. 
 
Unfortunately, these risks are easily overlooked given the substantial 
advantages of using the data. I want to highlight at the outset of this 
chapter that data extracted from the images can never directly capture 
socioeconomic outcomes. They can only serve as proxies, which by 
definition makes them imperfect. Access to electricity is a useful example 
to consider: in an ideal world we would be able to directly capture 
whether someone has access to electricity or not. In the absence of such a 
perfect variable, there are at least two types of data sources available. On 
the one hand most countries collect censuses or administrative data, for 
example on household electricity usage typically recorded or electricity 
sales per customer. On the other hand, nighttime lights images are 
available online and capture the geographic location of manmade 
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lighting that is persistent enough to be picked up by a satellite in outer 
space. Both data sources are discussed in more detail below, the point I 
want to make here is that we can expect there to be great differences 
between what these two data sources can tell us about the true outcome 
of interest.  
 
To do so, the discussion focuses predominantly on electricity because this 
is arguably the most direct way of interpreting the images: after all, each 
pixel reflects the presence or absence of anthropogenic light. At the same 
time, electricity access is often considered a “marker” of development 
(Dinkelman 2011: 3078), making it a relevant outcome of concern, be it 
from a public administration, policy, or economics angle. To demonstrate 
how the discussion extends to other social science applications, I also 
look at income and educational attainment, given their importance for 
studying human development.  
 
In order to highlight the aforementioned risks, I reproduce the results 
presented in Elvidge et al. (2010), to demonstrate variation in cross-
national correlations between census-based and satellite-based 
electrification measures. I also draw attention to large outliers in their 
study that are easily overlooked. To demonstrate that cross-country 
results are not necessarily portable to the subnational level, I take 
advantage of South African census data to cross-validate the satellite-
based measures.  
 
There are two main reasons why South Africa is a particularly useful 
setting for this exercise: first, the massive scale of South Africa’s 
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electrification programme in the 1990s makes for a fertile testing ground 
for assessing the extent to which both different levels of and changes in 
socioeconomic outcomes are observable from outer space. Following 
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, over 10 million 
people are estimated to have gained access to electricity. These changes 
are well documented in traditional data sources and should be clearly 
visible from outer space. Second, the availability of high quality census 
data offers a rare opportunity for cross-validating the satellite images. 
During the two decades for which nighttime lights data are currently 
available (1992-2012), South Africa has had three censuses (1996, 2001 
and 2011). Since even most industrialised countries only carry out one 
census per decade, the frequency of the data presents a strong 
comparative advantage of South Africa. More importantly, coupled with 
its exceptionally high quality compared to most other countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Jerven 2013: 101).  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: first, I provide a 
social science perspective on nighttime light images by reviewing the 
existing literature, including both remote sensing and social science 
contributions. I then offer an overview of underlying data sources and 
detailed definitions of variables in section 4.3. On this basis, I cross-
validate satellite-based measures of socioeconomic indicators with 
census-based measures on the cross-country level as well as with data 
from South African municipalities. Section 4.5 categorizes the main 
pitfalls to explain why such discrepancies might arise and demonstrates 
ways to navigate them. Section 4.6 concludes.  
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4.2 A social science perspective on nighttime light 
satellite imagery  
When looking at a satellite image of Africa by night, at least three distinct 
hubs of brightness stand out (see Map 1, Figure 8): the densely populated 
Nile Delta in Egypt stretching south of Cairo, the Niger Delta Basin in 
Nigeria, where most of the country’s oil fields are located and the area 
around Johannesburg in South Africa, which generates approximately 
one tenth of the GDP of the entire continent. The rest of the continent 
appears almost completely dark, particularly in comparison to the 
shining lights of Western Europe by night (see Map 2, Figure 8). Densely 
populated countries such as the Netherlands or Germany display high 
levels of brightness, consistently and nearly ubiquitously. Zooming in on 
the geographic extent of South Africa reveals a much darker image, 
which likely reflects not only a lower population density, but also lower 
access to electricity (see Map 3, Figure 8). Nonetheless, major urban areas, 
such as the Cape Town Peninsula in the south-west and Port Elizabeth, 
Pietermaritzburg, and Durban along the southern coastline are clearly 
visible.  
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Figure 8: Views of the African continent, Western Europe and South Africa by night (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: Darkness on the African continent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2: Western Europe shining bright                   Map 3: South Africa’s eight biggest cities by night 
 
Note: Image and data processing by NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center. DMSP data collected by US Air Force Weather Agency. Above 
maps use images acquired with satellite F14 in 2001.  
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It seems intuitive that at the most basic level these striking images would 
be able to inform us about electrification: where we see lights, there must 
be electricity. Indeed, the images directly capture the existence of stable, 
electric lights as seen from outer space. But this was not the original 
intention. When NASA launched satellite TIROS-I in 1960 the mission 
was to provide global, operational meteorological data to meet military 
commitments (Air Weather Service 1974: ii). When the images became 
publicly available in the early 1970s – by then recorded with the 
succeeding Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Operational 
Linescan System (DMSP-OLS)33 – the group of scientists using the data 
extended from US military scientists to the global community of 
meteorologists. While the early literature thus focused predominantly on 
the use of the images for weather forecasting purposes, it soon became 
clear that the images provided a unique perspective of human activity as 
observed from outer space (see Croft 1978: 1979).  
 
When the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in 
Boulder, Colorado established a digital archive in 1992, a burgeoning 
literature focussing on empirical applications of the images emerged. 
Today researchers working with nighttime light images generally fall 
into one of two groups: scientists in the fields of remote sensing on the 
one hand and quantitative social scientists on the other hand. While the 
two groups do not have a common research agenda, they share an 
interest in making use of the images. Research by the latter group draws 
heavily on the insights and findings produced by the former, particularly 
                                                 
33 This is now a US Department of Defense programme run by the Air Force Space and 
Missile Systems Center. 
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the wealth of papers produced by Christopher Elvidge and his team at 
NOAA’s Earth Observation Group (EOG), who process and release the 
data. This makes the remote sensing literature a natural starting point for 
gaining a social science perspective on the data. 
 
Insights from the remote sensing literature. Much of the early work by the 
scientists at the EOG is descriptive in nature, clarifying the functionality 
of the satellite sensors and basic applications (e.g., see Elvidge et al. 1997, 
Imhoff et al. 1997, Sutton et al. 1997). More recent work has focused on 
the use of nighttime lights as a proxy for socioeconomic indicators, 
thereby establishing the relevance of the images for social science 
applications. Elvidge et al. (2010) document a strong positive relationship 
between nighttime lights and electrification rates across 229 countries and 
more than 2,000 subnational units. Their work presents the first 
systematic global assessment of electrification rates, which paved the way 
for subsequent social science applications. By overlaying lights and 
population rasters – a method that is further discussed below – they 
estimate that 1.62 billion people worldwide lacked access to electricity in 
2006, compared to 1.58 billion estimated by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). The resulting correlation coefficient between national level 
nighttime lights and IEA data is 0.90, suggesting a strong positive 
relationship between the two. The paper concludes that “while there are 
some known sources of error in the current product, the method does 
provide electrification rates using a standardized definition and 
standardized data sources, with complete global coverage.” As I 
demonstrate below, large outliers are hidden behind the high correlation 
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reported in this paper. I will therefore revisit this pioneering study 
throughout this chapter.  
 
Other scientists have confirmed the high correlation between satellite-
based and census-based measures of electrification. For example, 
Townsend and Bruce (2010) reinforce the correlation between satellite-
based and census-based measures of electricity in their analysis of the 
spatial distribution of electricity consumption in Australia. For the period 
1997 to 2002, they show that there was a very high correlation between 
state electricity consumption and nighttime lights with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.93 at the state and territory spatial resolution. Chand et al. 
(2009) show that in India between 1993 and 2002 changes in electricity 
consumption can be traced using nighttime light satellite imagery. Over 
this period, they find that a population increase of 170 million was 
accompanied by an increase in power consumption by 261,393 billion 
kWh. Nighttime light imagery mirrored this change with an increase in 
the number of nighttime lights of up to 26 per cent in all states. From 
these studies we may infer that there is a high correlation between 
electricity and nighttime lights – as per the definitions used in each of 
these studies and taking outliers into account – but as I demonstrate in 
this chapter the relationship on the subnational level is a lot less robust. 
 
Besides electrification, the remote sensing literature has applied 
nighttime light images to study economic activity: Doll et al. (2006) 
present a global map of GDP at a one-degree resolution using nighttime 
light imagery. They also compare satellite-based measures of income 
growth with GDP statistics for 46 countries. Building on this research 
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Ghosh et al. (2010a) construct a map of total economic activity in which 
they include both formal and informal economic activity. They argue that 
the map they generate provides an alternative means for measuring 
global economic activity, which for the first time includes the informal 
economy. In more recent work Ghosh et al. (2013) provide a review of 
efforts to use the nighttime lights images, not only to measure GDP, but 
also human well-being more generally. The possibility to proxy for 
economic growth has attracted particular interest from the economics 
strand of the social science literature. The pioneering study by Henderson 
et al. (2011) is further discussed below.  
 
In the spirit of capturing human development more generally, Elvidge et 
al. (2012) develop a Night Light Development Index, measuring human 
development across the globe with satellite images. Their index correlates 
relatively strongly with the Human Development Index, with an R2 of 
0.71. This offers an interesting possibility for social scientists to enrich 
their datasets with an index that is a “simple, objective, spatially explicit 
and globally available empirical measurement of human development 
derived solely from nighttime satellite imagery and population density” 
(Elvidge et al. 2012: 24). However, any such application will need to be 
carefully tailored to a given country and temporal context. 
 
Doll’s (2008) guide to the use of nighttime lights provides a useful 
overview of other interdisciplinary applications, such as urbanisation. He 
makes reference to earlier research in which he correlates areas that 
appear lit in the images with census based population figures to trace 
urban extents in the US. Building on this work, Sutton (2003) determines 
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the level of urban sprawl in US cities by comparing their radiance 
thresholds. More recent work compares regional and global urban 
growth in India, China, Japan, and the US, measures the dynamics of 
urbanization in India (Pandey et al. 2013), and contrasts patterns of urban 
expansion in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia between 1992 and 
2009 (Alvarez-Berrios et al. 2013). Agnew et al. (2008) show how the 
images can be used in a more qualitative way: they evaluate the US 
military surge in Iraq by assessing the extent to which the distribution of 
nighttime lights in Baghdad changed between March 2006 and December 
2007. 
 
There have also been a number of studies in the area of disaster 
management, for example analysing the extent of light disruption in 
Mississippi and Louisiana following hurricane Katrina in September 2005 
(Doll 2008: 29). Another interesting application of nighttime lights data is 
the approximation of greenhouse gas emissions. On a global level there is 
a strong positive correlation between nighttime lights and carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions. This relationship was first identified by Elvidge et al. 
(1997) and then built on by Doll et al. (2000), who map global CO2 
emissions at a resolution of one square kilometre. Ghosh et al. (2010b) 
make the distribution of carbon dioxide emissions visible on a global map. 
The possibility to map and monitor emissions and identify specific 
sources, such as gas flaring, make them an indispensible resource for 
climate change researchers and policy makers. In fact, the World Bank is 
leading a global gas flaring reduction initiative in partnership with the 
NOAA, who provide estimates of global volumes of gas flaring using 
nighttime light satellite imagery. The unbiased and independent nature 
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of the images render them particularly useful for research on countries, 
such as Russia or China, where the objectiveness of administrative data 
may be called into question.  
 
The aforementioned papers point to the breadth of possible social science 
applications of nighttime light imagery: from proxying for electrification, 
to economic activity, urbanisation to disaster management, the images 
provide a distinct view of the world from outer space. It is important to 
note, however, that most of the remote sensing literature has established 
robust correlations between the lights and socioeconomic indicators on a 
global level. Indeed, one of the main advantages of the remotely sensed 
images is to obtain information that is universally consistent, which 
makes it possible to establish proxies or indices that help us better 
understand socioeconomic development across the globe. To a certain 
extent, this is at odds with recent developments in the social science 
literature. Due to the high risk of endogeneity in cross-section data, an 
increasing number of empirical studies analyses socio-economic 
outcomes on the subnational level. Each application of nighttime lights in 
a subnational context requires careful consideration.  
 
Social science applications.  The economics literature was possibly the first 
social science branch to make use of the images to proxy for different 
variations of economic development. Henderson et al. (2012) use the 
images to measure economic growth from outer space. Published in the 
American Economic Review, this paper is generally considered the 
pioneering study in this literature, making it a common reference in 
subsequent studies. The authors develop a composite measure with 
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roughly equal weights on census-based and satellite-based growth to 
augment official income statistics in poor countries. They find that their 
composite measure differs from official data by up to three percentage 
points annually. They also take advantage of the high resolution of the 
images by calculating economic growth measures for subnational units in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and Alesina et al. (2012) follow 
the study in using nighttime lights data as a proxy. The former paper 
uses the satellite-based measure as a proxy for regional development. The 
authors argue that the use of what they refer to as 'luminosity' builds 
directly on contributions such as Elvidge et al. (1997) and Henderson et al. 
(2012) in the literature showing that “light density at night is a robust 
proxy of economic activity” (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013: 120). 
They perform cross-validation between what they term ‘light density’ or 
‘luminosity’ – by which they refer to the variable they calculate using the 
digital number that is contained in each pixel – and a census-based 
wealth index in Nigeria, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Zimbabwe. They find a correlation coefficient of around 0.75 per cent, 
which is robust to the exclusion of the top 1 per cent of lit areas. Their use 
of an online appendix to provide additional cross-validation sets a good 
example for how studies that do not focus primarily on the images can 
still provide justification to support their use of the images. Notably, the 
cross-validation they provide is not at the same geographical hierarchy as 
the nighttime lights data they use in their empirical analysis: they 
validate the data across countries and regions within countries. Their 
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main units of analysis are, however, 10 square kilometre areas and the 
pixel level.  
 
Alesina et al. (2012) focus on spatial inequality in their application of the 
lights. Specifically, the authors proxy for the level of development in 
ethnic homelands with what they term ‘average luminosity per capita’ – 
again, the term luminosity refers to the digital number contained in each 
pixel. To generate the per capita measures, they draw on population data 
stemming from the Gridded Population of the World dataset. There are 
important drawbacks when combining nighttime lights with this dataset; 
these are addressed below. Nonetheless, they use this measure to 
generate a spatial Gini coefficient with which they measure spatial 
inequality in ethnic homelands. Acknowledging likely problems of 
measurement error, they construct an alternative spatial Gini coefficient 
based on Thiessen polygons and include both in their empirical 
specifications. Since nighttime lights data is only one of multiple data 
sources in their study, they devote less than one page to explaining the 
data, with a justification that is symptomatic of other social science 
applications: “since comparable data on income per capita at the ethnicity 
level across all countries in the world do not exist, following Henderson, 
Storeygard, and Weil (2012) … we use satellite image data on light 
density at night as a proxy” (Alesina et al. 2012).  
 
As one of the first political scientists, Min (2014) provides further 
evidence of the validity of nightlights data as a measure of electrification. 
He uses the images to study the effect of electoral accountability on 
public goods provision and the distribution of power to the poor in India. 
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Recognizing the lack of robust evidence for the relationship between 
nighttime lights and electricity for smaller subnational units, Min makes 
an effort to validate the data in the Indian context by correlating village 
level electricity consumption, as well as the percentage of households 
using electricity for lighting, with what he terms nighttime light output – 
finding relatively strong coefficients of 0.82 and 0.70 respectively.  
 
Unlike the remote sensing literature, social science papers have a 
tendency to use the images as one of many data sources rather than a 
primary subject.34 As mentioned above, they also tend to use the data on 
the subnational level, whereas the remote sensing literature 
predominantly focuses on global applications of the images. Appendix 
Table C1 provides an overview of selected empirical applications in both 
literatures in descending order. While the list of papers in panel (b) are 
only a very small selection of the available remote sensing literature, 
panel (a) includes the main social science applications in the fields of 
economics and political science that have been produced to date.  
 
Chen and Nordhaus (2010: 1) claim that “to date, virtually all studies 
have used the nighttime luminosity data without comparing them with 
other measures.” I would argue that this is an exaggeration, but their 
claim does reflect a general lack of sufficient cross-validation when using 
the data in social science applications. That is precisely why the use of 
nighttime lights alongside South African census data in chapter 3 makes 
an important contribution to the growing body of social science 
applications. However, it is important to recognize that oftentimes the 
                                                 
34 Henderson et al. (2011) is an exception. 
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reason for using the images in the first place is precisely the fact that no 
alternative data sources are available. However, at closer inspection the 
images produce indicators of socioeconomic outcomes that are very noisy. 
In this context, Chen and Nordhaus (2010: 3) argue that “luminosity data 
has little value added in countries where sophisticated statistical 
information is available because compared to nighttime lights, 
measurement errors in standard economic data are relatively small.” The 
value added of the images is higher in countries where no data on 
socioeconomic indicators are available, but at the same time, this does not 
warrant their use without any attempts for cross-validation. 
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4.3 Turning nighttime lights into proxies for 
socioeconomic outcomes 
In order to make the best use of the information in the images and extract 
proxies for socioeconomic outcomes, we have to understand the 
underlying data sources. For those unfamiliar with remote sensing data, 
Appendix C lays the groundwork for using and interpreting them 
appropriately by providing definitions not only nighttime lights as a data 
source, but also gridded population data, which are often used in 
combination with the images. The main point is that these are very 
different data sources compared to census data, which is why we can 
expect differences in empirical applications. It is important to keep the 
distinctions between nighttime lights, gridded population and census 
data in mind, when turning the data into proxies for socioeconomic 
outcomes. This section shows how.   
 
While there are a number of ways to turn the digital number included in 
each pixel into a proxy for socioeconomic outcomes, existing social 
science applications have tended not to justify why they perform this step 
in a particular way. Instead, they simply refer to the data as ‘luminosity’ 
or ‘light density’ leaving the reader to wonder what precisely the 
measure actually means. In order to shed some light on the way in which 
we can use the data, the following shows that there are at least three 
distinct ways in which we can convert the information stored in each 
pixel into proxies for socioeconomic outcomes. This is an important 
exercise because the variable choice we make can affect the results we get.   
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Digital number. Arguably the most straightforward way of using the 
information contained in the nighttime light images is to determine the 
pixel value at the centre, the geographical centroid of a settlement and 
use that information to draw conclusions about the availability of 
electricity there. Alternatively, it is possible to add up pixel values for a 
desired level of geographic aggregation. This calculation uses the 
boundaries of a shape file to define the zones for which the digital 
numbers of each pixel are summed up.35 In the literature, the resulting 
value is often termed luminosity (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
2013). Based on this method, the average digital number can be 
calculated by dividing the sum of all pixels by the number of pixels in a 
given area. This continuous measure is in fact the average of an average 
because the digital numbers in the images are averages of daily, cloud-
free observations over a given year. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
(2013) use this method to calculate the average digital number at various 
different levels of aggregation as a proxy for ethnic inequality.  
 
However, one issue to be aware of when using this variable is that there 
are clusters of very brightly-lit pixels in main cities of developed 
countries. This problem is referred to as top-coding in the literature and 
arises when satellite sensors become saturated (Chen and Nordhaus 2010: 
7). This is less of a problem in poorer countries, and especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, where almost no pixels are top-coded (Storeygard 2012: 
9). In South Africa, only 0.16 per cent of pixels had a value of 63 in 1992 
                                                 
35 In ArcMap, this calculation can be performed with the ‘zonal statistics as a table’ tool, 
using the nighttime lights image as the input value raster and the shape file with 
boundaries as the feature zone to define the boundaries for which the data are to be 
calculated. 
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and while this figure has increased drastically in recent years, the number 
of top-coded pixels was still less than 0.5 per cent in 2012. If a researcher 
studies an area with a high share of top-coded pixels, such as New York 
City, the digital number is unlikely to be the appropriate variable.    
 
Share of lit pixels.  By reclassifying pixels it is possible to reduce the 
containing information into a binary code, indicating whether a given 
pixel is lit or not. To do so, pixel values between 1 and 63 are reclassified 
to take the value 1, indicating the presence of light, and pixels with value 
0 retain the same value, indicating the absence of light. Pixels with value 
1 are termed lit pixels, whereas pixels with value 0 are referred to as unlit 
pixels. This binary measure captures the presence or absence of light, 
rather than the intensity. For example, if a settlement grows brighter over 
the years, due to the introduction of more and brighter outdoor lighting, 
the share of lit pixels remains unchanged if this is not also associated 
with a geographic expansion. The share of lit pixels does not take the 
luminosity information provided in the nighttime lights into account. 
Crucially, this makes the variable less sensitive to variations in the 
satellite’s recording instruments or changes in atmospheric conditions 
over time (Min 2010: 16). The importance of this feature is further 
discussed below.    
 
The share of lit pixels in a given area is calculated as the sum of all lit 
pixels, divided by the total number of pixels in that area. Alternatively, 
this measure too can be determined for the centroid of a settlement, thus 
determining whether a given place is electrified at its centre or not. 
Indeed, this is the primary dependent variable used in Min’s study of 
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electrification in rural India (2010). As above, the appropriateness of the 
centroid approach crucially depends on the size of the settlement and 
how straightforward it is to determine its centre.  
 
Share of population living in lit pixels.  The above measures electrification in 
terms of the presence of light in a pixel. Social scientists are, however, 
likely to be more interested in whether or not people in a given square 
kilometre have access to electricity, rather than whether or not a given 
square kilometre appears lit from outer space. One way of adjusting the 
share of lit pixels is to combine it with information about population. The 
share of populated lit pixels can be calculated as the sum of pixels that 
are both lit and populated, divided by the total number of populated 
pixels. Alternatively, rather than using binary information about the 
presence of people in a given pixel, it is possible to use the population 
counts rasters to determine how many people live in pixels that are lit. 
Dividing this figure by the total number of pixels equals the share of 
population living in lit pixels. This is the method used in Elvidge et al. 
(2010). Based on the definition of this measure, we may expect that this 
variable is closest to the census.    
 
Share of households with electricity.  The census based electrification rate for 
a given geographic boundary is defined as the share of households with 
electricity. Based on this definition, it is calculated as the share of 
households in a given area answering that electricity is the type of energy 
mainly used for lighting. Subsequent references to census-based 
electrification measures are based on this definition.  
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Each of the four aforementioned variables could potentially serve as a 
proxy for a socioeconomic outcome. However, given their distinct 
definitions, they are unlikely to give us the same answers. The following 
section puts each of these variables to the test in order to determine how 
they relate to each other and specifically how the satellite-based measures 
can help us study socioeconomic outcomes from outer space.      
 
4.4 Cross-validation with cross-country and South 
African census data 
Even though several scholars have shown high correlations between 
satellite-based and census-based measures of socioeconomic outcomes on 
the global level, we cannot assume that the images can serve as a reliable 
proxy for socioeconomic indicators in all contexts. Upon closer inspection, 
the findings presented in Elvidge et al. (2010) provide an excellent 
example: their analysis of global electrification rates overestimates that of 
the International Energy Agency by 2.5 per cent. This figure seems 
insubstantial on a global level. However, when comparing their 
estimated national electrification rates with data from the IEA, there are 
large differences in many cases. As illustrated in Figure 9, the satellite-
based estimates are 41 and 23 percentage points larger than the IEA 
estimates in the Congo and India respectively. Conversely, the IEA 
estimates are 24 and 27 percentage points larger than the satellite-based 
estimates in Brazil and Thailand. This means that when Elvidge et al. 
(2010: 7) report that the total number of people found to be without 
electricity is only slightly larger than the figure estimated by the IEA, it is 
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important to understand that their estimate includes both under and 
overestimations of the IEA figures.  
 
Figure 9: Showcasing differences between satellite and census based 
electrification rates 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from Elvidge et al. (2010). 
 
In fact, the absolute difference between the national estimates is much 
greater than the 40 million that a naive interpretation of Elvidge et al.’s 
result suggests. In China alone the nighttime lights estimate identifies 320 
million more people without electricity than the IEA (Elvidge et al. 2010: 
8).36 Then again, in India the IEA statistic exceeds the nighttime lights 
estimate by 220 million.37 In absolute terms, the estimates for these two 
countries amount to a discrepancy of nearly half a billion people 
compared to the IEA data. While it is unclear whether IEA data are the 
                                                 
36 Doll and Pachauri (2010: 5663) find a similar discrepancy in China.  
37 Author’s calculation with data provided in Elvidge et al. (2010).  
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appropriate yardstick against which to measure the accuracy of nighttime 
lights data, this example demonstrates that there is a risk in using 
nighttime lights as a proxy for electrification. This observation draws 
attention to the presence of outliers, warranting careful cross-validation 
in each application of the images. 
 
In addition to the problem of outliers, correlations between census-based 
and satellite-based measures of socioeconomic indicators can differ 
widely depending on how the information in the images is used. To 
illustrate this idea, I draw on the data used in Elvidge et al. (2010) once 
more: panel (a) in Table 9 reports correlation coefficients between 
satellite-based and census-based electrification measures for 81 countries 
in the year 2006. The total digital number is only weakly correlated with 
census data (0.22). This is not surprising given that this measure simply 
adds the value of every single pixel in a given country, regardless of size 
and population. When using the images to analyse electrification in an 
entire country, relative to others, normalization of the digital number is 
clearly important. That explains why the correlation coefficient grows 
slightly stronger when using the average digital number instead (0.39).  
 
Instead of using the average, the digital number can be normalized by a 
fixed area as demonstrated in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou’s (2013) 
paper on pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African 
development. They calculate the average digital number, what they call 
light density at night, for the 10 kilometre radius from the centroid of 
several enumeration areas in each country of interest. They show a robust 
and highly significant correlation between the average digital number 
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and electrification in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013: Appendix 
Table 1).38 Their method ensures that comparisons of the average digital 
number correspond to precisely the same area for each unit (i.e. a 10 
kilometre radius). Since this is not the case when the digital number is 
calculated for the entire geographic extent of different countries, this 
variable is unlikely to be suitable for comparing geographical units that 
differ greatly in size.  
 
Compared to the total digital number the correlation between the share of lit 
pixels and the IEA based measure is more than twice as strong (0.55). This 
indicates that the binary reclassification of the images and the 
normalization of the measure, improves the accuracy considerably. With 
a correlation coefficient of 0.66, the share of lit pixels also displays a strong 
correlation with the share of population in lit pixels. The latter in turn 
displays by far the highest correlation coefficient compared to the census-
based variable. 
 
As reported in Elvidge et al. (2010) the correlation coefficient of 0.90 
suggests a strong positive relationship between the two measures on the 
global level. When it comes to cross-sectional analyses, the share of 
population in lit pixels appears to be the most appropriate out of the three 
aforementioned proxies for electrification. 
 
                                                 
38 Interestingly, the correlation coefficient decreases when they condition the correlation 
on log population density. It is not clear, however, how accurate the population data are 
at such a low level of geographical disaggregation. 
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When extending this analysis to census-based measures of income and 
education, a high variation in correlation coefficients can be observed: as 
reported in panel (b) in Table 9, the correlation between the share of 
population in lit pixels and GDP per capita is only 0.47, far weaker than the 
correlation between the former and electrification. Regarding the share of 
the labour force without primary education, panel (c) in Table 9 reveals 
that the correlation coefficients between this indicator and satellite-based 
measures have the expected negative sign. The higher the share of labour 
force without primary education, the lower the satellite-based proxies. 
However, coefficients are relatively weak, varying between -0.07 and -
0.23.  
 
This exercise demonstrates that there are large differences between the 
results we get – with correlations ranging between 0.23 to 0.90 in the case 
of electrification – depending on how we choose to turn nighttime lights 
data into proxies for socioeconomic outcomes. The picture looks different 
again on the subnational level or when we want to trace socioeconomic 
outcomes over time.  
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Table 9: Correlating different measures of socioeconomic outcomes in 81 countries 
  
Census-based 
indicator 
Digital number 
(DN, total) 
Digital number (DN, mean) 
Share of population in lit 
pixels (%) 
Share of lit pixels 
(%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a. Electrification 
     
Census/IEA: share of hhs with access to 
electricity 1.00 
    Digital number (total) 0.22 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) 0.39 -0.06 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels 0.90 0.17 0.45 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels 0.55 0.00 0.80 0.66 1.00 
b. Income 
     
Census/World Bank: GDP per capita 
(current US$) 1.00 
    Digital number (total) -0.06 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) 0.59 -0.06 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels 0.47 0.17 0.45 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels 0.57 0.00 0.79 0.66 1.00 
c.  Education  
     
Census/World Bank: share of labour 
force without primary education 1.00 
    Digital number (total) -0.07 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) -0.34 -0.22 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels -0.23 0.04 0.48 1.00 
 
Share of lit pixels -0.23 -0.33 0.80 0.62 1.00 
Note: Figures calculated for 81 countries in 2006. Census and share of population in lit pixels are from Elvidge et al. (2010). Share of lit pixels and digital number 
figures are based on author's own calculations using data acquired with satellite F16 in 2006. 
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Figure 10: Visualizing changes in electrification in South Africa between 1996 and 2011 
Figure 10a: Changes in lit pixels between  Figure 10b: Changes in census and satellite-based measures of electrification 
 
 
Note: Images and data processing by NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center. DMSP data collected by US Air Force Weather Agency. Figure 10a 
was created by the author by subtracting binary versions of the image acquired with satellite F18 in 2011 from the image acquired with satellite F12 in 
1996. Figure 10b uses South African census data from 1996, 2001 and 2011 as well as data acquired with satellites F12 in 1996 and 2001, and F18 in 2011. 
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Indeed, even if the satellite-based measure accurately reflects a socio-
economic outcome on the national level, the same may not necessarily be 
true of the subnational level. South Africa is a case in point. According to 
the South African census, 85 per cent of households had access to 
electricity in 2011. This figure represents an increase of nearly 30 
percentage points compared to the country’s first democratic census in 
1996. This period encompasses the beginning of South Africa’s post-
apartheid mass electrification campaign, which was inherently linked to 
its transition to democracy. As illustrated in Figure 10a, a comparison of 
lit and unlit pixels over the period 1996-2011 clearly indicates a positive 
change over time. Consistent with the census, the spatial concentration of 
these pixels is much higher in the northeastern half of the country, 
particularly in the former bantustan areas of Ciskei, Transkei or KwaZulu 
along the east coast. At closer inspection, the green pixels also validate 
the well-documented increase in urban sprawl around cities like Cape 
Town or Johannesburg.  
 
In addition to helping us visualise electrification – which is a powerful 
research tool in its own right – the images can help us quantify both 
levels and changes of South Africa’s electrification programme. Figure 
10b shows a line graph of census data and the three satellite-based 
electrification rates. The share of population in lit pixels increased in step 
with the census based measure from 62 per cent in 1996 to 83 per cent in 
2011. Over the same time period, the total digital number increased by 
636,510, or 30 per cent. The increase in the share of lit pixels is minimal, 
from 12 per cent in 1996 to 16 per cent in 2011. This is not surprising: vast 
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areas of the country are uninhabited so even if electricity access were 
universal we would not expect universal coverage of lit pixels.  
 
While the positive trend in both the total digital number and share of lit 
pixels are consistent with census data, it is not immediately clear how to 
interpret the figures presented by these two measures. What does it mean 
to observe a change in the share of lit pixels or in the digital number? As per 
the definition above, an increase in the share of lit pixels reflects an 
increase in the geographic expansion of average visible stable lights 
captured by the satellite sensors. This could reflect the expansion of the 
electricity grid to previously unelectrified settlements. However, the 
fundamental problem with this measure is that there is no way of 
knowing how this expansion relates to the people that live in those 
settlements.  
 
An increase in the total digital number on the other hand could indicate a 
stronger intensity of existing lights with no geographic expansion. This 
too does not offer any conclusive evidence as to whether or not more 
people gained access to electricity. Moreover, as pointed out above, the 
comparability of digital numbers over time may be compromised due to 
the sensitivity of the sensors, as discussed above. Even if digital numbers 
are calibrated to ensure comparability over time, then an issue of 
interpretability remains. In a cross-sectional analysis, it is difficult to 
interpret what it means to have a total digital number of 2.7 million as is 
the case in South Africa in 2011. In the same year, a country like 
Singapore, by comparison, has a total digital number of just over 40,000, 
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while the US’s total digital number in the same year is over 70 million. 
Yet, both countries have near universal access to electricity.  
 
The missing piece of information seems to be population or population 
density. But there is a trade-off: on the one hand we would like to use 
pixel level population data to determine whether a given pixel is 
populated. On the other hand population data are not available for most 
years for which nighttime light images exist and in available years well-
documented measurement problems apply. These are particularly 
pertinent at low levels of aggregation and in rural areas (Doll and 
Pachauri 2010: 5665). While the share of population in lit pixels is most 
closely related to the census based-electrification rate, both in a cross-
section and over time, the reliance on population data can be problematic.  
 
Moreover, the high correlation on the national level does not entail a high 
correlation on the subnational level. Indeed, a subnational breakdown 
reveals that the difference between the different measures varies greatly 
across South Africa’s municipalities. As shown in panel (a) of Table 10 
below, the correlation between the share of population in lit pixels and the 
census-based electrification measure drops from 0.90 to 0.51 compared to 
the results presented in Table 9. The correlation between the latter and 
the share of lit pixels is also lower but only decreases slightly from 0.51 to 
0.45. The total digital number is now hardly correlated with the census, 
while the latter’s correlation with the average digital number remains 
relatively constant, with only a slight drop from 0.37 to 0.30. Regarding 
the share of population in lit pixels the drop in the correlation coefficient is 
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likely related to the large differences in the Landscan based population 
figures. 
 
The same is true of income and education indicators, measured here as 
the average household income in a given municipality and the share of 
the population without any schooling respectively. Regarding the former, 
the strongest correlation is observed in association with the share of 
population in lit pixels, at 0.48. The share of lit pixels is similarly associated 
with this measure of economic activity, with a correlation coefficient of 
0.43. The weakest association is with the total digital number and average 
digital number (0.11 and 0.37 respectively). As for education, the 
variation across variables is similarly large: the total digital number shows 
the weakest correlation with -0.06.  
 
These estimates look at the level of a given socioeconomic outcome, but 
one of the advantages of the images is that they can help us trace changes 
over time. It is therefore useful to reproduce the above table for the 
changes in socioeconomic outcomes, both using the census and satellite-
based variables. The results, presented in Appendix Table C2, reveal that 
correlation coefficients are significantly weakened by this exercise. 
Regarding the change in electrification presented in panel (a), the highest 
correlation is between the change in households with access to electricity 
and share of lit pixels at 0.18 per cent. Satellite-based measures calculated 
using the digital number are marked grey because digital numbers are 
not directly comparable over time due to sensitivity of the satellite 
sensors. They are reported for consistency, but their use is not 
recommended when looking at changes over time.       
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The main takeaway from this discussion is that correlation coefficients 
between satellite-based and census-based socioeconomic outcomes are 
unstable and outliers may be significant. Therefore, we cannot blindly 
trust the satellite images to deliver the correct results. As I have shown 
with South African census data, even if the correlation coefficient 
between satellite-based and census-based measures is high at the national 
level, this does not mean that the correlation is equally high on the 
subnational level. The choice of the satellite-based variable can deliver 
very different results – social scientists therefore need to investigate 
which variable is the most appropriate depending on what variable 
generates the highest correlation coefficient.  
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Table 10: Correlating different measures of socioeconomic outcomes in South African municipalities 
  
Census-based 
indicator 
Digital number 
(total) 
Digital number 
(mean) 
Share of population in lit 
pixels 
Share of lit pixels 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a. Electrification 
     Census: share of hhs with access to 
electricity 1.00 
    Digital number (total) -0.07 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) 0.30 0.28 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels 0.51 0.01 0.51 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels 0.45 -0.01 0.63 0.88 1.00 
b. Income 
     Census: share of hhs with average 
income 1.00 
    Digital number (total) 0.11 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) 0.37 0.28 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels 0.48 0.01 0.51 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels 0.43 0.01 0.62 0.90 1.00 
c.  Education  
     Census: share of population without 
any schooling 1.00 
    Digital number (total) -0.06 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) -0.43 0.28 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels -0.45 0.01 0.51 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels -0.47 -0.01 0.62 0.90 1.00 
Note: Figures calculated for South Africa's municipalities in 2001, using South African census data and nighttime light images acquired with satellite 
F15.  
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4.5 Categorizing pitfalls and navigating them 
The previous section emphasized large variation between different 
satellite-based measures of socioeconomic outcomes. This raises two 
important questions: first, why might the images not capture the true 
level of change in a socioeconomic outcome? Second, how can we 
navigate the pitfalls? Answers to both questions follow in this section.   
 
There are a number of pitfalls that may undermine the usefulness of the 
images for measuring socioeconomic outcomes. Small et al. (2005) and 
Doll (2008) provide useful summaries of the main technical issues with 
the satellite sensors. Their summaries are however quite technical and 
implications for social science research are difficult to interpret. Yet, it is 
these implications that are most relevant to those who are more 
concerned with the practical question of how to use the final data 
product than understanding the technical intricacies of the satellite 
sensors. In order to explain why the images might not capture 
socioeconomic outcomes, I categorize the main pitfalls in terms of 
whether they are likely to induce Type I or Type II errors in social science 
applications.  
 
To illustrate the logic behind this categorization, it is useful to consider 
residential access to electricity as an example. As demonstrated in the 
decision tree in Figure 11 below, there are two possible outcomes for each 
observed pixel: a pixel is either unlit, with a digital number of 0, or the 
pixel is lit, with a digital number between 1 and 63. If a pixel is unlit, then 
no stable, anthropogenic lights are visible in this pixel. From this 
observation we may infer that people living in this pixel do not have 
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access to electricity. If this is correct, then we are directly inferring the 
true outcome from the images. However, it should be clear that there is a 
gap between our observation and the conclusion we infer. It is of course 
entirely feasible that people living in the unlit pixel do have electricity, 
even if we cannot infer this from the images. In this case we incur a Type 
I error: we are wrongly inferring that fewer people have electricity access 
than is actually the case. In this case, we are underestimating the actual 
electrification rate.  
 
Figure 11: Possible outcomes of observed pixels in nighttime light 
imagery 
 
 
If the observed pixel is lit, we can conclude that average stable lights are 
present in this pixel. From this observation we may infer that people 
living in the lit pixel have access to electricity. If this is the case, then we 
are inferring a true outcome. However, it is possible that some or even 
none of the people in this pixel may in fact not have access to electricity, 
in which case we incur a Type II error. This in turn leads to an 
overestimation of the actual residential electrification rate since we are 
assuming that more people have electricity than is the case.  
Observed Pixel 
Unlit             
DN=0 
Electrified                  
Type I error 
Not electrified             
True outcome 
Lit             
DN=1-63 
Electrified                  
True outcome 
Not electrified            
Type II error 
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Which type of error is more likely to occur depends on the area we are 
interested in studying. Since social scientists are generally interested in 
areas covered by more than one pixel, they may incur a combination of 
Type I and Type II errors in their samples.  
 
Type I errors.  Since nighttime light images offer an aerial view of the 
world, they can only capture light that is visible from above. When we 
observe an unlit pixel, there are at least three reasons why this may lead 
to Type I error: first, the pixel may appear unlit because there is no stable, 
visible, outdoor lighting. Instead, there may only be indoor lighting, 
which simply cannot be captured from outer space. Second, even if 
outdoor lighting is present, it may be too weak to be detected. There is a 
minimum threshold at which the nighttime light images are able to detect 
lighting. If an area is very sparsely populated, with only 15 to 20 street 
lamps within a one-kilometre radius for example, then the satellite sensor 
may not be able to pick them up. Min (2014) points out this issue in his 
analysis of nighttime lights in India, noting the lowest population density 
at which lights are observed are 60 people per square kilometre. All 
pixels with fewer than 60 inhabitants were unlit regardless of the 
presence of outdoor lighting. Nighttime lights will therefore literally not 
be able to shed light on the most sparsely populated areas and associated 
research questions. This point is further reinforced by Doll and Pachauri 
(2010) who focus on rural populations without access to electricity. Their 
study points to large discrepancies between nighttime light measures of 
electrification and IEA data. They demonstrate that nighttime light data 
may not be able to proxy for electrification if population density is not 
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high enough or if electricity usage is not dense enough or not used in 
outdoor lighting (Doll and Pachauri 2010: 5665). 
 
Third, lit pixels capture stable lights averaged over a one-year period. In 
many countries, however, within-year disconnections or power outages 
are a common feature, which depending on the severity may cause pixels 
to appear unlit even though inhabitants would be considered to have 
access to electricity under traditional definitions of the term. 
Unfortunately the images provide “little ability to discern periods of 
blackouts, power outages, or changes in infrastructure and customer 
access” (Min et al. 2013: 8130).  
 
In all three cases, the evidence from the images would lead us to reject 
the hypothesis that residents living in a given area have access to 
electricity, even if the hypothesis is true. This would lead us to 
underestimate the true level of electrification. Social scientists need to be 
mindful about both the presence of outdoor lighting, population densities, 
and the role of disconnections pertaining to the geographic area under 
review. 
 
Type II errors.   One problem that can lead to Type II error is the inability 
to identify the source of visible lighting. Using nighttime lights as a proxy 
for residential access to electricity is particularly risky in areas with 
persistent public or industrial light sources. In their study of nighttime 
lights in Israel, Levin and Duke (2012: 4) show that outside of towns, the 
main source of lights is from highways and other lit roads that connect 
urban areas. The inspection of a nighttime light image of an oil producing 
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country such as Nigeria also reveals that industrial sites such as mines 
and gas processing plants produce a lot of light output. Gas flares too are 
visible in the imagery explaining off shore lighting, for example in the 
North Sea. Such light sources are not necessarily indicative of residential 
access. Moreover, in many developing countries public street lighting 
may be available in areas long before individual dwellings are connected 
to the grid (or vice versa). In such cases the inference that residents have 
electricity based on the observation of a lit pixel, is a Type II error. Using 
the variable share of lit pixels, for example, the aggregation of lit pixels 
coupled with the absence of residential access will produce an 
overestimation of the true level of residential access to electricity.  
 
While this source of Type II error is likely to affect most studies that seek 
to distinguish between public and private entities, it has remained largely 
unaddressed in existing social science applications. One possible way to 
address this issue is to mask large industrial areas prior to carrying out 
the calculation. Elvidge et al. (2010: 6) point out the importance of this 
step and explain how this process works in practice. When applying the 
images to a given country context, it is important to be aware of the 
presence of gas flaring or other large industrial sights. Masking out such 
areas can significantly reduce the likelihood of Type II error. 
 
Another problem that increases the likelihood of Type II error is the 
overglow effect observed in nighttime light images. This effect is 
observed when lights from one pixel spill over to another. This is 
particularly pronounced over water or snow cover (Pinkovskiy, 2011: 9), 
but also in pixels adjacent to large urban centres. As above, the overglow 
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effect creates observations of lit pixels that suggest the presence of stable 
manmade lights where they may not in fact exist. This can create 
considerable inaccuracies when using nighttime lights as a measure of 
electricity consumption (Townsend and Bruce 2010: 4461). Townsend and 
Bruce (2010) have developed an overglow removal model, which can 
help social scientists navigate the problem. This reinforces my earlier 
point about understanding the context to which the images are applied.  
 
Comparability in time-series.  One of the main advantages of the images is 
that they provide a unique, high-resolution view of human activity on an 
annual basis for two decades, an ideal foundation for panel data analysis. 
Yet, comparisons over time pose a challenge: due to the use of different 
satellites and thus sensors to obtain nighttime light images, there are 
concerns about their comparability over time. The problem is that 
“satellites differ in their optical quality and may degrade over time” 
(Chen and Nordhaus 2010: 12) and there is no in-flight calibration of the 
visible band on the OLS (Elvidge et al. 2013: 3). Indeed, according to 
NOAA’s website, sensor problems led to the discontinuation of data 
collection from sensors F10 and F11 in 1995 (NOAA 2013a). The text file 
accompanying each download from NOAA makes this explicit: “while 
the time-series of annual cloud-free composites were produced using the 
same algorithms and stringent data selection criteria, the digital number 
(DN) values are not strictly comparable from one year to the next.” 
(NOAA 2013b). Doll (2008: 15) shows that there can be considerable 
differences in brightness between the sensors flying on different satellites 
by comparing the sum of digital numbers in India for the years 1992-2003 
using overlapping years from different sensors. Consequently, the value 
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of a pixel in one year is not necessarily comparable with the value of that 
same pixel in another year. This is clearly a significant limitation.  
 
Ongoing research is developing calibration methods to help interpret 
brightness changes over time. Elvidge et al. (2013) make a first attempt to 
quantitatively analyse an intercalibrated time series. They conclude that 
intercalibrated nighttime lights can successfully reveal electrification 
patterns, but they also highlight the importance of verifying the data in a 
given context before drawing conclusions. Without calibration, direct 
comparisons between the digital numbers over time can be misleading. 
The argument against using digital numbers to make comparisons over 
time is an argument in favour of using a binary classification to analyse 
the images. Instead of interpreting the brightness of a pixel as light 
intensity, a binary variable focuses on the presence or absence of light. 
The comparability concern can therefore be mitigated by reclassifying 
pixel values between 1 and 63 as lit pixels and the remainder as unlit 
pixels. As noted by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013: 17) the binary 
nature of this measure implies that the non-linearity of luminosity is no 
longer a concern.  
 
Given these pitfalls it should be clear that the assumption that the images 
can serve as a reliable proxy for socioeconomic outcomes in all contexts is 
flawed. To help researchers decide what satellite-based measure is most 
appropriate for their application of the images, Table 12 provides an 
overview of the satellite-based variables and how they compare to each 
other and census data. The main advantage of census data is that they 
capture household electrification and other socioeconomic outcomes 
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more closely than the satellite-based measures. In terms of the unit of 
analysis, households or persons are usually of more interest, which 
means that census-based or other administrative data are the more 
obvious choice. The main drawback is that researchers are limited to 
administrative boundaries and years that may not match the researchers’ 
data requirements. Administrative boundaries may change over time or 
may be too coarse. The main advantage of the images: the flexibility of 
zooming in on any geographic area with a resolution of one square 
kilometre undoubtedly generates great value for social science research. 
The availability of annual data over two decades is certainly also 
advantageous. The respective advantages and pitfalls of the two data 
sources highlight their complementarity.  
 
As outlined in section 4.4 above, there are different ways of turning the 
images into proxies of socioeconomic outcomes. Each variable has pros 
and cons and it is important to understand these when deciding which 
variable to use. The variable most closely related to the census is the share 
of population living in lit pixels. By taking the location of local populations 
into account, the unit of analysis of this variable are people, therefore 
allowing for an interpretation that is most closely related to the census 
data. The comparability in time-series is, however, limited to years with 
available gridded population data, which as explained above is not 
available free of charge and the publisher recommends the use of the 
latest available year. In fact, “previous versions of the LandScan data are 
made unavailable as new datasets are released because the makers of the 
LandScan data … caution against using the data as a change detection or 
migration tool” (Elvidge et al. 2013: 4690/1). This may or may not be 
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problematic for social scientists depending on whether it is realistic to 
assume constant population growth over a given period. There may, 
however, be additional concerns regarding the reliability of the 
population data at low levels of geography. Since Landscan data capture 
daytime population counts, we need to critically assess the applicability 
of the data, not just in the context of a given country, but also at the 
desired level of geographical disaggregation. This concern also applies to 
the share of populated pixels. Even though this variable is less reliant on the 
accuracy of population counts in a given pixel, it still relies on the 
accuracy of the location of populated pixels.  
 
The share of populated pixels is the least restrictive satellite-based variable, 
when it comes to both data availability and use in time-series. Unlike the 
population-based variables, this variable only relies on the images and is 
therefore not reliant on the accuracy of population counts. It also 
mitigates the comparability concern by reclassifying pixels into a binary 
classification of lit or unlit pixels rather than using the full range of 
digital numbers. These characteristics render this variable the most useful 
for panel data analysis. However, both the share of lit pixels and the digital 
number use units of analysis that are more difficult to interpret. It is not 
immediately clear how the share of lit pixels or digital number in a given 
area relates to the number of electrified households or the level of income. 
That is why these variables are likely to be most useful in contexts where 
they are used to trace changes over time rather than determining the level 
of human activity at one point in time.  
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Table 11: Overview matrix of electrification measures 
 Census-based 
electricity measure 
Satellite-based electricity measures 
Share of hhs with 
electricity 
Share of population living 
in lit pixels 
Share of populated lit 
pixels 
Share of lit pixels Digital number 
Unit of analysis Households Persons Pixels Pixels Digital number 
Data sources required 1. Census data 1. Nightlights  
2. Landscan  
1. Nightlights  
2. Landscan  
1. Nightlights 1. Nightlights 
Years Available 1. 1996, 2001, 2011 1. 1992-2012; 
2. 2011* 
1. 1992-2012; 
2. 2011* 
1. 1992-2012 1. 1992-2012 
Lowest available 
resolution 
Varies with changes in 
census boundaries; e.g. 
census wards 2011 
~1km2 ~1km2 ~1km2 ~1km2 
Comparability in 
time-series 
Yes, but limited to 
census years. 
Limited to years with 
available gridded 
population. 
Limited to years with 
available gridded 
population. 
Yes. No, unless digital 
number calibrated.  
Main advantage  Most closely captures 
access to electricity. 
Takes population 
location and counts into 
account; most closely 
related to census data. 
Takes population 
location into account, 
less reliant on accuracy 
of population counts 
than the share of 
population living in lit 
pixels. 
No reliance on second 
data source; can be 
calculated for two 
decades with 1km2 
resolution. 
Takes radiance 
characteristic of 
nightlights into 
account.  
Main pitfall Limited to 
administrative 
boundaries and census 
years.  
Limitations of 
population data apply: 
reliance on accuracy of 
pixel level population 
counts which represent 
ambient population; 
limited availability. 
Limitations of 
population data apply: 
accuracy of location of 
populated pixels.  
Unit of analysis is pixel; 
does not take into 
account where people 
live. 
Digital numbers are 
difficult to interpret. 
Data not normalized, 
making comparisons 
limited to areas of 
equal size.  
Note: *Landscan data can be requested online. They cannot be downloaded immediately and are not free of charge. 2011 is the latest year for which 
they are currently available.  
 151 
To summarise this discussion, the following four steps may help social 
scientists navigate the potential pitfalls presented by nighttime lights 
data: 
 
1. Geography.  Examine the desired geographical hierarchy in the 
country/countries of interest. Identify large industrial sights, 
particularly gas processing plants as they produce a lot of light. 
Identify national parks, large lakes, forests, etc, i.e. areas where 
you do not expect any lighting to be present. Mask them if 
possible. Identify areas with population counts lower than the 
minimum population density threshold.  
 
2. Variable choice.  Choose the appropriate satellite-based proxy 
variables based on geography, data availability, and requirements 
outlined in Table 12. E.g., if the share of top-coded pixels is likely 
to be very high in the area under review, the digital number is 
unlikely to be the appropriate variable. Do not compare digital 
numbers over time. Use binary classification of the images or inter-
calibrate.   
 
3. Cross-validation.  Produce simple correlations between satellite-
based variables and alternative data source(s). Choose the satellite-
based proxy with the highest correlation. Given the high risks of 
using the data, it is not recommended to do so for a level of 
geography for which no suitable data for cross-validation is 
available.  
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4. Interpretation.  Interpret the satellite-based measure precisely as 
per the definitions outlined in sections 4.3 and 4.4 above. Avoid 
using vague concepts such as luminosity or light density.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The accuracy of empirical analyses crucially depends on the quality of the 
data used to generate the results. Yet, high quality data on socioeconomic 
outcomes are inherently difficult to obtain, particularly in the developing 
world where inconsistent data collection methods often pervade official 
estimates. Many developing countries lack reliable population censuses. 
And even if data exists, quality is often poor and there is no way to verify 
the data released by governments. A potentially powerful substitute is 
presented by data collected with remote sensing technology. Nighttime 
light images allow researchers to zoom in on any area of interest with a 
local accuracy of approximately one square kilometre. The scale and 
scope is unparalleled by administrative data, as even the smallest 
administrative units usually encompass several square kilometres and 
data collection methodologies often vary substantially across countries.  
 
As I have argued in this chapter, there are important problems with this 
data product that tend to be insufficiently addressed in existing 
applications of the data to social science contexts. In the long term, 
further improvements in technology will hopefully address many of 
these issues. Some progress is already being made: in 2011 a new 
instrument, the Visible Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), was launched. 
According to Elvidge et al. (2013: 1) “the VIRRS offers substantial 
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improvements in spatial resolution, radiometric calibration and usable 
dynamic range when compared to the DMSP low light imaging data”. 
The usefulness of nighttime lights for social science applications will 
increase with improvements to the sensor and corresponding data 
products.  
 
However, for the time being, social scientists cannot simply trust that 
remote sensing technology delivers datasets that we can use as perfect 
substitutes for socioeconomic outcomes. It is important to use these data 
critically, with an understanding of their limits and what can go wrong. 
Given the risks of Type I and Type II errors, it is not sufficient to rely on 
the relatively robust positive correlation between satellite-based and 
administrative data in cross-country studies to justify the application of 
the images to individual country contexts and for different geographical 
hierarchies. Based on the analysis of potential pitfalls as well as cross-
validating the data with South African census data, I generate lessons 
learned that will hopefully guide social scientists in applying nighttime 
lights data in the future. 
 
The findings presented in this chapter have two important implications: 
first, from a practical point of view, it will require more time and effort 
from social scientists to use the data. Due to the formal constraints of 
journal articles, an extensive justification of the use of the images may not 
seem realistic at first. Luckily, online appendices are offering new 
possibilities for doing so. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou’s work (2013) 
provides useful guidance for how to combine the use of the data with 
rigorous cross-validation using online appendices. Second, having to 
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cross-check the data before using it limits the usefulness of the satellite 
data because it is likely to be most valuable in cases where alternative 
data does not exist. This is unfortunate, but given the significant potential 
for error further research is needed to leverage the impact of remote 
sensing technologies in the social sciences. This research will require the 
integration of the remote sensing literature with the social science 
literature: only by advancing our understanding of the science behind the 
technology can we optimise the use of the data to further our knowledge 
about human development. In the end, empirical results generated 
through social scientific inquiry will only ever be as good as the data 
used to generate them.   
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Chapter V 
 
Discussion and implications 
 
This thesis provides insights into the important question of how 
government affects the distribution of financial resources and services. 
As stated in the introduction, each paper was authored as a self-
contained piece of research with separate conclusions and implications. 
In general, each paper makes a contribution to answering the question of 
whether public goods and services improve as a result of 
democratization. The first two papers do so by analysing a specific 
outcome influenced by government policy on the provincial and 
municipal level respectively. The third paper adds to this analysis by 
enhancing the utility of nighttime light satellite imagery for quantitative 
social scientists. One of the centrepieces of this research is the 
incorporation of geographic analysis to study spatial patterns of the 
distribution of government resources. In addition to the conclusions 
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already provided in sections 2.7, 3.7 and 4.6, this final chapter 
consolidates the findings, summarises the contributions, and provides a 
discussion on areas for further research.  
 
Substantive contributions.  Existing empirical work often leaves unresolved 
what precisely it is about democracy that accounts for the effect on the 
outcome of interest. The main substantive contribution of this thesis is to 
shed some light on this issue: chapter 3 shows that enfranchisement 
increased household electrification rates during the first period of 
democratic local government in South Africa. This finding reinforces the 
existing literature and adds a first study in the context of South Africa as 
a contemporary case of democratization. It also addresses a main 
limitation in the literature, which often examines the impact of 
enfranchisement on resource allocation rather than services delivered, for 
example, by focusing on spending on local public health (Miller 2008) or 
education and social services (Vernby 2013). However, if funds are not 
spent as intended – as is often the case in developing countries – such an 
analysis cannot inform us about how the lives of the people for whom the 
allocations are intended are affected, even though ultimately that is what 
we care about. Another key contribution of chapter 3 is therefore that it 
adds to our understanding of how people’s lives were affected in post-
apartheid South Africa: in the period 1996-2001, households in 
municipalities with higher shares of newly enfranchised voters, 
experienced higher gains in access to electricity (of between 3 and 6 
percentage points per standard deviation of enfranchisement).  
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These improvements are observed across the country, but the chapter 
draws attention to a racial pattern, too: households in municipalities with 
higher shares of black voters benefitted the most in terms of receiving 
access to electricity (approximately 9 percentage points per standard 
deviation of enfranchisement). The effect is also positive but less strong 
for coloured voters, and statistically insignificant for newly enfranchised 
Indian voters. Previous “homeland” areas experienced some of the 
greatest changes in electrification. These areas, reserved for the black 
population under the policy of racial segregation, became synonymous 
with poverty and underdevelopment, reflecting the geography of 
apartheid (Christopher 1994). Recognizing that South Africa continues to 
be one of the most unequal societies in the world, the finding suggests 
that enfranchisement did have a positive effect on spatial inequality with 
respect to electricity provision.  
 
Unlike many other studies on the effects of democratization, this thesis 
takes one step further by carefully separating the effect of 
enfranchisement and partisan representation to clarify the mechanism by 
which democratization affects the provision of essential basic services. 
The findings presented in chapter 3 demonstrate that in South Africa the 
state-owned electricity company supplied the incumbent party’s core 
constituencies with an additional top-up in this initial period of the post-
apartheid electrification campaign. In the South African context, it 
therefore did not only matter that people got the right to vote, but also 
who they voted for. Interestingly, this effect is only observed in 
municipalities where the state-owned electricity company controls 
electricity reticulation, not in those with municipal distributors even if 
 158 
they were controlled by the incumbent party. In other words, the partisan 
composition of the local council made no difference to the distribution of 
electricity to households. The contribution of this finding to the existing 
literature is that it highlights the importance of pinpointing who is 
responsible for service provisions in order to understand observed spatial 
patterns of service delivery. 
 
The thesis also adds to our understanding of the role of subnational 
electoral competition as an incentive to manipulate the distribution of 
public funds. The detection of political budget cycles in the equitable 
share of South Africa’s intergovernmental transfer system suggests that 
even in the absence of electoral competition on the national level, 
electorally motivated distortions in financial resources may occur on the 
subnational level. The direction of the distortion points in the same 
direction as the Eskom-effect uncovered in chapter 3, only in this case the 
ANC’s core provinces rather than municipalities benefit from the 
distributive patterns. To stop the distortion of the equitable share for 
political gain, the government’s ability to manipulate the formula would 
have to be removed. In order to do so, more research is required to 
identify the precise mechanism through which past manipulations have 
been implemented. Regardless of the fiscal instrument, however, chapter 
2 demonstrates that both the timing of elections and electoral competition 
can play an important role when it comes to the distribution of financial 
resources to subnational units in a new democracy.  
 
An important limitation is that this thesis does not touch on the vast 
problems of corruption that burden South Africa’s financial management 
 159 
system: unauthorized payments and misallocations, contracts without 
competitive bidding, and manipulation of tenders are just a few examples 
that are commonly featured in the country’s news stream. According to 
the civil society organization Corruption Watch (2013), the South African 
government loses approximately USD 2.7 billion to procurement 
corruption each year. However, an important implication of the results 
presented in chapter 2 is that in addition to off-the-book malpractices, 
official channels may be subject to manipulation, too. 
 
One of the main obstacles in this line of research is that high-quality data 
on the delivery of goods and services, and socioeconomic outcomes in 
general, are inherently difficult to obtain. This is particularly true of 
Africa, where inconsistent data collection methods often pervade official 
estimates (Jerven 2013). Chapter 4 makes a contribution to the social 
science toolkit by demonstrating how nighttime light satellite imagery 
can be used to proxy for socioeconomic outcomes. The chapter provides 
the first literature review of interdisciplinary applications of the images 
tailored to the social sciences. By synthesising the pitfalls that arise from 
such applications, I emphasize the risk of Type I and Type II errors, 
adding to our substantive knowledge about the images. The paper also 
makes important methodological contributions, which are further 
discussed below.  
 
Methodological contributions.  This thesis demonstrates how distributive 
outcomes can be studied on the subnational level, not only by adding two 
examples for such studies to the still small inventory of subnational 
analyses on the subject, but also by offering new datasets to the research 
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community. In the introduction to this thesis, I argued that the 
availability of high quality data speaks in favour of using South Africa as 
a testing ground. Here I would like to add to this point that availability 
does not necessarily imply user friendliness. The budget information 
obtained for chapter 2, for example, is readily available from the South 
African Treasury’s website, but only in portable document format such 
that budget information cannot be directly converted into tables. Instead, 
putting together a dataset from the available information required time 
intensive data entry. The result is a new longitudinal data set, consisting 
of annual observations of all nine provinces for the period 1995 to 2010. 
Researchers can build on this by adding additional years of budget 
information in the coming years. This year’s twentieth anniversary of 
South Africa’s first democratic election presents a particularly exciting 
opportunity to extend existing datasets with a fifth election and further 
develop our understanding of South Africa’s political economy. 
Fortunately, this will be a much easier task as the South African Treasury 
now makes budgetary and financial information available in number 
format.   
 
The data behind the results in chapter 3 also offer a unique longitudinal 
dataset to the research community: since administrative boundaries 
below the provincial level were redrawn between South Africa’s first 
census in 1996 and the second census in 2001, it is not possible to directly 
compare socioeconomic outcomes below the level of the provinces over 
this period. Chapter 3 develops a methodology for carrying out precisely 
such analyses: using the spatial attributes of 21,243 subplaces from the 
2001 census, we aggregate their information up to the level of 799 
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municipal boundaries from the 1996 census. We chose 1996 municipal 
boundaries as our benchmark in order to further combine the data with 
1995/6 local election results, but the methodology could equally be 
applied to other boundaries. Since changing administrative boundaries 
are a common occurrence, particularly in developing countries, the 
method applied to this research (documented in detail in Appendix B) 
will hopefully be helpful for other researchers in the future. 
 
The empirical analysis in chapter 3 uses two independent data sources to 
assess electrification outcomes, providing an example for how nighttime 
lights data can be used. This is an advance over studies solely based on 
data collected with involvement by the governmental units that are 
under examination. However, as demonstrated in chapter 4, it is 
important to be mindful of the risks of using these data. By carrying out 
the first literature review of social science applications of nighttime lights, 
chapter 4 highlights the opportunities presented by the images to social 
scientists engaged in quantitative research. The value proposition is 
clearly attractive: the images offer free and easy access to global, high-
resolution data that can proxy for different measures of human 
development over the past two decades.  
 
At the same time, chapter 4 demonstrates that the importance of cross-
validating the data cannot be underestimated. By using South African 
census data, I show how this can be done in practice. In the future, the 
usefulness of nighttime lights for social science applications is likely to 
increase in line with improvements to the sensor, already ongoing with 
the aforementioned Visible Imaging Radiometer Suite, and 
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corresponding data products. This will open up new opportunities for 
combining the images with traditional datasets and further integrating 
them into social science research.  
 
Overall, the three papers included in this thesis emphasize the 
importance of considering spatial patterns when it comes to the 
distribution of government resources. Be it the allocation of financial 
resources to regions with different electoral profiles or the distribution of 
a basic public service such as electricity: geography matters. By using 
maps as a visualization tool for key variables, this thesis offers examples 
for how to add a geographical dimension to the way in which we can 
study socioeconomic outcomes. This is a powerful method for detecting 
spatial patterns and uncovering correlations for further investigation. The 
use of geographic information systems is not currently receiving a lot of 
attention in political economy, but hopefully this will change with time.  
 
External validity and directions for future research.  For the most part, the 
empirical findings presented in this thesis are based on a single country 
and specific outcomes. As argued above, the advantage of focusing on 
subnational units addresses some of the problems observed in cross-
country studies. The disadvantage is that interpretations of single cases 
are often unrepresentative of larger patterns (Golden and Min 2013: 83). 
An important challenge for this type of research is therefore to manage 
the opposing forces between data precision on the one hand and external 
validity on the other hand. Admittedly, this thesis has been more 
concerned with the former than the latter, with a preference for 
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generating precisely defined results rather than ones that are easily 
generalizable. 
 
However, a comparison of the findings with other research papers 
uncovers interesting parallels: the findings presented in chapter 2 are 
consistent with the studies at the national level that have found stronger 
and more consistent evidence of political budget cycles in developing 
countries (Golden and Min 2013: 83). A comparison with Banful’s (2011) 
study on intergovernmental transfers in Ghana further substantiates this 
observation on the subnational level: Banful also finds that there is scope 
for politically motivated targeting in a formula-based system. Regarding 
the magnitude of the distortion, comparisons with similar studies suggest 
the effect of vote margin on the equitable share in pre-election years is 
large39 and point in the same direction (e.g., see Case 2001, Miguel and 
Zaidi 2003). The results also confirm Brender and Drazen’s (2005) finding 
that PBCs weaken over time. A natural extension of this research is to 
determine whether the size of the effect is linked to the support 
incumbents receive, i.e. whether votes can in fact be retained with such 
allocations. Empirical work is divided over whether incumbents are 
rewarded or punished by voters for such distributive allocations (Golden 
and Min 2013: 84). This would be an interesting area for future research 
in the South African context.  
 
The finding that enfranchisement improves the delivery of public 
services, as suggested in chapter 3, conforms with the theoretical model 
                                                 
39
 See section 2.5 for examples. 
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established by Meltzer and Richard (1981). This establishes an interesting 
link between the effect of enfranchisement in South Africa and Sweden: 
Vernby (2013) finds that enfranchising non-citizens in Sweden caused 
substantial shifts in budget priorities in municipalities where non-citizens 
made up a non-negligible share of voters. While Vernby studies spending 
on education and social services as an outcome, not electrification, it is 
remarkable that these two studies on enfranchisement in completely 
different settings point in the same direction. Similarly, Miller (2008) 
finds that the enfranchisement of American women led to increases in 
local public health spending and traces these to subsequent 
improvements in child mortality. These comparisons give external 
validation to the finding that enfranchisement matters for service 
delivery.  
 
This suggests that in the South African context, public services other than 
electricity may have improved with democracy, too. Indeed, 
Kudamatsu’s (2012) work on how democracy affects health outcomes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates that the basic pattern documented for 
electricity may apply more widely, e.g., regarding the provision of public 
housing. Exploring this further presents an interesting avenue for future 
research, which should also address the important issue of the quality 
and sustainability of services delivered.  
 
While the examples above are useful to draw parallels to other work in 
the existing literature, it is important not to overgeneralise the results. 
Kramon and Posner (2013: 469) reinforce this by showing that patterns of 
distribution can and do vary across outcomes, even within countries. By 
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the same token, measurement of outcomes and the way we choose to 
interpret the data matter greatly for the way we understand results. Only 
by recognising the fact that our answers depend on both the outcomes 
and the data we use, can we continue building on our knowledge of the 
social consequences of democracy.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A  
 
Appendix Table A1: Components of the equitable share formula 
between 1995 and 2010 
Component Explanation 
Education  
Based on the average size of the provincial school-age 
population (ages 6–17) and the number of learners enrolled 
in public ordinary schools in each province.  
Health  
Based on the proportion of the population without access to 
medical aid funding in each province. 
Social welfare*  
Based on the estimated number of people in each province 
entitled to social security grants (i.e. the elderly, disabled 
and children) weighted using a poverty index. 
Basic 
Derived from each province’s share of the total population 
of the country. 
Backlog/poverty 
Based on the distribution of the provincial capital needs as 
captured in the schools register of needs, the audit of 
hospital facilities and the share of the rural population.  
Economic activity Based on the provincial share of remuneration. 
Institutional  
Independent of data; this is divided equally among the 
provinces.  
Note: This table is based on information from the SA Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Reviews 1999 - 2010. *As of 2006, the social welfare component was removed from the 
formula as responsibility for social security grants shifted from the provincial to the 
national sphere of government with the implementation of the Social Assistance Act of 
2004.  
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Appendix Table A2: Description of variables 
Variable name Type Unit  Construction Source 
Revenue 
variables: 
- Total Transfer  
- Equitable 
share 
- Conditional 
grants 
Dependent  
Log of Rand 
per capita 
Log of inflation 
adjusted rand of 
revenue variable 
divided by the 
number of 
habitants for each 
year between 1995 
and 2010 
SA Treasury, 
Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Reviews, Statistics 
South Africa, Population 
Estimates 
Pre-election Independent Provinces 
Dummy = 1 one 
year before an 
election, 0 
otherwise 
Independent Electoral 
Commission Reports. 
Vote margin 
(1994, 1999, 2004, 
2009) 
Independent Provinces 
Equals the absolute 
difference between 
the share of votes 
of the first and 
second party in the 
previous provincial 
election 
Independent Electoral 
Commission Reports. 
Vote margin 
(1994) 
Independent Provinces 
Equals the absolute 
difference between 
the share of votes 
of the first and 
second party in the 
1994 provincial 
elections 
Independent Electoral 
Commission Reports. 
GDP per capita Control 
Rand per 
capita 
GDP divided by 
the number of 
habitants for each 
year between 1995 
Statistics South Africa, 
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
Income and Expenditure 
Surveys 
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and 2010 
Total population Control 
Number of 
people 
Sum of habitants 
IHS Global Insight 
supplied by Gauteng 
Provincial Government. 
Population < 14 Control 
Number of 
people 
Sum of habitants 
under the age of 14 
IHS Global Insight 
supplied by Gauteng 
Provincial Government. 
Population > 60 Control 
Number of 
people 
Sum of habitants 
over the age of 60 
IHS Global Insight 
supplied by Gauteng 
Provincial Government. 
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Appendix B 
 
Generating a single dataset with 1995/6 election, 1996 
and 2001 census data 
 
Comparability problem.  Although census data for 1996 and 2001 are 
readily available, comparisons over time have been rare. The main reason 
for this is that the overhaul of local government during the 1990s 
dramatically changed the geographical hierarchies relevant for the 
censuses. For example, the 12,852 so-called placenames (PNs) in the 1996 
census were regrouped into 21,243 subplaces (SPs) in the 2001 census. 
Moreover, the 813 transitional authorities 40  that applied to the 1996 
census were demarcated into 262 municipalities prior to the 2001 census. 
In this process, boundaries were redrawn and areas were renamed. The 
image below shows an overlay of 1996 and 2001 boundaries and clearly 
demonstrates how drastically the boundaries changed over time. As a 
consequence, the comparisons that do exist are mostly limited to the 
provincial level, which is the lowest geographical level that has stayed 
constant since 1994.41 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Under apartheid, municipal structures were referred to as local government. In the 
transition period subsequent to democratization, they were termed transitional local 
authorities. Since early 2000 they were referred to as municipalities. The three terms 
(local government, transitional authorities and municipalities) are used interchangeably 
to refer to local government entities.  
41
 Note that the number of magisterial districts stayed constant (354), however, some of 
the boundaries in the Western Cape were redrawn.  
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Appendix Figure B1: Municipal demarcation (green lines indicate 1996 
and red lines 2001 boundaries)  
 
 
 
Overview of census data.  The census data stems from the 1996 and 2001 
Community Profile and GIS databases purchased from Statistics South 
Africa. Census 1996 variables were obtained on the municipal level, i.e. 
the level used in the analysis. Census 2001 variables were obtained on the 
subplace level and then aggregated up to the 1996 municipal level 
boundaries as explained below. Table B1 provides details on the 
geographical hierarchies available for 1996 and 2001 census data. 
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Appendix Table B1: Geographical hierarchies in census 1996 and 2001 
1996 2001 
Hierarchy Entities Hierarchy Entities 
Provinces 9 Provinces 9 
District Councils 45 District Councils 60 
Magisterial Districts 354 Magisterial Districts 354 
Local Authority 799
42
 Municipality 262 
Place Name 12,851 
Main Place 3,109 
Sub Place 21,243 
 
Generating 2001 census data for 1996 boundaries.  In order to obtain 2001 
census data on the 1996 municipal level, we carried out the following 
steps. First, we extracted all census variables based on the smallest 
geographical hierarchy in the census 2001, i.e. 21,243 subplace units. 
Second, we merged this data file with the corresponding subplace shape 
file in ArcGIS based on the numerical code that uniquely identifies each 
subplace in both the shape file and the data file. Finally, we assigned each 
2001 sub place (21,243 polygons and 267 variables) to a 1996 level 
municipality (799 polygons, also obtained from the StatsSA GIS database). 
In some cases a 2001 subplace was assigned to more than one 1996 level 
municipality. The following explains how this is accounted for. 
 
                                                 
42
 The number of municipalities in the original shape file is 813 – to see why we use 799, 
please refer to the discussion on ‘Number of municipalities in 1996’ below.   
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Adjusting for overlapping subplaces.  One possible method to execute this 
step is to use ArcMap’s spatial join analysis tool. The default method of 
this tool is called ‘intersect’ and assigns a polygon from the lower 
geographical hierarchy to the higher level, if there is an intersection 
between the two. This method works best when the lower level 
geographical units are perfectly contained within the higher-level 
geographical units. Most subplace polygons are smaller than the 
municipality polygons and are often fully contained within a higher-level 
polygon, as shown in Figure B2, Example 1. However, there are also 
several cases in which 2001 subplaces cross the border of a 1996 
municipality, as shown in Figure B2, Example 2. This introduces a double 
counting problem because the spatial join / intersect method adds the 
attributes of the overlapping subplace to every municipality with which 
the subplace intersects.  In order to take these cross-border subplaces into 
account, we calculated a weight based on the area size of the subplace 
that is covered by a municipality. For example, if a subplace has 100 
individuals and 10 per cent of the subplace area falls within municipality 
A and 90 per cent falls within municipality B (i.e., it is cut by the 
municipal boundary), then 10 individuals will be allocated to 
municipality A by assigning a weight of 0.1 and 90 to municipality B by 
assigning a weight of 0.9. The key underlying assumption of this method 
is that the population is evenly spread throughout the subplace. 
Dinkelman (2011) makes the same assumption in her work on the effects 
of rural electrification on employment in KwaZulu-Natal.  
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Appendix Figure B2: Overlay of geographical hierarchies (green lines 
indicate 1996 municipalities and red lines 2001 subplaces) 
Example 1: 2001 SPs (red) perfectly 
contained within 1996 municipality 
(grey) 
Example 2: 2001 SP (red) overlaps 
with two 1996 municipalities (grey) 
 
 
 
 
Election data.  Municipal election results were obtained from the Elections 
Task Group (ETG), which administered the 1995/6 local government 
elections. 43  The ETG report is not available electronically and was 
digitized based on photocopies from an original version held by the 
University of Cape Town Library. The data was geocoded in ArcGIS by 
using the municipalities provided in the 1996 census shape file as a geo-
locator. Roughly 80 per cent of municipalities were perfectly matched 
based on the names provided in the election report and those provided in 
the census shape file. The remaining 20 per cent were matched 
                                                 
43
 Subsequent elections have been managed by the Independent Electoral Commission, 
which was established as a permanent, independent institution by the Constitution. 
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manually.44 The names in the shape file were adjusted in correspondence 
with the names in the electoral report in order to avoid duplication 
during the merger. Finally, the electoral results were assigned to the 799 
municipality polygons in the 1996 census shape file. 
 
Number of municipalities in 1996.  The number of municipalities in the 
analysis is 799. It is important to note that the Local Government 
Transition Act (LGTA) in 1993 created 843 interim local government 
structures. Each of these 843 structures belonged to one of three 
municipal categories, i.e. metropolitan, local or district council. However, 
in terms of both geography and local government representation these 
structures were not uniquely identified. For example, a district council 
generally included more than one municipality. Our analysis focuses on 
municipalities that are uniquely identified in terms of both geography 
and representation, which is not the same as the number of local 
government structures created through the LGTA 1993. Notably, our 
analysis also includes 14 municipalities less than in the original shape file 
obtained from StatsSA, which shows 813 municipalities. This small 
discrepancy has the following reasons: one municipality (Doringberg 
TRC) appears twice in the census shape file, i.e. it has mistakenly been 
                                                 
44
 The two main reasons for the absence of a perfect match between the names provided 
in the electoral report and the shape file are 1) spelling discrepancies and 2) 
duplications. For example, the electoral report provides abbreviated versions of long 
names, which do not match perfectly with the complete spelling embedded in the list of 
municipalities in the shape file. Another common inconsistency between the two lists 
was that sometimes the word ‘rural’ forms part of the name of a transitional rural 
council and sometimes it did not. Duplicates included Middelberg TRC and Middelberg 
TLC, which are municipalities in Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape. Richmond TLC is 
the name of a municipality in the Northern Cape as well as in KwaZulu-Natal.  
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assigned to the same polygon twice. The thirteen other municipalities45 
are shown as separate geographic entities, but are not represented by a 
separate local government. For example, Elukwatini appears as a local 
and as a rural council, but according to the election report, both areas 
were governed by the Elukwatini local council (see 1995/6 Election 
results). 
 
Description of variables  
 
Dependent variables:  
Electricity.  This variable is defined as the percentage share of households 
with access to electricity in a given municipality. This variable is based on 
the answer “electricity” to the census question: “What type of 
energy/fuel does this household MAINLY use for lighting?” See section 
B, 2.1 and H-28 in the census household questionnaires in 1996 and 2001 
respectively.  
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles and 
GIS databases. 
 
Nightlight.  We define nightlight as the percentage share of lit pixels in a 
municipality. The calculations include the following steps, which we 
apply to the raw nighttime lights rasters for the years 1992, 1996 and 
                                                 
45 1) Badplass TRC, 2) Blaauberg MLC, 3) Eastern Johannesburg MLC, 4) Elukwatini 
TRC, 5) iLembe Regional Council, 6) Indlovu Regional Council, 7) Mzinyathi Regional 
Council, 8) Nqamakwe TLC, 9) Oostenberg MLC, 10) Renovaal TLC, 11) Vierfontein 
TLC, 12) Waterkloof TLC, and 13) Zululand Regional Council.  
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200146: First, we convert the stable lights image into a binary grid, where 
1 represents pixels in which light is detected and 0 where no light is 
detected. We do so by using the ArcGIS reclassify tool. Note that there 
were no pixels with missing values in any of the years in the South 
African geographic extent. The resulting raster image is depicted in Map 
2 in Figure 5. Second, we calculate zonal statistics using the municipal 
boundaries shape file. This produces a table in which the variable “count” 
represents the number of pixels in a given municipality and the variable 
“sum” represents the sum of lit pixels in a given municipality. The ratio 
of the two is therefore the share of lit pixels in a municipality, which 
yields our variable nightlight (see Map 3 in Figure 5).  
Source: http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/global_composites_v2.html 
 
Independent variables:  
Enfranchised.  This variable is defined as the percentage share of 
enfranchised citizens in the municipal electorate and thus refers to all 
non-white citizens of voting age in a given municipality at the time of the 
first democratic local government elections. It is derived from a cross-
tabulation of population group and age from the 1996 census and thus 
calculating the share of non-white citizens aged 18 or above. The 
variables Enfranchised black, Enfranchised coloured, and Enfranchised Indian 
are subsets of Enfranchised that calculate the percentage share of 
enfranchised citizens for the black, coloured and Indian or Asian 
population groups respectively. For the corresponding census questions 
                                                 
46 In 2001 two satellites recorded nighttime lights (F14 and F15), in this case we use the 
average between the two images.  
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see section A, 5 and P-06 in the census household questionnaires in 1996 
and 2001 respectively. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles and 
GIS databases. 
 
ANC seat share.  This variable is defined as the percentage share of total 
seats on a given local council won by the ANC in the 1995/6 elections. 
The related variables NP seat share and IFP seat share are defined as the 
percentage share of total seats won by the National Party and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party respectively.  
Elections Task Group (1996). Local Government Elections in South Africa 
1995/1996. 
 
Geographic controls: 
Elevation.  We calculate various descriptive statistics (mean, median, max, 
min, standard deviation, range) to determine the elevation and slope of a 
given municipality. We do so by using the zonal statistics tool in ArcGIS 
and obtain elevation indicators in meters above sea level. To obtain these 
measures, we use the following projected coordinate system: "WGS 1984 
UTM Zone 35S". In the paper, the variable elevation is the average 
municipal elevation in meters above sea level.  
Source: USGS (2004). Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, 1 ArcSecond 
scene SRTM_u03_n008e004, Unfilled Unfinished 2.0, Global Land Cover 
Facility, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, February 2000. 
 
Slope.  In order to calculate the slope of a given municipality, we perform 
a surface analysis in ArcGIS and generate a new raster layer. We apply 
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the zonal statistics tool to this raster, using the municipality shape file 
and thus calculate various descriptive statistics (mean, median, max, min, 
standard deviation, range) of slope in percent rise. These calculations are 
performed using the projected coordinate system: "WGS 1984 UTM Zone 
35S" 
Source: USGS (2004). Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, 1 ArcSecond 
scene SRTM_u03_n008e004, Unfilled Unfinished 2.0, Global Land Cover 
Facility, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, February 2000. 
 
Distance from electricity grid.  This variable measures the shortest distance 
in kilometers between the centroid of a municipality and the South 
African high-voltage power grid in 1996. This measure is calculated using 
the proximity tool in ArcGIS 10 using the municipality shape file and 
power grid shape file, containing the geo-referenced high-voltage Eskom 
power lines in South Africa in 1996.  
Source: Eskom (1997). Annual Report 1996. Johannesburg: Eskom. 
 
Distance from main road.  This variable measures the shortest distance in 
kilometers between the centroid of a municipality and the closest main 
road in 1996. This measure is calculated using the proximity tool in 
ArcGIS 10 using the municipality shape file and the shape file of main 
roads in 1996 included in the 1996 GIS database. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 GIS databases. 
 
Population controls: 
Population density.  We calculate this variable by dividing the total 
population in a given municipality, using 1996 and 2001 census data, by 
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the area of that municipality measured in square kilometers. The area is 
calculated using the area tool in ArcGIS 10 using the 1996 municipality 
shape file. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles and 
GIS databases. 
 
Population share.  We define this variable as the percentage share of the 
total South African population living in a given municipality.  
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles. 
 
Socioeconomic controls: 
Employment rate.  This variable is calculated as the percentage share of 
employed people out of the total labor force in a given municipality. The 
number of employed people is a census variable corresponding to the 
questions in section A, 17 and P-19 in the census household 
questionnaires in 1996 and 2001 respectively. The total size of the labor 
force is calculated by summing the relevant labor force sub-categories. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles. 
    
Low income.  This variable is the percentage of individuals in the labor 
force earning less than 500 Rand in 1996. Since data is grouped in earning 
ranges and since the 1996 and 2001 census rounds use different 
groupings, it was not possible to match 1996 and 2001 figures. Hence, we 
can use the 1996 level variable in our regressions, but not the 1996-2001 
difference. For the census questions corresponding to income see section 
A, 20 and P-22 in the census household questionnaires in 1996 and 2001 
respectively. 
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Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 Community Profiles. 
 
Median income.  This is the median household income in South African 
Rand (ZAR) in 1996 (nominal) and 2001 (real). Figures for the two years 
were made comparable by inflation-adjusting the 2001 data using the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). CPI base 2008 (i.e., equal to 100 in 2008) is 
48.6 in 1996 and 66.1 in 2001, so we deflate 2001 income by dividing by 
1.36. For the census questions corresponding to income see section A, 20 
and P-22 in the census household questionnaires in 1996 and 2001 
respectively. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles. 
 
Share of population with no schooling.  This variable is the number of people 
with no schooling as a percentage of the total population in a given 
municipality. For the census questions corresponding to schooling see 
section A, 16.1 and P-17 in the census household questionnaires in 1996 
and 2001 respectively. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 1996 and 2001 Community Profiles. 
 
 
Distinguishing Eskom and municipal electricity 
distribution areas 
 
The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) was unable to 
supply the original list of 362 municipalities that had been granted 
electricity distribution licenses by the previous National Electricity 
Regulator (NER), which no longer exists. Instead, we obtained a 1996 
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membership list of the Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings 
(AMEU), which identified 248 municipalities that had electricity 
departments at that time. We use this information to approximate a split 
into municipal and Eskom distribution areas. Since the AMEU data 
exclude some municipalities with electricity undertakings, we have about 
a hundred wrongly classified municipalities in the Eskom distribution 
subsample. Moreover, in some areas with municipal distributors, Eskom 
was nonetheless involved in electrification. For example, the company 
took on the electrification of Kayelitsha, located on the Cape Flats and 
now part of the City of Cape Town, through a joint venture (Qase et al. 
2001). These imprecisions make it less likely that we detect differences 
across the subsamples. 
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Appendix Table B2: Descriptive statistics 
 a. All observations (N = 799) b. Enfranchised non-white < 86.65 (N = 399) c. Enfranchised non-white ≥ 86.65 (N = 400) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
ΔElectricity 9.1 19.1 -54.1 95.5 3.7 14.7 -54.1 60.2 14.6 21.3 -42.8 95.5 
ΔNightlight 2.4 12.1 -36.7 100.0 1.2 9.7 -30.0 100.0 3.6 14.0 -36.7 100.0 
Electricity (1996) 63.1 27.0 0.0 100.0 74.0 19.8 6.2 100.0 52.3 28.8 0.0 100.0 
Nightlight (1996) 62.9 39.2 0.0 100.0 71.5 38.3 0.0 100.0 54.4 38.4 0.0 100.0 
Electricity (2001) 72.3 20.0 0.5 100.0 77.7 16.5 21.2 100.0 66.9 21.7 0.5 100.0 
Nightlight (2001) 65.4 38.2 0.0 100.0 72.7 37.7 0.0 100.0 58.1 37.3 0.0 100.0 
Enfranchised 82.2 18.5 0.0 100.0 69.8 18.8 0.0 86.6 94.6 4.8 86.7 100.0 
Enfranchised black 57.2 36.3 0.0 100.0 40.5 30.7 0.0 86.0 73.9 33.6 0.0 100.0 
Enfranchised coloured 22.9 31.5 0.0 99.2 26.8 30.1 0.0 84.2 19.0 32.4 0.0 99.2 
Enfranchised Indian 1.4 6.5 0.0 87.6 1.6 5.8 0.0 53.9 1.1 7.1 0.0 87.6 
ANC seat share 54.7 31.0 0.0 100.0 40.7 26.6 0.0 100.0 68.7 28.8 0.0 100.0 
NP seat share 17.9 24.0 0.0 100.0 25.2 26.1 0.0 100.0 10.7 19.3 0.0 100.0 
IFP seat share 1.5 8.6 0.0 100.0 1.5 7.5 0.0 71.4 1.5 9.7 0.0 100.0 
Distance from electricity grid (1996) 49.2 46.5 0.1 266.7 39.7 33.5 0.1 211.5 58.8 54.9 0.4 266.7 
Distance from main road (1996) 19.5 23.1 0.0 201.4 18.0 23.2 0.0 134.0 20.9 22.9 0.0 201.4 
Slope 1.4 0.9 0.2 4.9 1.3 0.9 0.2 4.9 1.4 0.9 0.2 4.1 
Elevation 970.8 530.4 5.2 2061.6 891.9 583.0 5.2 1899.0 1049.5 459.6 24.1 2061.6 
Number of households (1996) 10367.2 26375.7 4.0 265111.0 10446.7 29086.4 4.0 239313.0 10287.8 23397.5 52.0 265111.0 
Population density (1996) 3797.1 17951.4 0.3 233598.8 4730.9 19378.3 0.3 233598.8 2865.7 16376.4 3.4 226593.5 
Share of pop. with no schooling (1996) 20.7 12.7 0.0 77.6 16.7 12.1 0.0 77.6 24.7 12.1 1.3 61.7 
Low income (1996) 38.6 18.7 0.0 96.1 34.2 19.4 0.0 90.1 42.9 16.8 8.1 96.1 
Median income (1996) 16340.0 28281.5 0.0 360000.0 24228.0 37846.7 2079.0 360000.0 8471.7 6827.7 0.0 41927.8 
Households without electricity (1996) 4074.0 9136.6 0.0 72214.0 2325.8 5949.1 0.0 50579.0 5817.7 11204.8 0.0 72214.0 
ΔNumber of households 3663.1 16286.2 -21450.7 267563.1 4029.7 19272.3 -21450.7 267563.1 3297.3 12638.0 -6731.8 127569.1 
ΔPopulation density 2503.8 8862.0 -4700.5 88052.7 3005.0 9449.7 -4700.5 79469.7 2003.9 8215.6 -503.6 88052.7 
ΔShare of population with no schooling -2.0 6.2 -43.6 30.9 -2.0 6.3 -43.6 30.9 -1.9 6.1 -26.8 28.9 
ΔMedian income 1001.3 25576.9 -355473.3 89634.6 -107.8 35689.1 -355473.3 89634.6 2107.6 5948.4 -23443.5 24200.7 
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Appendix Table B3: Robustness to excluding municipalities with high levels of electrification in 1996 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
a. Direct effects 
      
Enfranchised 0.375*** 0.475*** 0.522*** 0.658*** 0.905*** 0.813*** 
 
(0.063) (0.093) (0.110) (0.132) (0.233) (0.278) 
b. Conditional effects 
      
Enfranchised 0.130 0.239* 0.299* 0.474** 0.558 0.488 
 
(0.081) (0.134) (0.152) (0.186) (0.396) (0.434) 
ANC seat share -0.535*** -0.370* -0.376* -0.118 -0.439 -0.435 
 
(0.142) (0.214) (0.219) (0.280) (0.485) (0.589) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 0.006*** 0.005* 0.005* 0.002 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Including municipalities with 1996 levels of electrification < 90 80 70 60 50 40 
Observations 667 517 405 308 237 181 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity (difference 1996-2001) calculated from census data. All 
regressions include a constant, province fixed effects, geographic controls, population and socioeconomic controls (1996), and households without 
electricity (1996). Refer to Table 5 for a description of control variables, and the data appendix for full details. The pattern of results is not affected 
when we vary the combination of controls. The pattern of results is not affected when we vary the combination of controls. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table B4: Robustness to excluding municipalities in individual provinces 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
a. Direct effects 
         
Enfranchised 0.255*** 0.180*** 0.160*** 0.204*** 0.182*** 0.177*** 0.191*** 0.167*** 0.208*** 
 
(0.048) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.039) 
b. Conditional effects 
         
Enfranchised 0.104* 0.028 0.084* 0.035 0.070 0.041 0.053 0.034 0.049 
 
(0.058) (0.048) (0.050) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) 
ANC seat share -0.379*** -0.358*** -0.218** -0.367*** -0.366*** -0.397*** -0.370*** -0.350*** -0.450*** 
 
(0.100) (0.089) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091) (0.086) (0.086) (0.089) (0.097) 
Enfranchised  ANC seat share 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sample excluding WC NC EC KZN FS G L NW M 
Observations 671 693 623 732 704 754 799 746 722 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage share of households with electricity (difference 1996-2001) calculated from census data. Province 
abbreviations: WC = Western Cape; NC = Northern Cape; EC = Eastern Cape; KZN = KwaZulu-Natal; FS = Free State; G = Gauteng; L = Limpopo / 
Northern Province; NW = North West; M = Mpumalanga. All regressions include a constant, province fixed effects, geographic controls, population 
and socioeconomic controls (1996), and households without electricity (1996). Refer to Table 5 for a description of control variables, and the data 
appendix for full details. The pattern of results is not affected when we vary the combination of controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Figure B3: Conditional effect with alternative measures of partisan representation 
Note: The first graph is based on the results in column (5) of Table 7. The following two graphs show the results when we replace the ANC’s seat 
share with that of the NP and the IFP, respectively, and run an otherwise identical model. 
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Appendix C  
 
Interpretation of nighttime light images and 
definition of underlying data sources  
 
In order to draw intelligible conclusions from comparing data derived 
from data sources as different as satellite imagery and census data, it is 
important to have a clear understanding of what each derived measure 
represents and where it comes from. The use of vague concepts such as 
‘luminosity’ or ‘light density’ can easily lead to interpretations that are 
removed from the actual information contained in the nightlight images. 
To avoid misinterpretation, the here are definitions of the main data 
sources.  
 
Nighttime lights.  NOAA’s Earth Observation Group processes the 
nighttime light images acquired by the DMSP OLS and releases them in 
their digital archive, which is publicly available online and spans 21 
years, from 1992-2012.47 The images containing average, visible, stable 
lights are NOAA’s “flagship product”; they are also the most relevant for 
calculating electrification rates as they depict anthropogenic lights from 
places with persistent lighting and exclude ephemeral events, such as 
fires. Each of the 30 arc second grids contains over 700 million pixels, 
equivalent to nearly global coverage spanning from -180 to 180 degrees 
                                                 
47 For each satellite-year, NOAA makes three image types available for download: a 
cloud-free coverage image, one which contains the average of the visible band digital 
number values with no further filtering and a cleaned up average visible, stable lights 
image. Further information is provided in the readme file that is included in each 
download as well as in Doll (2008). 
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longitude and -65 to 75 degrees latitude. Each pixel represents slightly 
less than 1 square kilometre on the earth’s surface and has a value 
between 0 and 63. This integer is referred to as the digital number (DN) 
and indicates different levels of luminosity. The higher the digital 
number in a given pixel, the higher the luminosity.48 In this context, 
luminosity refers to the level of brightness of the observed anthropogenic 
or manmade lights. Grid cells without average, stable light observations 
have the value 0, which makes areas without lights clearly identifiable. 
This is the context in which I refer to a pixel or an area being unlit. 
Further general information about the data is provided in the readme text 
file accompanying each download of the data. Doll’s aforementioned 
guide (2008) provides additional technical information about how the 
sensors work and how the data are collected.  
 
Gridded population data.  Even if we assume that the absence of light in a 
given area indicates the lack of electricity in that area, this observation 
alone does not allow any direct inference about whether or not people 
are affected by this lack of electricity. To generate per capita measures, it 
is possible to combine nighttime light imagery with population data, 
ideally using the same resolution. This enables differentiation between 
pixels that are unlit and unpopulated, such as forests and lakes, and 
pixels that are unlit, but populated. More specifically, it allows one to 
estimate the percentage of population living in lit pixels, as shown in 
Elvidge et al. (2010).  
 
The US Department of Energy’s Landscan data, hereafter referred to as 
Landscan, can be used to combine information about where people live 
                                                 
48 Luminosity is not directly proportional to the digital number, but it is proportional to 
the square root of the digital number cubed:              
 
 ⁄  (Doll 2008: 9).  
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with the presence of nighttime lights. Landscan data are constructed 
using an algorithm to disaggregate census counts within an 
administrative boundary to generate population counts for a resolution 
of 1 square kilometre. Unlike census data this dataset aims to represent 
the ambient population. It measures daytime counts in terms of 24h 
averages, thus showing populations on roads and other public areas such 
as airports where people work, but no one lives. Subnational-level 
Landscan population counts may differ considerably from census data, 
particularly in regions where daytime activity is different from nighttime 
activity. Unlike nighttime lights, Landscan data are not available free of 
charge for non-US government agencies. Data requests for the latest 
available data, which is currently 2011 data, can be submitted via email 
and “license fees are determined on a case-by-case basis” (Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory 2014). For applications in combination with 
nighttime lights data see Elvidge et al. (2010) or Ghosh et al. (2010a).  
 
The Center for International Earth Science Information Network 
(CIESIN) also publishes gridded population datasets that can be used in 
combination with nighttime lights. While these data are free of charge, 
the standard gridded population product, the Gridded Population of the 
World (GPW) is only available for a resolution of 2.5’ (approximately 4.5 
square kilometres at the equator). For the purpose of calculating 
nighttime lights, this is problematic because the less-fine-grained 
resolution of the GPW dataset does not match the resolution of the 
nighttime lights dataset. Moreover, the datasets are largely derived from 
an earlier version of nighttime lights (Doll 2010: 194). In this context, 
another problem with the GPW is that the aim of this dataset is global 
breadth, rather than local accuracy, which may make it less appropriate 
for use in local-level analyses. Doll and Pachauri (2010) compare GPW 
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and Landscan data in relation to nighttime lights and show that there are 
vast differences between observable populations in different parts of the 
world, depending on which data source is used.  
 
Overall, Landscan data are generally recognised as the most accurate 
gridded population dataset. They also match the resolution of nighttime 
lights images in all available years and are used in Elvidge et al. (2010), 
which is a reference point for most social science applications. I therefore 
draw on Landscan data for the construction of population based 
measures of socioeconomic outcomes in the subsequent analysis.   
 
Census data.  The method for collecting census data is in many ways the 
opposite of remote sensing. The aim of a census is generally to collect 
information about the universe of a population in a given country. 
Traditionally, census takers would aim to visit and complete surveys for 
every registered dwelling in a country. These efforts are usually 
coordinated by a national statistics office. Availability is usually 
restricted to one census per decade and the resolution depends on each 
country’s enumeration methodology. The sophistication of statistics 
offices varies greatly across countries and statistical capacities tend to be 
particularly poor in sub-Saharan African countries (Jerven 2013). This 
limits the comparability of census data and yet they generally present the 
only available data source of household level characteristics for 
international comparisons.  
 
With respect to electricity, census data are the main data source across 
countries because it is usually the most accurate if not the only data 
source on household characteristics. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 
derives most country national statistics from census data. In the absence 
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of a consistent definition of access to electricity across countries, the IEA’s 
database is constructed using the definitions of each respective national 
government (Doll and Pachauri 2010: 5662). From the point of view of 
achieving consistency across countries, remote sensing technologies 
therefore offer a clear advantage. The same logic applies to other 
socioeconomic indicators such as income or educational attainment, 
which are published on an annual basis in the World Bank’s 
development indicators.  
 
In South Africa, there are three available censuses for the years 1996, 2001, 
and 2011, in each of which there are three possible variables that are 
relevant for electrification. All three are derived from the following 
question on the census surveys: “What type of energy/fuel does this 
household mainly use for cooking, for heating and for lighting?” In 
addition to electricity, there are eight other possible answers to this 
question: gas, paraffin, wood, coal, candles, animal dung, solar, or other 
(Statistics South Africa 2001: A11). Based on the phrasing of the question, 
the answer ‘electricity’ captures use rather than access to electricity 
(Statistics South Africa 2005: 144). A household may have access to 
electricity, but not use it. The difference between access and use is likely 
to be particularly pronounced where households can use a suitable 
substitute for electricity, for example by cooking with firewood rather 
than an expensive electric stove. Cooking with energy sources other than 
electricity, such as gas, may also simply be a preference and thus not 
indicative of a lack of access to electricity. This distinction is important 
because energy consumption patterns are not only a function of 
availability, but also preferences. When we interpret data in empirical 
analyses, it is important to do so with a good understanding of where the 
data comes from and what precisely it entails. 
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Appendix Table C1: Selected empirical applications of nighttime light satellite imagery in descending order 
Paper Year 
Socioeconomic 
outcome studied 
Level of analysis 
Regional 
focus 
Nighttime light variable 
Journal/ 
Publication 
 
a.  Social science applications  
 
 
Min 2014 Electrification Subnational India 
Dichotomous variable: 0 if DN at 
village center equals 0, 1 
otherwise 
American Journal of 
Political Science 
(revise and resubmit) 
Storeygard 2014 
City-level economic 
activity 
Subnational: 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Digital number  
Unpublished 
manuscript 
Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou 
2013 Local economic activity Subnational: pixel  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Average digital number Econometrica 
Pinkovskiy 2013 Economic activity Subnational Global Digital number 
Unpublished 
manuscript 
Alesina et al.  2012 
Income per capita / 
spatial inequality 
Subnational: 
districts and ethnic 
homelands 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Average digital number  
CEPR Discussion 
Paper 
Henderson et al.  2011 Real income growth National Global Digital number 
American Economic 
Review  
 
b.  Remote sensing and geoscience applications 
 
 
Min et al. 2013 Rural electrification Subnational 
Senegal and 
Mali 
Digital number 
International Journal 
of Remote Sensing 
Elvidge et al.  2012 Human development Subnational Global Various Social Geography 
Elvidge et al.  2010 Electrification 
National and 
Subnational 
Global 
Share of population living in lit 
pixels 
Book chapter 
Doll and Pachauri 2010 Rural electrification Subnational Global Digital number Energy Policy 
Agnew et al. 2008 Electrical infrastructure Subnational Iraq Digital number 
Environment and 
Planning 
Doll et al. 2006 
Regional economic 
activity 
Subnational Global Digital number Ecological Economics 
Doll et al. 2000 
Socioeconomic 
parameters and 
greenhouse gas 
emission 
National and 
subnational 
Global na Ambio 
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Appendix Table C2: Tracing changes in socioeconomic outcomes over time 
 
Census-based 
indicator 
Digital number 
(total) 
Digital number 
(mean) 
Share of pop. in 
lit pixels 
Share of lit pixels 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a. Change in electrification (1996-2011) 
    
Census: share of hhs with access to electricity 1.00 
    Digital number (total) 0.08 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) 0.11 0.20 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels 0.12 0.11 0.18 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels 0.18 0.10 0.28 0.64 1.00 
b. Change in income (1996-2011) 
    
Census: share of hhs with average income 1.00 
    Digital number (total) 0.10 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) 0.01 0.20 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels 0.04 0.11 0.18 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels 0.08 0.10 0.28 0.64 1.00 
c.  Change in education (1996-2011)  
    Census: share of pop. without any schooling 1.00 
    Digital number (total) 0.11 1.00 
   Digital number (mean) 0.03 0.20 1.00 
  Share of population in lit pixels 0.04 0.11 0.18 1.00 
 Share of lit pixels 0.06 0.10 0.28 0.64 1.00 
Note: Figures calculated for South Africa's municipalities in 2011 and 1996, using South African census data and nighttime light images acquired with 
satellites F15 and F18. The total and average digital numbers are greyed out because of comparability concerns over time due to sensor sensitivity. 
 
